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RECRUITS TO LABOUR

The British Labour Party, 1914–1931



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The British Labour Party
1914-1931

Catherine Ann Cline

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For My Parents



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CATHERINE ANN CLINE

New York City
January, 1963



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Introduction

AS THE extent of the Liberal landslide in the election of 1906 became clear, A. J. Balfour, the Conservative leader, penned this analysis in a letter to the King's private secretary.

We have here to do with something much more important than the swing of the pendulum or all the squabbles about Free Trade and Fiscal Reform. We are face to face (no doubt in a milder form) with the Socialistic difficulties which loom so large on the Continent. Unless I am greatly mistaken, the election of 1906 inaugurates a new era.¹

Whether Balfour was simply refusing pettishly to admit the importance of the great Liberal victory, or whether he had, in fact, discerned some of the forces which were to alter so radically the political complexion of twentieth-century England, his statement was indeed prophetic. Within two decades the triumphant Liberals were to decline to the position of a third party, and their role as one of Britain's major political forces was to be assumed by the Labour party which in 1906 was making its first appearance on the political scene.

The party which emerged with the election of twenty-nine Labour members to the House of Commons in 1906 was the result of the efforts of men like Keir Hardie, at

once a socialist and a trade-unionist, who had long advocated a party independent of Liberals and Conservatives and committed to the interests of the working class. In 1900 a conference of the representatives of the Trades Union Congress and the socialist societies had established the Labour Representation Committee with the object of electing candidates who would cooperate on labour questions in the House of Commons. The court decision in the Taff-Vale case, which jeopardized the workers' right to strike, and the disappointing record of the Conservative government in the area of social legislation served to increase the appeal of independent Labour candidates to the working class voter in the years between 1901 and 1906. The resulting strength displayed by Labour candidates in the election transformed the Labour Representation Committee into a full-fledged Labour party.

This newly formed party confined its appeal and its interests largely to the workers. No attempt was made to recruit members outside the affiliated trades unions and socialist societies; indeed there was no provision in its federated structure for individual members. An effort was made, on the other hand, to attract non-socialist trades-unionists by avoiding an official commitment to socialism and confining the objectives of the party to the passage of social legislation beneficial to the worker. Questions of foreign² or domestic policy which had no immediate bearing on the situation of the British worker were regarded as distractions from the main business of the party and were thus ignored or dealt with hastily at party conferences.

This narrowly working class party had, however, failed to win the complete support of the workers themselves in 1906, and the prospects for doing so were somewhat discouraging. There were in the House of Commons, in

addition to the members of the new Labour party, twenty-one "Lib-Labs," working class representatives sponsored by their trades unions who remained members of the Liberal party. During the previous twenty years, the movement for an independent Labour party had gained strength only at those times when the old parties, distracted by Irish and South African affairs, ignored the demands of the trades unions,³ and it was most unlikely that the new Liberal government which included such astute politicians as David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill would repeat this mistake. The moderate program of social reform which the government might be expected to pursue seemed likely, by responding to labour demands, to stifle any further growth of the independent party of the working class.

Not only did the Labour party at its inception fail to include many of the important trades unions, but it had less than unanimous support from the other element in the alliance, the socialist societies. Of the three socialist groups then in existence only one, the Independent Labour party, directed its efforts wholeheartedly toward the promotion of the Labour party. Much of the impetus for the formation of a party which would unite the trades unions and the socialist societies had come from this group which hoped thus to work for the improvement of the lot of the workers as well as their conversion to socialism. The small but influential Fabian Society gave only formal and grudging support to the Labour party during the prewar years. (On the relationship of the Fabians to the Labour party during this period see below, pp. 25-28.) The Social Democratic Federation, the only truly Marxist group in England, was unaffiliated, having withdrawn from the Labour Representation Committee in 1901 when the committee refused to allow its candidates to be listed "Socialist" on the ballot.

On the eve of World War I the Labour party was an even less formidable political force than it had been at its inception eight years earlier. True, the Lib-Labs had disappeared, and the trades unions now confined their endorsements to Labour candidates which resulted in an increase in Labour membership in the House of Commons. True, legislation beneficial to working class interests concerning the legal status of trades unions, workmen's compensation, and old age pensions had gained passage, partly at least as a result of the Labour party's activities. Yet the reduction of the Liberal majority in the House of Commons after 1910, while appearing to place the Labour party in a more decisive role, served in fact to impair its freedom of action. The Labour party was capable of turning out the Liberal government, but faced with the bleak alternative of a Conservative government, Labour leaders were forced to help maintain the Liberals in office. Political exigencies began to destroy what had been the chief appeal of the Labour party, its independence. As the party was still not officially socialist, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish Labour policies from those of progressive Liberals, and criticism within Labour's ranks began to mount.⁴

Not only the achievements of the Labour party, but the whole strategy of political action as a means of improving working class conditions was under attack during the years preceding the war. The Osborne judgment of 1909, which made trades-union contributions to political funds illegal, created difficulties until the Trades Union Act of 1913 restored the right. Meanwhile, syndicalism with its reliance on direct action, *i.e.*, the general strike as the most effective weapon of the working class, made great strides among the trades unions, and by 1914 a paralyzing strike of the Triple Alliance of Miners, Transport Workers and Railwaymen was a likely pros-

pect. This movement posed serious problems for the Liberal government, but it was most menacing to the Labour party, for it threatened a clash between its leaders in Parliament and the trades unions which were its chief support.⁵

The outbreak of the war appeared at first simply to increase the already considerable tensions within the Labour party, for there were within its ranks both advocates and opponents of England's participation. In fact, however, the war marked the beginning of the rise in the Labour party's fortunes. The virtual renunciation of the strike weapon by the trades unions eliminated, for a time at least, the syndicalist threat, and, by the end of the war, the influx of recruits from the old parties had already begun.

It is the purpose of this study to examine the reasons for the Labour party's rapid growth in the years immediately following the war. Since this shift had no single leader as did Joseph Chamberlain's Liberal-Unionist secession from the Liberal party in 1886, and since the average voter leaves no record of the reasons for his actions, a group of about seventy prominent recruits has formed the basis of this study. A large proportion of this group were members of Parliament, but other noted recruits who were articulate about the reasons for their change of political allegiance have been considered as well. A few young men who entered the Labour party directly after the university, and who were not, therefore, technically converts have been included because their Liberal or Conservative family backgrounds seemed to associate them with this group.

The vast majority of the recruits to the Labour party during this period were converts from the Liberal party. Indeed, of the seventy considered, only two appear to have had an official connection with the Conservatives.⁶

Prominent Conservative families provided, in addition, a few of those younger recruits who had had no previous party affiliation.⁷

An attempt has been made also to trace the converts' impact on the Labour party's development during the decade following their entrance into the party. These were the years which witnessed Labour's first sudden assumption of office as well as the disastrous split in the party's leadership which so weakened it during the decade of the 1930's. As Labour became a national party, it was forced to work out policies in fields such as foreign affairs hitherto ignored in its single-minded concentration on domestic social reform. What was the role played by the new members in the formation of these policies and in the internal dissensions which led to the defection of Ramsay MacDonald, the party's leader, in 1931?

The question of the extent of the converts' influence is interesting in view of the fact that they represented in terms of background and education a class almost totally new to the Labour party. They were, for the most part, from the upper or upper-middle classes, products of the public schools, Oxford or Cambridge, members of professions or gentlemen whose careers had been entirely in politics as is common in that stratum of English society. Since the only method of joining the Labour party before 1918 was to become a member of one of its affiliated groups, and since non-workers were ineligible for trades-union membership, Labourites of the upper classes were to be found before the war only in the numerically weak I.L.P. Even here, the membership was confined almost entirely to the working class, or to such lower-middle class leaders as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden, and men of university background such as Clement Attlee were rarities.

The social gulf which yawned between the old leaders

of the Labour party and the prominent recruits distinguishes this shift of political allegiance from earlier instances. The careers of Gladstone and Winston Churchill attest to the fact that a change of party seldom results in any serious loss of influence in English politics. The converts to Labour were not, however, simply shifting from one section of the traditional governing class to another; they were entering a radically different milieu. True, the Labour Party Constitution of 1918 appealed to "producers by hand or by brain" and, by establishing constituency parties, facilitated the entrance of middle and upper-class members into the party. It was true also that far from resenting the educated and the well-born, working class voters had often seemed to favor them as candidates of the old parties. There was no guarantee, however, that they would welcome middle and upper class leadership within the citadel of Labour.

The extent of the middle and upper class accessions to the Labour party is suggested by R. H. Tawney's observation in 1932, "If variety of educational experience and economic condition among its active supporters be the test, it [the Labour party] is . . . less of a class party than any other British party."⁸ The causes and consequences of this transformation of the working class party of 1914 into the national party of 1932 form a significant chapter in the history of modern British politics.

I

The Break with the Liberal Party, 1914-1918

THE crucial importance of the period from 1914 to 1918 in Labour party history lies not only in the conversion of Liberals of pacifist, internationalist sentiment to the Labour party, but also in the conversion of the Labour party itself away from its enthusiastic support of the war to an internationalist and quasi-pacifist policy. Both conversions were considerably advanced by the activities of the various Liberal-Labour organizations which sprang up during the war; these groups introduced many Liberals to the Labour party and, by their propaganda, influenced the stand of the Labour party on questions of foreign policy.

The full support of the war accorded by the Labour party throughout the years 1914-1917 was no more attractive to pacifist Liberals than the policy of their own party. The somewhat vague antiwar policy of its prewar years had been abandoned by the official Labour party during the first days of the conflict. Labour M.P.'s assisted in recruiting campaigns and, by its participation in the first and second coalitions, Labour shared responsibility for the direction of the war. It is true that the day after the declaration of war the Labour party executive had passed a resolution highly critical of Grey's diplomacy which called for peace "at the earliest possible moment,"

but MacDonald's proposal to read this statement in the House of Commons was voted down by the Parliamentary Labour party. MacDonald resigned his chairmanship, and at the Labour party conferences of the next few years resolutions hinting at the desirability of an early peace were shelved or rejected.¹

Despite the fact that the war spirit captured both the Labour party and its strongest federated organization, the Trades Union Congress, there existed within the Labour party what was perhaps the most effective antiwar organization in the nation, the Independent Labour party. This group had long constituted the radical socialist wing of the Labour movement, and its members were accustomed to a position of nonconformity. Clinging to its ideal of the international solidarity of the working class, the I.L.P. denounced the war as "an appalling crime" forced on the nations by "the rulers, the diplomats, the militarists."² "Workers of Great Britain," thundered the *Labour Leader*, the I.L.P. organ, "you have no quarrel with the workers of Europe. They have no quarrel with you."³ The workers of Great Britain were, however, as warlike as the rest of the nation, and about ten thousand working class members (or one-third of its membership) left the I.L.P. in the first months of the conflict.⁴

Paradoxically, the class-conscious pacifism of the I.L.P. proved more attractive to the middle class than to the workers to whom it was directed. This may be explained by the fact that the I.L.P., with the advantages of a well-developed organization, was recognized by members of newly formed pacifist groups—however different the inspiration of their pacifism—as one of their most potent allies.

Though at first glance it would appear to be a divisive factor, the presence of this organized antiwar group within the Labour party proved eventually to be an asset. There

were probably as many Liberal as Labour pacifists, yet there was no organized group within the Liberal party to which they might attach themselves, and this constitutes one of the most important explanations for their eventual defection. It will be seen, however, that the bitterness of the pacifist attack on prewar diplomacy (which was, of course, Liberal diplomacy) would have made the existence of such a group within the Liberal party a virtual impossibility even if it had possessed the Labour party's loose federal structure.

Alienated from their own party and unconverted as yet to the socialist ideology of the I.L.P., Liberal pacifists indulged in a frenzy of organization during the first year of the war in an attempt to overcome their political rootlessness. The Union of Democratic Control, the No-Conscription Fellowship, the Bryce Group, and the Society for the League of Nations were the products of this period. These groups not only performed their stated function of political education, but also served to eliminate the loneliness felt by so many pacifists in the first weeks of the war.⁵ Moreover, in drawing together the political nonconformists of the war years, these groups provided an opportunity for contacts between Liberals and members of the I.L.P. which were probably an important encouragement to some in their eventual entrance into the Labour party.⁶ (Since the number of Conservatives who belonged to these groups was negligible, non-Labour party members will be referred to throughout this chapter as Liberals.)

The best known of these Liberal-Labour organizations was the Union of Democratic Control, formed within two weeks of the outbreak of war. Its chairman was Ramsay MacDonald and its secretary was E. D. Morel, the crusading Liberal journalist whose exposé of atrocities in the Congo Free State a few years before had done much

to secure international action toward their elimination. The executive committee consisted of Norman Angell, a journalist whose popular book *The Great Illusion* (1910) had been a vain attempt to mobilize public opinion against the approaching conflict, and three M.P.'s—Philip Snowden of the I.L.P., the Liberal aristocrat Arthur Ponsonby, and Charles Trevelyan, whose pacifist sympathies led him to resign his post in the Liberal government at the outbreak of the war.

Membership in the U.D.C. did not imply adherence to any one of the various shades of pacifist opinion nor indeed to pacifism at all. Arthur Ponsonby considered all war immoral while Norman Angell considered it irrational. Another member, Bertrand Russell, held that while some wars might be justified by their possible consequences (as in the case of the American Civil War), no worthwhile issue was then at stake. Morel based his opposition on causes rather than consequences, maintaining that England's guilt was at least equal to Germany's. Some members of the U.D.C., however, not only supported the war but actively participated in it. H. B. Lees-Smith, a university professor and Liberal M.P., served at the front as a corporal, and William Arnold-Forster, of a family whose members were politically prominent in both Liberal and Conservative governments, served as a lieutenant commander in the navy and helped to direct the blockade of Germany.

Though differing in their attitude toward the war, the members of the U.D.C. agreed that secret diplomacy had been one of its most important causes. They pointed out that not even the cabinet, to say nothing of the British public, had approved Grey's commitments to France which had eventually involved England in war. The original purpose of the organization, therefore, was to agitate for machinery which would secure democratic control of

foreign policy in the future and thus insure that the nation would never again find itself involuntarily committed to war. They argued that there was nothing "occult" about foreign policy⁷ and that since the problems involved were more often moral than intellectual they were more proper material for democratic decision than many domestic issues. The position of the U.D.C. was well expressed by one of its sympathizers:

There is no magic means of conjuring war. The passions, the cupidities, possibly even the convictions of nations may provoke it in the future, as they have done in the past. But at least it should be possible to secure that, if there is to be a war, it should be the people themselves that choose it with their eyes open; and that, if a whole generation of young men is to be destroyed, at least they should see the catastrophe coming and be able to affirm with full knowledge that so it had to be and that to them no choice was given.⁸

It is indeed curious to observe this small group which was regarded with utter contempt by the mass of the British people stoutly maintaining its faith in the judgment of public opinion.

Having agreed on the desirability of democratic control of foreign policy, the members of the U.D.C. had difficulty in settling on the machinery by which it should be implemented. The American system, which accorded small importance to an expert diplomatic service and a large measure of control to the Senate, influenced their thinking considerably. They demanded that all treaties and commitments be ratified by the House of Commons, but how other foreign policy decisions could be subjected to parliamentary control posed a problem. Secrecy was the very thing they wished to eliminate, yet the more cautious spirits recognized that a certain amount of secrecy

was necessary for the conduct of foreign policy. It was recognized also that to meet this objection by placing the conduct of foreign affairs under a joint committee of both parties would destroy responsible government.⁹

The difficulties involved in the achievement of a democratic control of foreign policy probably account for the diversion of the activities of the U.D.C. into other fields.¹⁰ Its members were active in the agitation for a negotiated peace¹¹ and much attention was devoted by them to the principles which they thought should govern international relations in the postwar world. The international council which they suggested shows the influence of the pacifists, for its purpose was to be arbitration, and no mention was made of sanctions should arbitration fail. The pacifists were probably also responsible for the U.D.C.'s proposal that disarmament should be made part of the peace settlement. The U.D.C. held further that no territory should be transferred without a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. Another principle on which they based their hopes for a peaceful and prosperous world was that old article of the Liberal faith—free trade.

Members of the U.D.C. were also active in the agitation against conscription, but the focus of this movement was another organization, the No-Conscription Fellowship, founded by Fenner Brockway of the I.L.P. in November, 1914. The original purpose of the group was to oppose enactment of compulsory military service. When conscription was finally adopted in 1916 the activities of the group shifted to aiding conscientious objectors and their families.

Membership in the No-Conscription Fellowship was limited to those who were eligible for military service, but the large body of public opinion hostile to conscription provided it with many additional supporters and sympathizers. The Military Service Bill had met with firm

opposition in the House of Commons from a group of Liberals disturbed by its interference with individual liberty, and Sir John Simon resigned from the cabinet in protest against it. The Society of Friends, whose members considered the taking of human life immoral under any circumstances, gave their support to the activities of the fellowship. A considerable number of "cranks, eccentrics, political rebels, fanatical Nonconformists and hard-bitten individualists"¹² were attracted to the organization which of all the antiwar groups seemed to provide the most effective obstruction to the war effort. Many members of the U.D.C. were also members of the No-Conscription Fellowship; Bertrand Russell served as its president for a time until he was imprisoned for a supposedly subversive pamphlet published by the N.C.F. Relations between the No-Conscription Fellowship and the I.L.P. were very close. Both its founder, Brockway, and its first president, Clifford Allen, were I.L.P. members. N.C.F. pamphlets, spurned by many printers, were published by the I.L.P.'s Labour Press.

The members of this heterogeneous group shared many important experiences throughout the war. Their memoirs describe their feeling of being an elect, a morally sensitive minority, surrounded by hostile warmongers.¹³ When the N.C.F. came under police surveillance there was the comradeship of conspirators, and for some thirteen hundred who refused alternative service there were dreary months and years in prison. Friendships and loyalties sprang up among Liberals, anarchists, and socialists who would not otherwise have known each other.

While the U.D.C. protested the manner of England's involvement in the war and the N.C.F. resisted its demands on individual citizens, the Bryce Group and the League of Nations Society directed their efforts toward obtaining an international organization in the postwar

period. Many of their members were also members of the Union of Democratic Control and the No-Conscription Fellowship, and the majority were doubtless in sympathy with their aims. Cut off by their own convictions from participation in the national endeavor, they felt compelled to spend themselves for some cause. Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, the founder of the Bryce Group and a member of the League of Nations Society, admitted, "I myself always knew that I was engaged on a forlorn hope, but saw nothing else on which I could engage with conviction." ¹⁴

The Bryce Group, so called because Lord Bryce attended some of the meetings, was started by Lowes Dickinson, the Cambridge don, during the first weeks of the war. Its purpose was research and study of the problems of international organization, and the Bryce Report which it produced in 1915 was the basis for discussion during the next few years among those interested in such an organization. It suggested a union in which member nations would bind themselves by treaty to submit disputes to arbitration. It provided for sanctions, economic and forcible, against both signatory and nonsignatory powers, to insure submission of disputes to arbitration, but there were to be no sanctions to force acceptance of the award. ¹⁵ There was some dissatisfaction with the report among the members of the group itself. Ponsonby, for example, objected to the use of force under any circumstances. ¹⁶ Hobson, the economist, maintained that only an organization which had the power to eliminate the worst inequalities in economic resources among nations could prevent war, and he advocated a strong federation in which a considerable amount of the sovereignty of member nations would be surrendered in order to deal with the problem. It will be seen later that the League of Nations Society, while it did not approach Hobson's federation in its rec-

ommendations, went beyond the suggestions of the Bryce Report.¹⁷

For such a small body, the Bryce Group proved to be extremely influential. In 1915 it joined with the Fabian Research Committee which was to have an important part in determining the peace policy of the Labour party. Its contacts reached across the Atlantic where it provided considerable encouragement to the League to Enforce Peace, a group which is believed to have influenced President Wilson.¹⁸ It was an important influence in shaping the Covenant of the League, certain clauses of which were taken directly from its proposals.¹⁹

While the Bryce Group devoted itself primarily to the study of the possible forms which an international organization might assume, the League of Nations Society concentrated its efforts on propaganda in favor of such an organization. This group, consisting largely of pacifists, was founded in 1915 and grew to a membership of several thousand.²⁰ Its founders were the Liberals Lord Courtney and W. H. Dickinson, and the Conservative Lord Parmoor. Dickinson and several other members were also members of the Bryce Group.

This group should be distinguished from the League of Free Nations Association with which it eventually merged. This latter group was formed in 1917 after Wilson's pronouncements had made support of a league respectable. Its members were all energetic supporters of the war, and few if any of them ever entered the Labour party. This group advocated creation of a provisional league among the allied nations during the war while the League of Nations Society opposed such a policy fearing that it would mean the permanent exclusion of Germany.²¹ The proposals of the League of Nations Society differed also from those of the Bryce Group in that the former recommended that the proposed league have the

powers to impose sanctions to enforce arbitration awards as well as to force the submission of disputes to arbitration as the Bryce Group had suggested.

The last of the Liberal-Labour organizations to come into existence during the war years was the 1917 Club. It differed from the other groups mentioned in that its purpose was primarily social, and it professed no serious educational or propagandist aims. The inspiration for its formation, however, had been the first Russian revolution, and its members were all interested, as Bertrand Russell phrased it, in "an early and dishonourable peace"²² and opposed to Lloyd George's "knock-out blow." Its membership was drawn from all the other Liberal-Labour organizations. J. A. Hobson, a member both of the U.D.C. and of the Bryce Group, was one of its founders, and MacDonald, Trevelyan, Morel, Ponsonby, and Russell were members. Some, like Oswald Mosley, had been unattached to any of the other groups, and a few, like H. G. Wells, had even supported the war.

The 1917 Club is important for several reasons. It provided the opportunity, as did all the Liberal-Labour groups, for contacts between Liberals and members of the I.L.P. The inclusion of some persons who had enthusiastically supported the war signaled the end of the extreme isolation in which the pacifists had existed during the previous three years. The very existence of the club was, furthermore, a manifestation of the growing sentiment in the country for a peace-by-negotiation, a sentiment extending from Lord Lansdowne, the Unionist ex-Prime Minister, to the Peace Negotiations Committee formed by left-wing socialist groups.

One important result of the movement for a negotiated peace was that it united the I.L.P. and trades-union wing of the Labour party, hitherto violently opposed in their attitudes toward the war. The adoption by the Labour

party of the War Aims Memorandum in December, 1917, signalized not only the growing war-weariness and disillusionment of the trades-union section of the Labour party, but its conversion to the positive peace program for which the I.L.P., the Union of Democratic Control, the Bryce Group, and the League of Nations Society had worked throughout the war.

When Philip Snowden of the I.L.P. argued in the House of Commons in February, 1916, for a statement of specific peace terms on the part of the Allies, the trades-unionist M.P. Stephen Walsh quite accurately pointed out that the vast majority of Labour party members were opposed to such a move. What was it which caused the Labour party less than two years later to publish a detailed and, from the point of view of Germany, moderate statement of its war aims with the declaration that the struggle should not "be prolonged for a single day, once the conditions of a permanent peace can be secured"? ²³

The weariness and suffering of two more years of war are an obvious factor. Furthermore, the trades-unionists were beginning to feel that they were making a somewhat greater sacrifice than that required of other groups in the nation. In a burst of patriotism they had suspended use of the strike weapon and had agreed to "dilution," *i.e.*, the use of unskilled workers where union rules would ordinarily require skilled men. There was a widespread feeling that hard-won trades-union standards were being permanently jeopardized while the limit on profits which the government had promised was poorly enforced. The adoption of conscription had further irritated trades-unionists. They had always opposed it, fearing that it might be used as in France to defeat strikes. The Labour party had reluctantly acquiesced in the conscription of single men in December, 1915, with the understanding

that it would not be extended to married men—a promise which was broken within a few months.

It was this atmosphere of growing dissatisfaction which dominated the British Labour movement when the Russian revolution initiated a series of events which were to disillusion the workers of England still further. The immediate result of the March Revolution was to increase enthusiasm for the war in Labour circles which had always disliked the alliance with the czar and were delighted to replace him with a truly democratic ally. Kerensky, the head of the new Russian government, called for a peace “without annexations or indemnities,” and a conference of allied Socialists was called in Stockholm to draw up a statement of war aims. It now seems fairly well established that Lloyd George encouraged Arthur Henderson, the Labour party leader and Minister of Labour, to go to Russia to investigate the desirability of British Labour’s participation in the Stockholm Conference. On Henderson’s return, however, Lloyd George suddenly reversed his stand on the matter—possibly because he saw an opportunity to make peace with Germany at Russia’s expense—and realized that it would be best if British Labour were not publicly committed to a more idealistic peace settlement.²⁴ Henderson, however, had become convinced of the desirability of such a conference, and continued to urge the Labour party’s participation. In the ensuing controversy, Henderson resigned from the cabinet after having been very shabbily treated by Lloyd George and his colleagues. The incident had created the impression that the government was unwilling to have possible peace terms discussed. Though Labour remained in the coalition, Arthur Henderson, one of the most powerful and respected trades-unionists in the country, had lost all faith in the purity of the government’s intentions,

and his was perhaps the decisive influence in bringing the Labour party to its statement of December, 1917.

The final impetus to the adoption of the memorandum by the Labour party was the publication by the Bolsheviks in December of the secret treaties found in the Russian foreign office. They proved conclusively that the democratic ideals with which the people had been inspired were not the only issues at stake in the war, but that the Allied governments were cynically pursuing their own aggrandizement. Liberals and Labour party members alike were shocked, but the Labour party was in a position to protest officially while the Liberals, with Lloyd George at the head of the coalition, were not.²⁵

The product of these various dissatisfactions and disillusionments was the "Memorandum on War Aims" adopted by a special conference of the Labour movement on December 28, 1917. It states firmly that it "has no sympathy with the attempts made, now in this quarter, now in that, to convert the War into a War of Conquest." "Whatever may have been the objects for which the War was begun," it remarks significantly, "the fundamental purpose of the British Labour Movement in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for Democracy." The type of peace which it recommended as most likely to do this bears a striking similarity to that advocated in the pamphlets of the various Liberal-Labour groups. It depended, the memorandum maintained, "on the suppression of secret diplomacy and on the placing of foreign policy, just as much as home policy, under the control of popularly elected Legislatures; on the absolute responsibility of the Foreign Minister of each country to its Legislature." The peace treaty should provide both for "the common limitation of costly armaments" and a "Super-National Authority, or League of Nations." All nations should be

pressed to join this body and member states would use "every means at their disposal" to enforce its authority.

The influence of the Liberal-Labour groups was equally great in the section dealing with territorial adjustments. In complete agreement with the principle laid down by the U.D.C., the memorandum declared that not even Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France without a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. The sections on the Balkans and Italy seem to be based on the recommendations made by the two Liberal pacifists Noel Buxton and Charles Roden Buxton in their work, *The War and the Balkans* (1915). It recommended, as did the Buxtons, that nations independent of Turkish and Austrian influence be established in the Balkans and that they be united politically in a federation and economically in a customs union. It followed the opinion of the Buxtons also in denying that Italy had any right to expand in the Balkans. The memorandum adopted the plan for Central Africa outlined by Morel in his book *Africa and the Peace of Europe* (1917) in suggesting the pooling of all European possessions between the Sahara and the Zambesi River into one unit to be administered by the League of Nations.

In observing the extent to which the Labour party adopted the program of the Liberal-Labour groups, it is not meant to imply that their propaganda alone could have moved the Labour party to the statement of December, 1917. It is significant, however, that when the Labour party became disillusioned with the war for other reasons, it was to the program of the Liberal-Labour groups that it turned.

The Labour party had adopted the foreign policy of the antiwar group. To what extent did the authors follow their program into the Labour party? It is clear that these organizations provided a significant number of the re-

cruits of the postwar period. Among those converts who formed the basis of this study, almost half were active members of one or more of the various pacifist or internationalist groups during the war. (See Appendix.)

The influx into the Labour party of the members of the antiwar groups did not, however, occur immediately. Full information is available on twenty persons prominent in the various Liberal-Labour groups who eventually joined the Labour party. Of these, thirteen had severed their former party connections by the time of the 1918 election. At that time, however, only eight had actually become members of the Labour party, while all but three of the twenty had joined by 1920.²⁶ This chronology suggests that there was a lingering hope on the part of these Liberals and Conservatives that when peace had been concluded they might return to their old party allegiance. Had the peace program of the Labour party-pacifist alliance met with reasonable success, this might well have occurred. It was their complete failure to influence the policy of the coalition at Versailles which separated the Liberal and Conservative pacifists irrevocably from their old parties.

It was only natural that these men should hesitate to leave the parties to which they and their families had traditionally been attached in order to enter a party dominated by trades-unionists and socialists. Despite the Labour party's eventual adoption of their peace program, the pacifists were disappointed throughout the war with the warlike behavior of the working class. "I'm afraid our working class is the most ignorant and stupid in Europe, at any rate where foreign affairs are concerned," Lowes Dickinson remarked, and it was foreign affairs in which he and the other pacifists were interested.

Furthermore, to join the Labour party meant to commit oneself to a domestic program for which the Liberal

pacifists seem to have felt no particular enthusiasm at the time. They were, however, the type of crusaders and idealists of which good socialists are made, and the unsettling experience of the war plus the close contact with members of the I.L.P. were certain to have an effect. Beatrice Webb had written sarcastically of the pacifism of her brother-in-law Lord Parmoor which she was convinced sprang from a concern for the war's effect on property. In 1919, however, she remarked in some surprise, "During the war Parmoor has developed into a political idealist. Whatever may have been his reasons for being against the war at the beginning, the horrors of it, and the revengeful spirit of the peace, have turned him into something very like an International Socialist. So does evil company corrupt good manners! . . . 'I really do not know where I stand in all economic questions' he said to me the other day; 'all I know is that I disagree fundamentally with all those with whom I used to act in the House of Commons.' " ²⁷

Feelings similar to those of Lord Parmoor were doubtless experienced by the Liberal pacifists. The war had estranged them from their own party and had exposed them to new experiences and new contacts. The realignments of the war years had brought the Liberal pacifists to an alliance with the Labour party; the disillusionment of the peace was to bring them within its ranks.

II

The Recruits and Socialism

BRITISH conservatives, observing the remarkable growth of the Labour party in the early years of the post-war era, must have recalled with concern the prophecy of Karl Marx:

In times when the class struggle is nearing the decisive hour . . . a portion of the middle class ideologists, those who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole, joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands.¹

That the middle class provided a substantial portion of the recruits of this period is apparent. The question arises, however, as to how large a proportion of these would be regarded by Marx or even the less orthodox British socialists as "ideologists" who "had raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole." How important was socialist theory in attracting new members to the Labour party? More significant still, how many of those who were attracted primarily by the Labour party's stand on other issues, such as foreign policy, may be described as converts to socialism?

Until 1918 the socialist movement in England had not been closely identified with the Labour party. Though

some of the resolutions adopted at Labour party conferences had called for the nationalization of this or that industry, the ultimate socialist aim of an economy where "the means of production, distribution and exchange" were state controlled had never been voiced.

Likewise, a considerable number of the most prominent and enthusiastic socialists were either independent of the Labour party or only loosely affiliated with it. It has been noted that though the number of socialists at prewar Oxford was large, most of them became members of the old parties on leaving the university.² The British Socialist party, an offshoot of Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation, had no connection with the Labour party. Though the Fabian Society was represented on the Labour party executive from its inception, the society's official historian records that it "did not greatly concern itself with the Labour Party."³ The Fabian Society continued to attract members of all parties, and Fabians standing for parliament in the years before the war were frequently Liberals and occasionally Conservatives.⁴

The relationship of the Fabians with the Labour party which developed from one of aloofness during the prewar period to a complete integration in the postwar years, was greatly influenced by two of the most eminent Fabians, Sidney and Beatrice Webb. As early as 1893 Webb had noted the limitations of the Fabian Society's original policy of the permeation of all parties. In a manifesto, "To Your Tents, Oh Israel!" authored jointly by Webb and George Bernard Shaw, the attempt to influence the Liberal government was accounted a failure, and the necessity for the formation of an independent labour party was clearly recognized.⁵ Yet when the Labour Representation Committee was established in 1900, followed by the formation of an independent labour party in 1906, Webb regarded the project as distinctly unpromising.⁶ He

continued to direct his energies toward influencing the Liberal government at the national level. Meanwhile on the London County Council he welded together a coalition of Liberal and Labour members called "Progressives," who worked with considerable success toward the realization of the "gas and water Socialism" with which his name is associated. From 1909 to 1912 both of the Webbs were engrossed in the campaign for the reform of the Poor Law. A definite attempt was made by them to keep this effort nonpartisan, which provided an additional motive for continued dissociation from the Labour party.⁷

The failure of the Poor Law agitation was regarded by the Webbs as discouraging proof that the policy of permeation had no hope of success.⁸ It has been suggested that it was not the policy itself but their conduct of it which was at fault.⁹ They had, through Haldane, become closely attached to the Rosebery group of "Liberal Imperialists" before the turn of the century. It was through such men as Haldane, Grey, and Asquith that they attempted to influence Liberal policy; the "Radicals" of the Lloyd George variety, however, were perhaps more natural allies—in the sense at least that their followers represented the more progressive wing of the party. Whether or not their failure was inevitable, it was undoubtedly a crucial factor in their eventual decision to put all of their energies into the Labour party.

Yet the attempts on the part of the Webbs to work through the Labour party seemed equally doomed to failure. Beatrice Webb's diaries for the period from 1912 to 1914 are filled with uncomplimentary references to the "reactionary" trades-unionists who dominated Labour policy and with yearning backward glances at the policy of permeation. In July, 1913, she was prepared to admit defeat. "Our attempt to connect up with the Labour Party

in the House of Commons has failed," she observed sadly.¹⁰

It was the war which was finally responsible for the integration of the Webbs into the Labour party. At the outbreak of the war, the War Emergency Workers' National Committee was formed with the object of protecting the interests of the working classes against the economic dislocations of war. All sections of the labour and socialist movement, both within and without the Labour party, were represented, and Webb, who represented the Fabian Society, was given his first opportunity to work closely with the Labour party. The Independent Labour party, the socialist group which had hitherto provided intellectual leadership for the Labour party, was somewhat in disgrace because of its pacifist policy, and Webb had increasing influence in the determination of Labour party policy.¹¹ By 1916 he was a member of the Labour party executive. By 1918 he had drafted the new Labour Party Constitution in collaboration with the trade-unionist, Arthur Henderson.

With the adoption of the new constitution in 1918, the Labour party was transformed into an officially socialist party. One of its clearly stated objectives was as follows:

To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service.

Labour and the New Social Order, a party manifesto produced by Webb, spelled out a comprehensive program of nationalization, municipalization, and state control calculated to destroy "the individualist system of capitalist production." The socialism thus adopted was not identi-

cal with that preached by Webb in the prewar period, for it called for a considerable amount of worker control, an obvious concession to the syndicalism or more moderate guild socialism which had gained strength in the second decade of the century. Yet the aim was essentially that of Sidney Webb's state socialism, in which the worker was to be set free, but free to work "for the service of the community, and of the community only."¹²

Labour's adoption of a socialist program can not be wholly attributed to Webb's influence. The I.L.P. wing of the party had been socialist from the beginning, and the trades-unionists, like many others in Britain, were doubtless impressed by their experience with the government's direction of industry during the war. The increasingly important role assumed by Webb in Labour party councils was, however, an additional factor in moving the party toward an explicit acceptance of socialism.

The definite commitment of the Labour party to socialism occurred at a moment when it would be most likely to attract those socialists who had remained in the old parties. The war had produced a collectivist economy in Britain. Not only did the government control prices, wages, and standards of quality in all important industries, but it had itself become the largest manufacturer and almost the sole importer in the nation.¹³ As Sir Leo Chiozza Money, a Fabian and Liberal M.P., remarked, England had "won through the unprecedented economic difficulties of the greatest war of history by methods which it had despised. National organization triumphed in a land where it had been denied."¹⁴ It was, in the eyes of the socialists, an unhopd for advance, and one which must be maintained. Yet the legislation on which these activities were based was to terminate shortly after the war. Clearly no time was to be lost in a slow program of permeation.

Despite some rather warm statements from Lloyd George and Winston Churchill regarding the lessons gained from the war concerning the value of state activity in economic life, the coalition proceeded rapidly toward decontrol. Within a week after the armistice, Money had resigned from his post in the Ministry of Shipping in protest against the decision to sell merchant ships constructed by the government to private firms.¹⁵ He explained:

When Mr. Lloyd George elected to sell out our national war property to the capitalists and to restore to private controls the trades which through private control nearly brought us to irretrievable disaster in the war, he took a stand which enabled many of us to decide which way to go. It is just as well that the issue should be made pellucidly clear. Labour stands for the national ownership of the nation. The others—it matters not what they are termed—stand for private control of the means of production, distribution, and exchange.¹⁶

By 1924, H. W. Massingham, a Fabian who had recently resigned as editor of the Liberal periodical, *The Nation*, was echoing Money's remarks:

The capitalist reaction of 1921 and 1922 makes a shabby chapter in the story of British statesmanship. And it can never be forgotten that its instrument, if not its author, was a Liberal Prime Minister. No such paradise as Mr. George's fancy built up . . . could, indeed, have arisen from the wreck of the war. But Mr. George proceeded to demolish the modest gains which that disaster had yielded to the work of social reconstruction. . . . The experiments in model industrial cities were allowed to go to waste, and the attempts to steady prices and stabilise production were aban-

done. The control bodies were dispersed; the large stores of State goods broken up, and the still richer stock of social and administrative experience thrown away.¹⁷

Years before, when Shaw and Webb called for an independent labour party, Massingham had resigned from the Fabian Society in protest.¹⁸ Yet this socialist, content for years to work gradually through the Liberal party, was unwilling to accept the "wastage" of the early postwar years.

The years from 1918 to 1922 may thus be said to mark the fusion of the Labour party and socialism in British political life. The issue of Labour and socialism versus the old parties and capitalism had been clarified both by the Labour party's official adoption of the socialist program and the coalition's zeal in dismantling government controls of economic life. The result was the abandonment by socialists during the early postwar period of the policy of permeation of the old parties. By 1924 all Fabians standing for parliament did so as Labour candidates. In 1918 the Labour party became socialist; in the next few years the socialists were to become Labour.

If one excludes those Fabians like the Webbs who had had no official Liberal or Conservative affiliation before 1914, the socialists constitute only a fraction of the recruits of the postwar period. They were, however, a distinguished group. The best known perhaps was H. G. Wells,¹⁹ author of one of the most popular pieces of prewar socialist literature. The one, however, whose contribution was most valuable to the Labour party was Sir Leo Chiozza Money. Money had already served the socialist cause before the war by his authorship of the much discussed *Riches and Poverty* (1905), in which he demonstrated statistically not only that private enter-

prise had created great inequities of wealth in England, but also that the national income under private enterprise was inadequate whatever the distribution. He became, between 1918 and 1923, the Labour party's most prolific propagandist in the cause of nationalization. Percy Alden, a Liberal M.P. who was both a pacifist and a Fabian, made a last despairing attempt to convert his old party to the "collectivist principle" before he too shifted to Labour.²⁰ Among the ex-Fabians who entered Labour's ranks, in addition to Massingham,²¹ was William Temple, later to become Archbishop of Canterbury.²²

If the Labour party now represented socialism in England, what of that larger group of Labour party recruits which had been untouched by socialist theory before the war? Were they converts to socialism as well as to the Labour party?

The most striking fact to be noted in relation to this question is how few of these previously nonsocialist recruits appeared interested in the issue of the control of industry. Of the seventy or more prominent persons who shifted their party allegiance to Labour during this period, only a handful commented at any length on the matter of nationalization. These recruits, so articulate on the problems of Kenya and India, so vociferous concerning the necessity of destroying secret diplomacy, initiating taxation of land values, and revising the Versailles treaty were almost silent on the central principle of their newly adopted party.

This is not to imply that there was any serious opposition to a socialist program among the new converts. Josiah Wedgwood and other proponents of a land values tax made it clear that they regarded capitalism as only a symptom of the more basic land problem and, therefore, as an unnecessary object of attack.²³ In general, however, though the references of the recruits to socialism were

infrequent and vague, they were seldom hostile. One letter explaining the reasons for a shift to Labour appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* over the signature "Victorian Liberal." Its author proved to be precisely that, for he declared himself hesitant concerning the wisdom of nationalization in many instances, but he declared himself to be attracted to the Labour party because it was "a party with a forward outlook, eager for the betterment of the condition of the people, and, above all, not subject to control by or for the wealthy exploiters of poor men's labour."²⁴ Another defined socialism as "a determination to put the interests of the people before the interests of property."²⁵ Still another regarded socialism as simply the old Liberal demand for "freedom of development."²⁶ Almost all declared themselves in favor of "a new order, economic as well as political,"²⁷ but specific proposals were left to the Fabians.

Among those Labour party recruits who were not socialists before the war were a few who would appear at first glance to have been fully converted to the official faith of their new party. Sir John Sankey, for example, penned a report on the coal industry which became the rallying point for the forces in favor of nationalization. Lloyd George's Minister of Reconstruction, Dr. Christopher Addison, joined Labour and produced a book entitled *Practical Socialism* (1926), and Oliver Baldwin, son of Stanley Baldwin, was the joint author of a work which recommended "collective ownership" as the solution of social ills.²⁸ Godfrey Elton, an Oxford don, attributed his conversion to the Labour party to the reading of Money's book *The Triumph of Nationalization* (1920), and to his own observation that "the principle of national control" was "almost a monopoly of the Labour Party."²⁹ Yet even in these instances, one hesitates to apply the term "Socialist."

The bitterest dispute over "the principle of national ownership" during the postwar period in England raged about the coal industry, and it was in this connection that the views of Sir John Sankey gained importance. In 1919, the miners, who in the period of government control during the war had achieved not only increases in wages but also their long-sought objective of bargaining on the national rather than the district level, demanded nationalization of the mines as well as an increase in wages and a reduction in hours, and Lloyd George averted a strike by appointing a royal commission to study the industry. Of the thirteen members, six were nominated or approved by the miners and six by the mine owners, leaving only the chairman, Sir John Sankey, supposedly impartial. Though a Conservative, Sankey was removed from politics by his position as a justice of the King's Bench, and had, in addition, a close knowledge of the coal industry deriving from his long residence in Wales where he had specialized in legal work connected with the Workman's Compensation Act.

In the preliminary report, the three employers who were not mine owners joined Sankey in the conclusion that even upon the evidence already given "the present system of ownership and working in the coal industry stands condemned, and some other system must be substituted for it, either nationalization or a method of unification. . . ." ³⁰ The miners, with the firm assurance from Bonar-Law that the government was "prepared to adopt the Report in the spirit as well as in the letter, and to take all necessary steps to carry out its recommendations without delay," ³¹ were induced to postpone their strike a second time and await the final report. At this last stage there was no majority report as the recommendations of the miners' representatives went somewhat beyond those of Sankey. On the fundamental question, however, a ma-

jority of the commission recommended with Sankey "that the principle of the State ownership of the coal mines be accepted."³² Trapped between his government's promise to the miners and a House of Commons which assured him publicly and privately that it would never pass nationalization legislation, Lloyd George finally declared in shocked tones that, of course, a decision of such importance could never rest with a royal commission. He then proceeded to introduce legislation embodying proposals for unification under private ownership recommended by only one of the members of the commission. The reaction among the miners was one of outrage. They were convinced, as one of their leaders thundered, that they had been "deceived, betrayed, duped."³³ Mr. Justice Sankey, on the other hand, became their hero. In the eyes of the miners, he had displayed the objectivity and sense of justice which the coalition leaders were so completely lacking. Though Sankey, maintaining his judicial aloofness, did not enter the ensuing controversy, it is not surprising that within a few years he had entered the party which had worked so energetically, though unsuccessfully, for the adoption of his proposals. Nor is it surprising that he renounced the Conservative party, some of whose members, angered by his recommendations, had subjected him to personal abuse.³⁴

An analysis of the report embodying these proposals, however, reveals little enthusiasm on Sankey's part for the general principle of national ownership which he so strongly recommends in the case of the coal mines. Throughout the report, the uniqueness of the coal industry, both in its importance and in its condition, was continually stressed. It was, according to Sankey, by far the most basic industry in England, and was for that reason invested with an unusual national interest.³⁵ The waste and inefficiency of its current organization, and the tensions between employers and employees were declared

so uncommonly bad that the usual arguments against nationalization had no relevance.

It is true that in the minds of many men there is a fear that State ownership may stifle incentive, but today we are faced in the coalfields with increasing industrial unrest and a constant strife between modern labour and modern capital. I think that the danger to be apprehended from the certainty of the continuance of this strife in the coal mining industry outweighs the danger arising from the problematical fear of the risk of the loss of incentive.³⁶

When, eleven years later in the House of Lords, Sankey made his only subsequent public remarks on nationalization, it was once again on this argument that he based his appeal. "There are a few who say: 'Leave it alone. Leave the trade to itself.' . . . They are peculiar people who, when an industry is sick, or when an individual is ill, say, 'Leave it alone; leave him alone.' " ³⁷ The tone of caution and lack of enthusiasm which dominated the report and his later speech indicate that Sankey regarded nationalization as unpleasant and even dangerous medicine, to be administered only in the most serious cases.

In only two instances did Sankey base his argument on the virtues of nationalization rather than on the serious conditions in the coal industry. The scheme put forward by the miners differed from their prewar proposals in providing for the participation of the workers in the management of the industry rather than in simply transferring ownership and direction to the state. This appealed to Sankey as a highly desirable arrangement.

Half a century of education has produced in the workers in the coalfields far more than a desire for the material advantages of higher wages and shorter hours. They have now, in many cases and to an ever increas-

ing extent a higher ambition of taking their due share and interest in the direction of the industry to the success of which they, too, are contributing.³⁸

Likewise he pointed to the experience of the war to dispel any fears about the consequences of a bureaucracy unmotivated by the expectation of personal profit.

The experience of the last few years has, however, shown that it is not really difficult for the British nation to provide a class of administrative officers who combine the strongest sense of public duty with the greatest energy and capacity for initiative. Those who have this kind of training appear to be capable in a high degree of assuming responsibility and also of getting on with the men whom they have to direct.³⁹

The most important testimony on this point during the hearings of the Coal Commission came from another eventual convert to the Labour party, the Liberal politician Lord Haldane. Though his letters at the time reveal that Haldane likewise regarded nationalization as the only "cure" for the coal industry,⁴⁰ his testimony was devoted entirely to the possibility of obtaining an efficient management for a public corporation. Haldane was convinced from his experience in reorganizing the army before the war that such administrative personnel could be trained.

A great many people go into business, not from the sordid love of money, but because they wish to make a fortune. It is a way in which to distinguish themselves. It is not because they want to drink champagne or eat turtle, but because they want to be marked out as people who have succeeded in life. I am suggesting an equally potent motive in life which leads to a dis-

charge of public duty. I think you will appeal to that tremendously.⁴¹

Sankey appears to have been encouraged by this and similar testimony to venture to recommend national ownership of the mines, albeit as a desperate expedient.

Whereas Sankey, both in 1919 and thereafter, severely limited his proposals for nationalization to the coal industry, another Labour party recruit, Dr. Christopher Addison, was prepared to apply the principle of national ownership to coal mines, shipping, food supply, and, he implied, to other areas of economic life as well. In his book, *Practical Socialism*, he argued chiefly from his experiences as Minister of Munitions during the war that state organization and control resulted in more efficient production by making possible large-scale planning in such matters as research, utilization of scrap material, transportation, and marketing. He pointed to the elimination of the inequities between male and female factory workers in support of his contention that social problems which had persisted for generations under private enterprise could be dealt with easily by a state industry charged with consideration of the public welfare as a whole.⁴² Likewise he maintained that initiative and incentive, far from being suppressed during the period of state control, had found opportunities and outlets denied them under private enterprise.⁴³

Though Addison was thus prepared to recommend national ownership in instances where the current system seemed wasteful and inefficient, his enthusiasm for nationalization appears to have stopped short of the socialist desire to transfer to the state the means of production, distribution, and exchange. His was, as he himself described it, a practical socialism. Convinced by his own experience that the collective principle was a useful one,

he confined himself to some suggestions for its use. The vision of a radically different society organized along socialist lines, so frequently found in socialist literature, does not appear in Addison's writings.

A glance at Addison's political record suggests that his undoctinaire socialism was not of primary importance in explaining his shift to Labour. While he was still a member of the coalition government, party discipline was strong enough to move him to vote against a Labour amendment embodying the proposals of the Sankey Report. His break with the coalition, which ended a close eleven-year association with Lloyd George, occurred rather over the government's decision to economize on the far-from-socialistic housing program which was Addison's responsibility. During his explanation of his resignation in the House of Commons, Addison made no criticism of the private enterprise orientation of the coalition's housing policy. His objection was rather to the program's curtailment which was, he maintained, a betrayal of Lloyd George's election pledge of "homes fit for heroes."⁴⁴

Lloyd George pointed out, on the other hand, that Dr. Addison, whose appointment as Minister without Portfolio was to end shortly, was resigning dramatically "at the expense of only one month's salary."⁴⁵ It could be argued also that Addison was anxious, in the interests of his political future, to dissociate himself from a policy which, whatever the cause, had been costly as well as ineffective. Though Addison's own dim prospects within the Liberal party, and, indeed, the Liberal party's own uncertain future, may well have made his break an easy one, his long record of sincere dedication to social reform makes it seem likely that he was, in fact, distressed over the social consequences of a radical retrenchment in the housing program. Probably it was the conviction

that the Liberal party, as a result of its participation in the coalition, could no longer utilize men of his reformist views which impelled him into the Labour party. Yet they were reformist views, not those of a theoretical socialist.

Another less prominent practical socialist was a recruit from the Conservative camp, William Stapleton Royce. A wealthy landowner who had made his fortune building railroads in South Africa, Royce stood as a Conservative candidate for Parliament in 1910 before he was elected for Labour in 1918. Convinced from his own experience that the poor condition of English railroads resulted from the desire on the part of the management to pay high dividends, he declared himself in favor of the nationalization of the railroads.⁴⁶ Though he was also in favor of national ownership of the mines, he was opposed to "indiscriminate Nationalization."⁴⁷ Beyond that, his socialism appears to have consisted largely of a sympathy with the "bottom dog."⁴⁸

On the other hand, Godfrey Elton, another ex-Conservative among the recruits, was excited by the prospect of "a nation organized for peace" with the same "inspiring characteristics" of "the nation organized for war."⁴⁹ Yet this desire to see the nation united—for anything—appears to have been motivated less by socialistic than by patriotic sentiments. Likewise inspired, as Elton himself admitted, by a mixture of patriotism and Tory democracy, was the desire to reward the sacrifices of the common soldier during the war with a better England.

And if . . . its [the Labour party's] professed object was to succour the sort of men I had seen marched off into the desert to their fate after the fall of Kut, what matter if the language of some of its partisans was extravagant and some of the appendages of its central

creed exotic? . . . My political faith indeed shaped itself as something very like a revival of Charles Kingsley's "the Church, the gentleman and the workman against the middle classes and the Manchester men." ⁵⁰

When asked to choose in 1931 between a "National Government" and socialism, Elton, with complete consistency, rejected socialism in favor of another "united" effort. ⁵¹

The echo of Tory democracy may likewise be detected to some extent in the writings of Oliver Baldwin, another convert from a prominent Conservative family, who was elected a Labour M.P. in 1929 after an unsuccessful try in 1924. Though convinced of the necessity of collective ownership, he ignored the Fabians' arguments concerning the possibilities which this would present for more efficient production. He and his collaborator, Roger Chance, appear to have regarded socialism, like the income tax with which they continually coupled it, chiefly as a check on irresponsible wealth—a device which would be unnecessary in a society of truly refined people. They observed:

As it was just and necessary that the humanity of the enlightened employer (covering wages, hours of labour, and pensions) should become a common rule for all, so it is now just and necessary that the voluntary benevolence of the few in the disposal of their surplus wealth shall be adopted as a national standard to be enforced equitably by the State. . . . Though . . . there are always men and women of public spirit and good taste who discharge the responsibilities of great wealth, such people are in a minority . . . and the Socialist believes that "voluntarism" must be assisted or

replaced by a wide extension of collective or communal organisation.⁵²

Though Baldwin was regarded as somewhat to the left of the moderate 1929 Labour government in his proposals, his socialism continued to bear the marks of its Conservative ancestry.

It should be noted, in fact, that this move toward socialism in its varying degrees was more characteristic of the Labour party recruits from conservatism than of the more numerous Liberal converts. Of the group of five discussed above, all except Addison were former Conservatives. Probably the explanation lies in the fact that certain sections among the Conservatives, unencumbered by the traditional Liberal antipathy to state interference in economic life, were, in fact, closer to socialism than most Liberals. Latter-day Tory democrats like Elton and Oliver Baldwin seem to have been temperamentally more amenable to schemes of nationalization than the land taxers, free traders, and Quaker industrialists who comprised the Liberal converts. Though the nineteenth-century Liberal faith in free enterprise may have been too weak to forestall the shift of many Liberals to the Labour party, it appears to have been strong enough to prevent them from displaying wholehearted enthusiasm for the official doctrine of their new party.

Though the rhetorical habits of a lifetime may have prevented a majority of the recruits from articulating clearly their approval of socialistic measures, those few who did so put forward reasons which may provide some indication of factors which influenced the entire group. The experience of the war, by providing a concrete example of state direction of industry, appears to have eliminated excessive fears of evil consequences while

providing proof of the efficiency with which such enterprises could be conducted. Reassured by this experience, others doubtless felt with Sankey that "when an industry is sick," or, in the case of Addison and Royce, inefficient, the state could step in with beneficial results. The war also, by providing unusual opportunities for contacts among classes, aroused in men like Elton and Baldwin a zeal for social betterment which impelled them to adopt the strongest program of reform available—in postwar Britain, the program of the Labour party.

Two groups may therefore be distinguished among the recruits to Labour in the years from 1914 to 1924. A few, mostly Fabians like Money and Webb, had clear and precise aims which included, ultimately, a socialist commonwealth. The other, larger group, though jolted by the experiences of the war into a receptivity to certain socialistic schemes, were less enthusiastic about a totally socialist economy. It seemed an excellent opportunity for the kind of skilful leadership in which the Fabians gloried, leadership of the uninitiated toward a socialist state. When, after a decade of growth and two Labour governments, they surveyed their limited achievements, the Fabians may well have recalled the warning uttered by H. G. Wells years before. "Make Socialists and you will achieve Socialism; there is no other plan." ⁵³

III

The Recruits and Fiscal Policy

The secret of our success has been our ability to unite men of diverse gifts, giving each an outlet for his special talent; by magnifying points of agreement and minimising points of difference, and by the exercise of a wise toleration.

KEIR HARDIE *

Other parties have their schisms, but few have courted trouble so recklessly as the Trade Union movement when it took to its bosom the whole army of Mugwumps.

GEOFFREY T. GARRATT †

THE formality and protocol which surround the presentation of the budget in the House of Commons are some indication of the extreme importance attached to fiscal issues in British political life. This is further illustrated by the significant part played by fiscal matters in the major political realignments following World War I. Enthusiastic advocates of a land values tax, free trade, and a capital levy comprise an influential if not numerous group of Labour party recruits in the early postwar period. This

* *My Confession of Faith in the Labour Alliance*, p. 106.

† *The Mugwumps and the Labour Party*, p. 55.

appears to have been less a conversion to the principles of the Labour party than a protest against the treatment of their respective causes by the leadership of the old parties, particularly the Liberal leadership,¹ and an effort, by thus shifting their political allegiance, to find a party more responsive to their demands.

The movement for an annual tax on land values² was based on the doctrine of the American reformer of the late nineteenth century, Henry George, who held that land becomes valuable not through any individual effort but as a result of the existence, efforts, and growth of the whole community. It follows then that society should tax back the full annual value of the land. Land being held for speculative purposes would thus be forced into use. A larger supply of available land would reduce its price, and farming would become a real alternative for the industrial worker. The life-or-death control which the industrialist had over his workers would thus be eliminated, and "wage slavery" would disappear. The income from this "single tax" would be sufficient to cover the cost of government, for many services now performed by the state, such as police protection, would be unnecessary in an idyllic society of self-respecting husbandmen.

This doctrine did not attract the Labour party in the prewar years. The British worker regarded the profits of the industrialist, not of the landowner, as the root of his problem. In commenting on the single taxers' proposal for the taxation of total land values, Philip Snowden of the I.L.P. pointed out their differences clearly:

According to the philosophy of a school of Anarchists who advocate the appropriation of all economic rent by taxation, but who would leave the present landowners in nominal possession of the land, it is right to tax an income from land 20s in [*sic*] the pound, but

wrong to tax the profits of trade. If a man has an income of £1,000 a year from land he must be taxed £1,000 a year. The man who has a thousand a year from shares in an industrial concern must be exempt from taxation. . . . The Socialist maintains that there is no real difference between land and capital of a fundamental character.³

Within the Liberal party, however, support for a land tax was strong. Some members of the land values group in the House of Commons simply supported such a tax as a desirable reform among others. Those most prominent in the prewar agitation for a land tax—Edward Hemmerde, Josiah Wedgwood, Robert Outhwaite, J. Dundas White, P. W. Raffan and H. G. Chancellor, all Liberal M.P.'s—were, however, single taxers who accepted without reservation the contention of Henry George that by the imposition of such a tax, and by that means alone, society could be regenerated.

The conviction that the major ills of society could be eliminated by a reform which was at once simple and just, imbued single taxers with an astounding devotion to their cause. Their political campaigns often resembled religious revivals,⁴ and the tone with which Wedgwood described his conversion to the movement was typical. "Ever since 1905," he recounted reverently, "I have known that there was a man sent from God, and his name was Henry George! I had no need thenceforth for any other faith."⁵

The already intense enthusiasm of the land tax advocates had been heightened by the political uproar produced by the first imposition of a tax on land values. Even the moderates among them considered the method of land taxation provided for in Lloyd George's 1909 budget far from satisfactory. Instead of adopting the principle of taxing all land values annually the budget had

confined itself to taxing the unearned increment on land at irregular intervals, such as the time of sale or renewal of a lease. A tax of $\frac{1}{2}$ d on the pound was imposed on land being used for agriculture while in demand for other uses, but rural land was, on the whole, untouched.

Though too mild to please the land taxers, the 1909 budget was so extreme as to provoke the landowning House of Lords to a fierce and almost suicidal opposition. The repeated rejection of the budget by the House of Lords precipitated a constitutional crisis which resulted not only in the adoption of the budget, but also in an enormous reduction in the power of the House of Lords. Disappointed though the land taxers had been in Lloyd George's proposals, the spectacle of the House of Lords jeopardizing its very existence in order to oppose the budget and the extension of democracy which followed its adoption, confirmed these enthusiasts in the conviction that a land tax was a truly fundamental reform which would strike at the roots of injustice and special privilege, both economic and political.

An extension of the land tax had been promised by the Liberal leadership, and during the next few years its advocates eagerly awaited the introduction of some radical measure by the government. By the eve of the war, however, delay and inactivity had convinced the land taxers that the Liberal government had no intention of meeting their demands. Frustrated by the suspected betrayal, an editorialist in the movement's organ *Land Values* uttered a seemingly wild threat which was to prove prophetic:

Already far and wide, deep and menacing, the murmurs of revolt are heard. The belief that the old Liberals will not attack land monopoly is growing; soon it will turn into conviction, and then the crisis will be precipitated that will shatter the old Liberal Party and give birth to a new.⁶

This dissatisfaction with the Liberal leadership on the part of the land taxers continued to mount. Their irritation became especially marked when in the early years of the war, despite a frenzied search for new sources of revenue, land values were left untouched by both Asquith governments.⁷ So consistently had land tax advocates been disappointed by the Liberals that they were not surprised when during the 1918 campaign the National Liberal Federation adopted what they considered a weak stand on the land tax. Again the threat of revolt was voiced in Wedgwood's comment on their resolutions:

I am afraid that my old friends Mr. McKenna and Mr. Tennant still rule the caucus, and still rule out, as they did in 1909, any real attack on landlordism. Those who are left of genuine Liberals will have to look elsewhere. There is little room for them in the "Liberal Party" of these resolutions.⁸

Where, then, were "genuine Liberals" to go? Wedgwood, who had severed his ties with the Liberal party by 1918, stood as an independent in the election, but such isolation was clearly unsatisfactory. Land tax advocates were looking appraisingly at the Labour party. Charles Trevelyan, an enthusiastic exponent of the taxation of land values, posed the question, "Can Radicalism and Socialism Unite?"⁹ *Land Values* pointed out that while before the war to leave the Liberal party meant to abandon all hope of achieving reform, such was no longer the case. The Labour party now had a real possibility of attaining office.¹⁰

There were, however, some fundamental differences between the land tax enthusiasts and the Labour party. Although the Labour party could not be said to have a land policy at the close of the war, the critical view of the land tax agitation expressed by Snowden years earlier was still dominant in Labour circles. Indeed as the party

became more strongly committed to socialism it tended more and more to favor the I.L.P.'s program of land nationalization. Whereas the land taxpayer wished to leave control of the land with the landowner while appropriating the total income for the community, land nationalization would give control of the land to the community while providing compensation for the landowner. In 1920 an I.L.P. pamphlet attacked the land tax doctrine.

Many of those who advocate the abolition of private ownership in land believe that once the full economic rent is absorbed by the State all will be well, and economic laws will force the occupier of land to put it to the best possible use. Socialists can hardly accept that point of view. . . . What best pays the individual is no test of what is best socially. If the full benefits of land socialisation are to be realised there must be control over the use to which any land rented by individuals or associations is put.¹¹

For a single taxpayer like Outhwaite, nationalization of land was unthinkable. He maintained that the nationalizers were, in effect, saying to the soldiers:

You have endured the sufferings and the horrors of war and have saved the land of Britain. But we have decided that the land of Britain rightfully belongs to the lords of the land. . . . Therefore we have decided to buy out the lords of the land, that you shall set to work, if permitted, and sweat and toil as slaves to the bondholders to whom we propose to pawn Great Britain. . . . The Socialist who urges land nationalisation proposes to perpetuate the very injustice which he denounces and which land taxation would abolish.¹²

This disagreement between the single taxpayers and the Labour party on the issue of state ownership and control

reveals the fundamentally different political philosophies which motivated these two groups. The followers of Henry George were temperamentally part of the nineteenth-century liberal, laissez faire tradition which held that society's problems could be solved by setting men free. To them the "freeing" of the land by means of the imposition of the single tax was "the last and greatest of the liberation movements,"¹³ successor to the struggles for the commercial freedom of free trade or the political freedom of extended suffrage. "Bureaucratic Socialists," "I.L.Pers," and Fabians had long been anathema in single tax circles because of their devotion to planning and control.¹⁴ Wedgwood had once ridiculed these reformers and their petty regulations. "Humanity," he declared, "is too big for their straitwaistcoats, and needs nothing but to be rid of its irons in order to stretch its limbs and walk upright, alone."¹⁵

Yet in 1919 Wedgwood, Outhwaite, and White joined the I.L.P., and in 1920 Hemmerde entered the Labour party. Thus four of the six most energetic land tax advocates of the prewar period were within Labour's ranks. The I.L.P.'s wartime stand for individual freedom had somewhat relieved the land taxers' earlier antipathy toward socialists.¹⁶ The essential differences between their own policies and outlook and those of their new party were, however, abundantly clear to them. It must be concluded, therefore, that their change of party was motivated by despair of the Liberals rather than any positive agreement with the Labour party.

Those who entered the Labour party through the I.L.P. were never completely at home in either group. Wedgwood had been a member of the I.L.P. for seven years when, in answering an attack in the I.L.P. newspaper *Forward*, he revealed that the cleavage had by no means been eliminated, and that, in his case at least, the old orthodoxy was stronger than the new.

By Socialism, I suppose you mean Social Reform and inspecting babies' hair. By Socialism I mean a land (or a time), when we shall not need policemen.¹⁷

Despite the discouraging prospects, the converts continued their agitation within their new party. They pointed out that the reduction in the price of land which would follow the imposition of a land values tax would, by reducing the compensation necessary, facilitate two of the projects central to the Labour party program—housing and nationalization of railroads and mines. Chiefly through the efforts of Wedgwood and his friends, the 1925 Labour party conference reached agreement on a formula which met the objections of the land nationalizers and sacrificed none of the fundamental principles of the single taxers. The resolution adopted called for the imposition of a land values tax, the proceeds of which would be placed in a fund to be used for the gradual purchase of land by the state. The expected outcomes of such a tax—the forcing of land into the market and its subsequent reduction in price—would thus be attained. Owners would be compensated by gradual purchase, but payments would be at the new deflated prices and out of revenue obtained from the landowners themselves, not from the community at large.¹⁸ Except for the issues of eventual state ownership and the elimination of other taxes, the single taxers had cajoled the Labour party into an acceptance of their program.

Alas for the expectations of the land taxers! Their influence on the Labour party was short lived. The following year the Labour party conference ignored the compromise which had been so painstakingly achieved, and, over the violent opposition of land tax advocates, adopted a resolution in favor of immediate land purchase with compensation on the basis of annual value.¹⁹

The limited extent of the influence achieved by land tax advocates within the Labour movement was further emphasized by the nature of the land tax sponsored by the second Labour government. In introducing this measure into the House of Commons, Philip Snowden declared that it would mean "emancipation from the tyranny and injustice of private land monopoly," but, though the old enemy of the single taxers had adopted their language, he had failed to adopt their program. The various important exemptions provided for in the original measure were extended to almost ridiculous proportions when Liberal amendments were accepted by the government. The twelve-year agitation on the part of the land tax advocates had thus failed to attain its object.²⁰ The land values tax was not, it appeared, to be permitted to reorganize British society. Already, however, it had helped to alter the membership of British political parties.

Whereas the land taxers constituted a distinct and conspicuous band among Labour's recruits in the post-war period, almost all of the converts from the Liberal party could be described as free traders. Unlike the land taxers, they were in harmony with their new party. Seventy years of Liberal propaganda had convinced the British worker that he would ultimately suffer from the imposition of tariffs. So strong was the devotion of the prewar Labour party to this cause that George Bernard Shaw had complained, "It [the Labour party] shouts for Free Trade as lustily as any 1846 cotton lord."²¹

During the war years England's free trade system, which had been zealously and successfully guarded by the Liberals since Joseph Chamberlain's attack in 1903, appeared to be in jeopardy. Of chief significance for the later political history of England was the fact that the departures from free trade were made in the early years of the war while Asquith was still Prime Minister.

The first breach in the free trade system came with the imposition in 1915 of the McKenna duties on luxuries. The purpose, according to the government, was to discourage the importation of luxuries in order to save transport space, conserve British funds in neutral countries, and, at the same time, increase revenue. Asquith argued that this was an emergency war measure which in no sense represented a departure from Britain's traditional policy of free trade.

The government's protestations of the temporary nature of these duties did little to allay the fears of ardent free traders. Phillip Morrell remarked that it was the equivalent of setting up a Parliament in Dublin, and insisting that it did not prejudice the issue of Home Rule.²² "Tonight we are under Free Trade," declaimed Outhwaite dramatically. "Tomorrow we are under Protection. Tonight, if we allow this Resolution to go through, we make a breach in the Free Trade system. We allow the enemy within our gates."²³ To the practical arguments, too, the free traders had replies. Sydney Arnold maintained that a more direct and effective method of discouraging the importation of luxury goods would be to prohibit such imports entirely.²⁴ As to the problem of revenue, the land tax advocates were eager to suggest their solution. "You have got a clear issue now," Outhwaite declared. "Either you are going to put taxation on land values or you are going to have Tariff Reform or Protection."²⁵ C. E. Price, chairman of the land values group in the House of Commons, objected strongly to the course pursued by the government.

To me it is a matter of profound regret that . . . we should be found taxing things against the taxation of which we have been fighting all our lives, while the one subject which twenty-five years ago, he [Asquith]

said should be the new source of revenue is not sought in this Budget.²⁶

Any lingering doubts which free traders might have had about the intentions of the first coalition toward their cherished system were dispersed by the government's adoption of the report of the Paris Economic Conference in June, 1916. This conference of the Allies had been held in an effort to prepare an economic program for the postwar period. Its report, though purposely vague, seemed to free traders to commit England to a protectionist policy. The report charged the Central Powers with preparing "a contest on the economic plane" after the war.²⁷ In self-defense, therefore, the Allies must organize "on a permanent basis of their economic alliance." Germany was to be, in effect, excluded from trade with the members of the alliance for a certain number of years after the war, and thereafter German trade was to be subject to special restrictions. During the period of reconstruction the natural resources of each nation were to be conserved for the use of other members of the alliance. The permanent policy of the alliance would be "to render themselves independent of enemy countries . . . not only so far as concerns their sources of supply, but also as regards their financial, commercial, and maritime organization." Subsidies and customs duties were suggested by the report as possible methods of attaining this objective, but the specific policies to be adopted were left to the discretion of the individual governments.

The outcry from the free traders was immediate. If the McKenna duties had been a temporary expedient, here the government was adopting a long-range policy clearly protectionist in spirit. While dedicated free traders were enraged by the proposals for boycotts and tariffs, the internationalist section of the public, which had been

looking forward to a more amiable world order after the war, was appalled by the prospect of two permanently warring economic blocs. The U.D.C. was especially vociferous in its opposition and added to its program a pledge to oppose "the economic war after the war."

The sponsorship by Asquith and the Liberals of these two protectionist policies probably does much to explain why in the battles against protection after the war, their leadership was considered unsatisfactory by the most dedicated free traders. In the debate on the Paris resolutions, Philip Snowden of the I.L.P. pointed out bluntly what had been hinted at repeatedly by the unhappy Liberals.

We have witnessed this afternoon one more surrender of Liberal principles to the Tory Party. The Prime Minister came down this afternoon and assumed a character which, he must by this time be very accustomed to wear. While he pronounced a funeral oration over Free Trade, he told us, as he told us on the last occasion when he surrendered voluntarism, that he still remained an ardent Free Trader. The Prime Minister was an ardent Home Ruler some time ago. Home Rule now appears to have been abandoned. The only thing the Prime Minister has left to surrender is his office and I would respectfully suggest for the sake of his future reputation, that he should relinquish that as soon as possible and leave the carrying out of Tory principles to those who believe in Tory principles—to leave attack upon civil liberty, the adoption of militarism, the abandonment of Home Rule, and the institution of Tariff Reform to those who may carry out those ideas and those matters with enthusiasm.²⁸

Though any further violations of the free trade system on Asquith's part were prevented by his deposition from

office at the end of 1916, his lack of energy in defending the doctrine against its attackers during the rest of the war was equally resented by some of his followers. When W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, was attracting attention and popular acclaim during his stay in England by his advocacy of a postwar policy of imperial preference and economic destruction of Germany, his bitterest opposition came not from the official Liberal leadership, but from the new Radical Council²⁹ which had been formed to represent "great numbers of Radicals throughout the country [who] feel that their opinions are not being voiced by the leaders to whom they have been accustomed to look."³⁰ It is significant that three of the five members of this Council—Joseph King, H. B. Lees-Smith, and Sydney Arnold—eventually found their way into the Labour party.

In the career of such an orthodox free trader as Asquith, minor violations in a period of national crisis would seem excusable, and the deep resentment of many Liberals can only be explained by the fact that free trade was to them a moral rather than an economic issue. When Neville Chamberlain cried, "Free Trade is not a religion. It is nothing but a commercial system,"³¹ he was quite right in assuming that his opponents viewed it as something more. The ethical quality which had long characterized the free trade movement in the minds of its adherents was demonstrated in the years before the war by the Congo reform campaign conducted by E. D. Morel, later a convert to Labour. In his program Morel gave the same importance to the establishment of free trade as to the elimination of slavery, less apparently from commercial motives than from the conviction that the native—or any other man—was not really free until he was able to sell to whomever he wished.³² The war served to intensify the conviction on the part of free traders concerning the

righteousness of their cause. During these years tariff reform had become associated with a movement for the economic destruction of Germany which made it seem a monstrous and ungenerous policy. Furthermore, it was firmly believed by free traders that the new League of Nations would be unable to survive in a protectionist world. Hobson's biography of Cobden, a product of the early postwar period, was an attempt to prove that free trade had been recognized by its earliest advocates as an instrument for the attainment of world peace and, indeed, that this was its chief importance in their eyes.³³ Though Hobson himself was prepared to oppose "the new Protectionism" with economic arguments, it was clear that his real objections rested on higher grounds.

It [Protection] is a crime—I had almost written *the* crime—against civilization. . . . For commerce has always been the greatest civilizer of mankind. All other fruits of civilization have travelled along trade routes. . . . Cut off commerce, and you destroy every mode of higher intercourse. Substitute commercial war for free exchange, and you reverse the current of all civilization and drive back to barbarism.³⁴

It seems paradoxical that while the Liberal leaders had been soiling their hands with these "crimes," the Labour party, on the brink of adopting socialism officially, had remained in a solidly laissez faire position on the matter of international trade. Following the imposition of the McKenna duties, the 1916 Labour party conference adopted a resolution declaring:

The departure from the principles of Free Trade is a return to a vicious system of Protection which, once begun, is likely to extend and become an additional

means of capitalist exploitation and a serious handicap to industry and trade.³⁵

Though this strong free trade stand on the part of the Labour party was a definite inducement to disgruntled Liberals to join its ranks, the number of converts motivated entirely by this issue appears to have been small. Hobson says he resigned from the Liberal party "when the Liberals of the Government abandoned Free Trade" ³⁶ during the war, but he did not enter the Labour party until after 1918. Trevelyan lists the free trade issue as an important, though not the sole, reason for his shift of political allegiance.³⁷ Arnold, King, and Lees-Smith, the members of the Radical Council who spoke out against the protectionist views of the Australian Prime Minister, had all been members of pacifist groups during the war. Though the chief impetus for entrance into the Labour party may have lain elsewhere, the free trade issue was, in these cases, a source of dissatisfaction with Asquith's leadership.

Since almost all the ex-Liberals were free traders, their presence in the Labour party served to confirm and encourage it in its championship of their traditional doctrine. The issue of protection was of mounting importance in the first three elections of the postwar period, and on all three occasions the Labour party enthusiastically defended free trade. The Labour party, was, indeed, in a much stronger position to denounce the evils of protection in 1923 than the newly reunited Liberals who had to explain away Asquith's war record and Lloyd George's earlier support of imperial preference.

Many of its socialist members disapproved of this preoccupation with free trade on the part of the Labour party.³⁸ Some complained, as George Bernard Shaw had

years before, that free trade was an illogical policy for a socialist party.

In so far as Protection means the deliberate interference of the State with trade, both foreign and domestic, for the regulation of prices and wages, the dictation of the terms of contracts, the resolute social moralization of competition, the choice of our markets and industries, and in general, the subordination of commercial enterprise to national ends, Socialism is in these respects ultra-Protectionist.³⁹

Others felt that the free trade controversy was irrelevant to the fundamental issue, capitalism versus socialism, and that the Labour party was dissipating its energies unwisely in becoming involved. For this diversion from the Labour party's primary objective, these critics held the Liberal recruits largely responsible, and in this they were probably correct.

The political history of the period gives some substance to these criticisms, for the first Labour government in Britain's history took office in 1924 after an election in which the chief issue was not socialism but protection versus free trade. The Labour party was true to its pledges and in its first budget triumphantly repealed the McKenna duties and reduced the duties on sugar, tea, and coffee. Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer, showed the source of his inspiration when he declared happily, "These proposals are the greatest step ever made towards the realisation of the cherished Radical idea of a free breakfast table."⁴⁰

It is an indication of the strength and persistence of political creeds that the leaders of Britain could continue to fight energetic political battles on the 1906 issues of "Free Land, Free Trade, Free Breakfast Table" almost as if the catastrophic political and economic events of

World War I had not intervened. Though the decisions reached on these matters may not have proven of crucial importance amid the changed realities of the postwar world, the Liberal party seems definitely to have lost prestige with its own membership by its failure enthusiastically to champion them at all times. The growth of the Labour party may have been a manifestation of new and revolutionary attitudes on the part of the British voter, but if one may judge from the leaders among the converts, devotion to the liberal doctrines of the nineteenth century played a significant part. **It was in the hope of finding a party more liberal than the Liberals that these land taxers and free traders shifted their allegiance.**

If the land tax and free trade disputes were survivals of another era, the fiscal policy most closely associated with the Labour party during the early postwar period, the capital levy, was an effort to deal with one of the most recent issues in English politics—the problem of the national debt and its method of repayment. Though it became in the course of the political battles of the early postwar period an uniquely Labour policy, it was largely Liberal in authorship, and it appears to have owed its continued prominence in Labour party programs to the championship of the recruits.

The vague proposals which were heard from time to time during the war to tax capital in order to pay off the national debt appealed to the “pacifist” Liberals in many ways. Their own hatred of war was in many cases coupled with a dark suspicion that the conflict had been encouraged by “wicked profiteers,” and they felt it only fair that a portion of these ill-gotten gains should be used to pay the war’s enormous cost. Their violent objections to conscription made them especially sensitive also to the oft-repeated question, “If life can be conscripted why not wealth?” Furthermore, pacifist and strongly internation-

alist groups were more concerned with the problem of the debt than other sections of the public, for they considered the payment of large reparations by Germany, which to many seemed the solution of the debt problem, neither likely nor desirable.

It was one of these pacifist Liberals, Sydney Arnold, who, in a one-hour speech in the House of Commons in April, 1918, gave the classic exposition of the idea of a capital levy and outlined the plan on which Labour proposals were later based. Arnold, who was a stockbroker and regarded as something of a financial expert, presented his plan as a financial expedient with few political overtones. According to Arnold, the workers were involved only slightly, if at all, in the debt problem, which was largely a matter of transfer of wealth among the more affluent groups in the nation. He stated clearly:

This scheme is not confiscation and it is not repudiation. It is merely an alternative method of meeting a liability that has to be met anyhow, and met by the wealthier classes of the country. . . . The great bulk of the War Debt is held by the Income Tax paying classes, and . . . they are paying most of the interest on the debt through the Income Tax.⁴¹

Briefly, Arnold's plan proposed the imposition of a tax on individuals with capital of more than one thousand pounds. The rate would be graduated, but would average about twelve and one-half per cent. War stock and certain other securities would be acceptable payment, thus avoiding the necessity of a large sale of stock which would send prices down. He calculated that such a levy would yield six billion pounds which would largely wipe out the debt estimated at eight billion pounds. Immediate reduction of the debt would eliminate the necessity of repayment during a later period of possible deflation when

the government would be repaying more than it had borrowed in terms of purchasing power and at a time when, in addition, the yield from income taxes would be likely to fall. With the reduction of the debt and, consequently, the amount required for interest, Arnold believed that a large reduction in the income tax rate would be possible.

The previous month a proposal similar to Arnold's, though differing in detail, had been put forward in an article in *The Contemporary Review* by a member of the U.D.C., Frederick Pethick-Lawrence. Pethick-Lawrence had been loosely associated with the Labour party for some time, but his energies had hitherto been devoted to the women's suffrage agitation. His active participation in Labour party politics dates from the war, and both in background and in sentiment he seems identified with the Liberal "pacifist" converts of this period. Pethick-Lawrence's tone in support of the capital levy was somewhat more contentious than was Arnold's. In discussing the difficulty of meeting the interest on such a large debt he asserted threateningly: "The working classes will rightly refuse to allow an enhanced proportion of the products of industry to go into the pockets of the classes whose great wealth has been increased by the war."⁴² This was but a hint of the bitter words which were to be exchanged before the capital levy ceased to be an issue in British politics.

In general, however, the capital levy proposal was treated with much more moderation by both advocates and opponents in the years before 1920 than was later to be the case. It had not, as yet, become a party issue, for though it was included in the 1918 Labour party program, the independent Liberals were still officially sympathetic, and it had many advocates outside the ranks of Labour. Most of the prominent economists pronounced the scheme feasible, and Pigou⁴³ and Keynes, neither of

whom were Labour party members, advocated it strongly. In his celebrated book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920), Keynes explained the grounds for his support.

The holders of war loan in every country are owed a large sum by the State; and the State in its turn is owed a large sum by these and other taxpayers. The whole position is in the highest degree artificial, misleading and vexatious. We shall never be able to move again, unless we can free our limbs from these paper shackles. A general bonfire is so great a necessity that unless we can make of it an orderly and good-tempered affair in which no serious injustice is done to anyone, it will, when it comes at last, grow into a conflagration that may destroy much else as well. As regards internal debt, I am one of those who believe that a capital levy for the extinction of debt is an absolute prerequisite of sound finance in every one of the European belligerent countries.⁴⁴

Even Bonar-Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Conservative Prime Minister, remarked absent-mindedly one day that a capital levy might be a good idea—a statement he was later to regret.⁴⁵

In the course of the political developments of the next few years the capital levy became more exclusively a policy of the Labour party, and, at the same time, a much more controversial issue. It was soon recognized by both socialists and their opponents that payment of the levy in securities which the government would then hold could form a convenient step to socialism.⁴⁶ Furthermore, though Arnold had at first argued that the owner of capital would gain back in a reduced income tax what he paid in the levy, it was soon suggested in Labour circles that

it might be well to use the additional funds for increased social services⁴⁷—a plan which the Conservatives regarded as proof of the revolutionary intentions of the levy's advocates. When the Labour party revised its scheme by suggesting an exemption of five thousand pounds rather than the previous one thousand, its opponents saw an obvious political motivation, though Labour leaders insisted that their action was based on the findings of the Board of Inland Revenue that the expense of collecting a levy on fortunes under that figure would not equal the yield. The Labour party, on the other hand, charged that the opponents of the levy were attempting to shift the burden of the debt to the workers. They insisted that the hard lot of the nineteenth-century workers had been caused by the existence of a debt the interest on which they had, by various ingenious methods, been forced to pay.⁴⁸ Not only had this process been painful, but it had been so slow that according to Hugh Dalton, one of the advocates of a capital levy, 496 million pounds of the 1817 debt remained. "Even today," he stated, "we have not yet finished paying for the Battle of Waterloo, much less for the Charge of the Light Brigade, or the Relief of Ladysmith."⁴⁹ Once again, according to the proponents of the levy, the bondholders of Britain were looking forward to a century of "tribute,"⁵⁰ a period in which they would once again sap "the life blood of the community."⁵¹

Support for a capital levy outside the Labour party disappeared rapidly in the early 1920's. The Liberals passed from mild support at the end of the war to outright opposition in the election of 1923, and non-Labour party economists were no longer in favor of the plan. In addition to the controversial aspects mentioned above, many felt that the right moment from both a psychologi-

cal and economic viewpoint had passed. The willingness to take drastic measures which the war had engendered in the nation seemed to have disappeared, and increasing unemployment created excessive public fear of any dislocations in the economic realm. Since a considerable deflation had already occurred, the advantages to be gained from repayment before deflation had been lost.

The Labour party had thus emerged by 1923 as the sole champion of the capital levy, and those advocates most strongly in favor of the scheme were by this time within Labour's fold. Once again, the exact importance of this issue, among others, as a motive for entrance into the Labour party is difficult to determine. Hugh Dalton did not become a member of the Labour party until after World War I, but he relates that his "political awakening" went back to his Cambridge days long before the war.⁵² Hobson did not enter until after the 1918 election, but his break with the Liberal party over free trade in 1916 had been so far aggravated by foreign policy differences that the Labour party seemed his only haven. When Arnold finally joined the Labour party in 1922, disillusionment with Liberal war policies on such issues as conscription and free trade formed an important background for his decision. Yet the delay involved in each case may be an indication that the Labour party in the early postwar period possessed some new attraction. If this be the case, certainly part of this new appeal was Labour's strong advocacy of a capital levy, for these were economists, men to whom the economic policy of the government would be of major interest.

Though the Labour party's strong stand in behalf of a capital levy probably helped to bring these and many others within its fold, the Labour leadership began to suspect, as time went on, that its effect in the country at

large was quite the reverse. During the early 1920's, the capital levy was a highly popular issue with Labour's opponents, and it had infinite possibilities for campaign purposes. One Conservative pamphlet in the 1922 election, referred to by Labour candidates as "the Clutching Hand," showed a hand with outstretched fingers about to snatch a little house and garden, a bicycle, piano, and a bundle of saving certificates.⁵³ In the same election there was much hilarity about the difficulty of collecting a capital levy from a butcher whose capital was entirely in sausages and black puddings.⁵⁴

The effectiveness of this propaganda was alarming to the Labour leaders. Snowden, who appears to have had some reservations about the wisdom of such a policy in any case, was reluctant to support a capital levy even in the 1922 election.⁵⁵ By 1923 both Snowden and MacDonald were eager to drop the issue, but they were overruled by the levy's enthusiastic advocates. Dalton's description of the small meeting at which the decision was made to continue support of a capital levy, demonstrates the influential part played by the recruits in inducing Labour to continue its advocacy of their own cherished scheme. Ranged against MacDonald and Snowden were Pethick-Lawrence, Arnold, Lees-Smith, and Dalton himself—all converts from other parties—as well as the Webbs and Arthur Greenwood.⁵⁶ In addition to providing authorship for the plan, this group had, by their entrance into the Labour party and especially by the influential position which they quickly attained in Labour councils, been able to assure its inclusion once again in the Labour party's program. Dalton further relates that MacDonald told him after the election that he was convinced that support of the capital levy had lost Labour fifty seats in the election.⁵⁷ Thus it is probably safe to conclude that Mac-

Donald and Snowden were somewhat relieved when the minority status of the first Labour government made it impossible for them to impose a levy, and when, in later years, other issues forced it out of public attention.

The importance of the capital levy lies less in the number than in the type of converts which it helped to attract to the Labour party. The economists—Pethick-Lawrence, Hobson, Dalton, and Lees-Smith—and the financier, Arnold, were typical of the experts in various fields who were entering the Labour party at this time.⁵⁸ Such members added both prestige and technical skill to the defense of Labour policy. Yet these men were not merely pamphlet writers, rationalizing and detailing trades union or I.L.P. policies. Their most important contribution to the Labour party was on the policy level, for the capital levy was, after all, their plan.

One might well marvel at the absorptive powers of a political party which could welcome simultaneously wild, free spirits like the single taxers and sophisticated advocates of the capital levy from the London School of Economics. These political migrations were impelled, however, by roughly similar causes—the conviction that the Liberal leadership was violating or ignoring the fiscal doctrines to which they were devoted, and the hope or knowledge that the young, progressive Labour party would perceive the wisdom of the course they advocated. There seems to have been, in this aspect of the shift to Labour, no sudden revelation of the cogency of socialism, no rejection of past creeds. It seems to have been rather a surprising political consistency and loyalty which accounts for the change, but it was a loyalty to policies rather than to party. So precise and definite were these converts in their demands on their new party, that at times the Labour party seemed to be in danger of becoming a slightly more progressive Liberal party with no

time or energy to devote to socialism. Yet the Labour party would seem to have gained a great deal from any development which brought it the eloquence of Wedgwood, the economic background and polemical skill of Hobson, and the political experience of Arnold.

IV

The Recruits and Foreign Policy

DURING the 1920 Labour party conference a delegate interrupted the debate to ask if "they were to waste the time of the Conference talking about the world when people were dying for want of houses." The delegate was protesting against one of the most striking developments in the postwar Labour party, the widening of interest from the rather narrow concern with the standard of life of the British worker which had characterized the party during the prewar years to the passionate interest in foreign policy which marks its postwar history. Though major attention to matters of foreign policy was new to most sections of the Labour party, this sphere had long been the central interest of many of the recruits of the war and early postwar period, especially of converts from the Liberal party, who brought with them firm convictions concerning the chief issues. What was the impact on Labour's foreign policy during the postwar decade of the presence within its ranks of this large group of ex-Liberals and a smaller group of ex-Conservatives?

Though Labour's growing preoccupation with foreign policy coincides with the influx of converts, it must be pointed out that the activities of the new members were not the sole cause of the party's shifting interests. The war had impressed on the public the relevance to their own lives of questions of foreign policy, and Lloyd

George's "diplomacy by conference" directed much public attention toward those problems of foreign policy which existed in the early postwar years. Furthermore, the sheer number of recruits, regardless of their background, raised Labour from the rank of a fourth party to that of the official opposition and, finally, to His Majesty's government—positions in which problems of foreign policy clearly could no longer be lightly dismissed. The post-war Labour party, in short, found itself in totally new circumstances, circumstances which required that increased attention be given to "the world."

Despite the probability that Labour would have focused increasingly on issues of foreign policy even without the stimulus of the Buxtons, Ponsonbys, Trevelyan, and the rest, there is little doubt that they provided an informed leadership which the Labour party would otherwise have lacked. Hugh Cecil had likened the idea of the Labour party conducting foreign policy to that of a baby running an airplane,¹ and Labourites themselves sometimes appeared conscious of their lack of experienced leadership in this area.² While the average trade-union leader had concentrated on industrial problems since boyhood, the middle class recruit often had a background of education and travel which led naturally to an interest in foreign affairs. It was to be expected, therefore, that these new members would play a role both in the formation of Labour's foreign policy and in the creation of a public opinion favorable to that policy.

An analysis of the positions attained by the new members within the party reveals that though they never achieved the prime responsibility for foreign policy, the office of Foreign Secretary, they very much dominated the positions of second rank in the area of foreign affairs. Though the full membership of the Advisory Committee on International Questions was never made public, it is

known that the three Buxtons (C. R., Dorothy, and Noel), Norman Angell, Hugh Dalton, G. Lowes Dickinson, Charles Trevelyan, Arthur Ponsonby, Bertrand Russell, J. A. Hobson, E. D. Morel, and Helen Swanwick, among the recruits, were members. This group, formed in 1918, was one of several committees of experts whose function was to advise the Labour party executive in various spheres. The memoranda drawn up for the guidance of the executive were frequently published in pamphlet form, so the group had an opportunity to influence the public as well as the Labour leadership.³ The committee appears to have had its greatest effect on Labour policy when the party was out of office,⁴ for it would have been both unnecessary and improper for the government to rely for advice solely on an unofficial body of this sort.

This dual purpose of investigation and propaganda was likewise served by the Labour delegations sent to various trouble spots in the period from 1919 to 1924. The converts were represented in most of these groups—Wedgwood was a member of the delegation to Hungary in 1920, and General C. Birdwood Thomson and C. R. Buxton were in the Ruhr delegation in 1923. Buxton had also served as interpreter for the delegation to Soviet Russia in 1920.

The energies of the recruits, which had been thus expended in advisory and propaganda activities from 1918 to 1922, were transferred to Parliament after the election of 1922 returned to the House of Commons many who had been defeated in the Khaki election of 1918. Henceforth such former Liberals as Ponsonby, Trevelyan, Morel, Wedgwood, Noel and C. R. Buxton, and the later convert Colonel Kenworthy, were among the most frequent spokesmen for Labour in the foreign policy debates.⁵

When Labour attained office in 1924 and again in

1929, a significant share of the responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy was assumed by the recruits. The government's official foreign policy spokesman in the House of Lords was Lord Parmoor. Arthur Ponsonby served as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 1924 government, and Hugh Dalton held the post in the 1929 government while Phillip Noel Baker was the latter's secretary. The new members likewise dominated the delegations to the League of Nations during Labour's months in office. Parmoor served as head of a delegation of six to the Fifth Assembly in 1924 which included also C. R. Buxton and Mrs. Swanwick as well as another convert, William Arnold-Forster, who served as Parmoor's secretary. Mrs. Swanwick, Mary Agnes Hamilton, Dalton, and Noel Baker attended during the period of the second Labour government. Since Trevelyan was accused of being "assertive" in foreign policy issues which came before the cabinet,⁶ it may also be assumed that those converts who achieved cabinet rank utilized the opportunity to express their views on foreign affairs. In addition to their official roles, the purely personal influence on policy such as that exerted by Sydney Arnold through his friendship with MacDonald should not be overlooked.⁷

At the same time that the newcomers to the Labour party were participating in the formation of Labour's foreign policy, they were likewise engaged in molding a public opinion sympathetic to their views. *Foreign Affairs*, the organ of the Union of Democratic Control, was the only Labour periodical devoted entirely to matters of foreign policy. From 1919 until his death in 1924, its editor, E. D. Morel, dominated the magazine's outlook. Most of its contributors and the two subsequent editors, Mrs. Swanwick and Norman Angell, were drawn from among the converts. The *New Leader's* treatment of foreign policy diverged in many instances from that of *Foreign Af-*

fairs, but its assistant editor, Mary Agnes Hamilton, regarded it as her mission to prevent any major break with the dominant party view,⁸ and Norman Angell, who served as acting editor for a time, also reflected the recruits' viewpoint. Most of those hitherto mentioned were responsible for books or pamphlets as well as frequent public lectures which continuously brought foreign policy issues before the public.⁹

The energy with which the recruits instructed the public on foreign policy issues and the speed with which the Labour party utilized the experience of its new members were indeed impressive. The number of important posts attained by the new converts might even seem to suggest that their influence in the area of Labour's foreign policy was decisive. Certainly the success of their rather unself-conscious infiltration placed control of Labour's foreign policy within their grasp. Yet the newcomers, having attained such remarkable opportunities for influencing Labour's foreign policy, proved to be somewhat divided as to what that policy should be.

These differences among the converts on foreign policy issues, which were to emerge clearly in the course of the first Labour government in 1924, were only hinted at during the years from 1919 to 1923. During that period the recruits dedicated their energies wholeheartedly to the crusade against the Treaty of Versailles. Their viewpoint—that Germany had been too harshly dealt with, both territorially and economically—was soon adopted by the rest of the Labour party and, in a remarkably short time, by the rest of the nation. Though there were other forces at work as well, the British public's disapproval of the Versailles settlement, which was to be so important a factor in the diplomacy of the 1930's, was to a large extent the result of the activities of this group during the early postwar period.

The particular nature of the influence exerted within the Labour party by the converts' view of the treaty is best illustrated by the varying receptions granted it by the different sections of the party in 1919. The trades-unionists who were then representing Labour in the House of Commons simply made a few good-tempered remarks, the upshot of which was that the treaty, like most human efforts, was imperfect. J. R. Clynes was anxious to save the party from any taint of pro-Germanism.

The Party's attitude in relation to this treaty is in no way determined by any consideration of tenderness for the German people themselves. Their crime has been so enormous that the penalty naturally must be severe.¹⁰

He was convinced that though the treaty had its "defects" and "blemishes," "it is the work of men who . . . must have acted with motives of the highest patriotism and with the highest and noblest considerations for human government." ¹¹

While Labour M.P.'s were voicing these cautious criticisms, E. D. Morel was launching the first issue of *Foreign Affairs* with a more severe judgment of the treaty, a judgment which, within a short time, was to be shared by the entire party. To Morel the treaty was not simply imperfect. It was wicked. Its authors were not noble patriots but vile tyrants.

For the past five months the statesmen and the diplomats have been spinning new webs of war. They have set their seal to the rape of nations, the dismemberment of states, the disruption of communities. They have condemned a great people to a generation of economic servitude and to national disintegration. . . . They have betrayed their peoples and the world.¹²

The Labour party executive, which was more influenced by the ex-Liberals than were the Labour M.P.'s, made strong criticisms of the treaty which were, however, more restrained in tone than those of Morel.¹³

These differing attitudes toward the peace settlement on the part of the trades-unionists and the converts probably derived to a large extent from their differing attitudes toward the war. While most of the trades-unionists had supported the war effort, those among the recruits most passionately concerned with foreign policy had usually opposed it. This latter group had insisted throughout the war years that the conflict was a useless slaughter resulting from an evil system of diplomacy which was controlled by greedy political leaders rather than the benevolent "peoples." They had strongly approved Wilson's principles, but the discovery that the treaty violated the Fourteen Points was, in a sense, a vindication of the unpopular position which they had maintained throughout the war. Trevelyan revealed this attitude quite clearly.

It was exactly as we had prophesied. The imperialist war had ended in the imperialist peace. We had been wrong in nothing except that we had failed to evoke in war time, the opinions which alone can extinguish war. *We* had been right; not the worthy optimists who had chattered about "a war to end war." ¹⁴

Mary Agnes Hamilton, another member of the group, on looking back remarked, "We denounced it [the treaty], at the time; we were indeed bound to do so, whatever it had been." ¹⁵

This same desire to justify their own stand during the war may explain the extent to which the attack on the treaty by the recruits took the form of an assault on the war guilt clause. Seldom in the history of English politics, where the pragmatically minded usually have the

leading role, has an effective group displayed such pre-occupation with an historical issue. During the first part of the decade, revelations concerning the evil machinations of French, Russian, and British statesmen in the prewar period filled numerous pamphlets as well as the columns of *Foreign Affairs*. Morel was convinced that Europe would never be pacified until the "myth" of Germany's sole guilt had been destroyed.

The fable of the German "plot," the phantasy of Allied innocence, the postulate of German sole guilt . . . this is the destructive legend accountable for all these calamities, for the tragedy of the image of Justice defaced, the tragedy of the negation of justice erected into a system, the tragedy of Europe arming once again for war.¹⁶

Indeed he seemed, at times, to transfer the war guilt to the Entente.

As prop after prop supporting the fiction [German war guilt] has crumbled, there has been evolved, link by link, a formidable chain of evidence of purposeful intent, of subtle genius in maintaining deceptive appearances, of chances calmly calculated between Paris and Petersburg.¹⁷

The culmination of efforts of this sort was the publication in 1926 of Lowes Dickinson's *The International Anarchy*. In this work the Cambridge don attempted a scholarly refutation of the thesis of Germany's sole guilt in favor of the idea of general responsibility, the moral of which he did not hesitate to point out with quite unscholarly vehemence.¹⁸

Since the treaty had been based on the false assumption of Germany's sole guilt, the recruits opposed almost automatically the territorial changes which it brought

about. The eastern boundaries of Germany, which left large German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia, were cited as flagrant violations of the Allies' own principle of the self-determination of peoples. The Polish Corridor was viewed as the most indefensible of the boundary revisions. C. R. Buxton contended, "Among all the strange, wild actions of the Peace Conference, among all its outrages of justice, in the name of justice, the Polish 'corridor' to Danzig is perhaps pre-eminent."¹⁹ The prohibition of German and Austrian unification was "a cruel treaty bar" which "must be thrown down."²⁰ Even Germany's loss of colonies, which might be expected to leave unmoved a group with such anti-imperialist tendencies, was regarded as an outrage.²¹

Despite the vehemence expended by the recruits on the war guilt clause and the territorial changes, it was against the economic section of the treaty that they found their most effective arguments. The most influential effort in this area was *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919) by John Maynard Keynes, a Liberal who remained resolutely outside the Labour party. Keynes's contention that Germany could never pay the reparations demanded and that it would be almost fatal to the economy of the rest of Europe if she did, was almost identical with the view put forward by Norman Angell in a book published the same month.²² Though some of the new Labourites like Morel might have chosen to emphasize the injustice of German reparations rather than their harmfulness, they were happy to use Keynes's devastating arguments in support of their own, and they did much to draw attention to his work. They recognized also that his withering portraits of the peacemakers and his criticism of the political motives behind the heavy reparations were most potent weapons, not only against the economic clauses, but against the treaty as a whole.²³

During the early years of the decade of the 1920's, mounting unemployment made the English public increasingly receptive to Keynes's view that England, for reasons of self-interest, should work for a reduction of reparations. The supposed connection between British unemployment and German reparations was utilized increasingly in the writings and speeches of the converts. In 1922 Arnold-Forster remarked:

With two million unemployed in our midst we have been compelled to realize the very obvious fact that the foreign trade we live by cannot be carried on with bankrupts or slaves and that we simply cannot afford to see Germany ruined or compelled to flood the world with sweated goods: she was, and she ought to be again, our best customer except India and our chief supplier except the United States.²⁴

A year later in the House of Commons Morel was even more explicit:

Surely it must be patent to every man of common sense in this House and out of it that for every penny we have got for reparations up to the present time we have had to pay 1s out of our own pockets in doles to the unemployed . . . that in pursuing this will-o-the-wisp of Reparations as at present conceived it means the industrial ruin of Germany. [*sic*] We have been pursuing it at the expense of British trade, British industry, the British producer and consumer, and the British working man.²⁵

The new members of the Labour party and, in a short time, the Labour party itself had, by these criticisms of the treaty, assumed the role of defenders of Germany. Their opposition to some of the Allied and more often French policies toward the defeated power during the

early postwar period was to confirm them in that role. The continuance of the blockade after the Armistice was described as "cold-blooded torture" and the Fight the Famine Council, which was formed by the Buxtons, Parmoor, and Pethick-Lawrence to work for the lifting of the blockade, was later to direct its efforts toward the adoption of policies which would lead to the economic rehabilitation of Germany.

The stationing of African troops in the Rhineland as part of the French occupation force likewise evoked violent protest among the converts. The revulsion with which the very idea of "black troops" was received in these circles is rather surprising, especially as the most vehement critic of the French action was Morel, the tireless leader before the war of the campaign in behalf of the natives of the Congo Free State. His exposé, *The Horror on the Rhine* (1920), consisted largely of a catalogue of the cases of rape in which African troops were involved. The inescapable conclusion was that womanhood in Germany was in serious jeopardy.

In ones and twos, sometimes in parties, big, stalwart men from warmer climes, armed with sword-bayonets or knives, sometimes with revolvers, living unnatural lives of restraint, their fierce passions hot within them, roam the countryside. Woe to the girl returning to her village home, or on the way to town with market produce, or at work alone hoeing in the fields. Dark forms come leaping out from the shadows of the trees, appear unexpectedly among the vines and grasses, rise from the corn where they have lain concealed. Then—panic-stricken flight which often availeth not.²⁶

Morel predicted that the effect of this occupation on the future of Europe would be disastrous. He was eloquent.

What attitude could you expect in the future, he asked, from the German boys who were then being told,

They inflicted upon us the supreme outrage. From the plains and forests, from the valleys and the swamps of Africa they brought tens of thousands of savage men, and thrust them upon us. Boys, *these men raped your mothers and sisters!* ²⁷

Morel's picture appears to have been considerably overdrawn. The majority of the troops were North Africans (therefore not black), and because of their Moham-medanism were less given to drunkenness than other occupying troops. An American observer found no serious complaint concerning their behavior.²⁸ Exaggerated though it was, *The Horror on the Rhine* went into eight editions and undoubtedly did a good deal to arouse anti-French feeling in England as well as to fix in British minds the concept of Germany as a persecuted nation.

This impression was further emphasized when in 1923 French troops entered the Ruhr following a default in Germany's reparations payments. Conservatives and Liberals as well as Labourites disapproved of the action, but, as might be expected, the most strident objections came from among the recruits. They insisted that France was not interested in obtaining reparations and had, in fact, rejected the offers of German trades unions to rebuild the areas which had been destroyed. Dorothy Buxton charged,

The last thing . . . that the "good Frenchmen,"—the capitalist-militarists—desired was that Germany should repair the ruins she had made. The open sore, France's bleeding wound, would then have been healed; the subject for impassioned appeals to the sympathy of the world and to the anti-German chauvinism of the French

people would have been removed. The capitalists and militarists who control French policy could not afford to have these precious ruins exchanged for smiling homesteads. . . . To them the Devastated Areas represented a highway which led straight to the Ruhr.²⁹

To Morel, French policy had ceased to be solely a matter of injustice to Germany; it had become a threat to all Europe. The passive resistance of the Ruhr inhabitants would, he asserted, "ring down through the ages," for he believed it to be "the only thing that stands between the world and the establishment of a military and economic domination by a single power in Europe."³⁰

The extent to which concern for the fair treatment of Germany dominated the foreign policy thinking of the recruits explains, in large part, their rather surprising lack of enthusiasm for the League of Nations during the early 1920's. Though they had been among the most enthusiastic advocates of an international organization during the war years, the exclusion of Germany and Russia from membership made of it, according to Hobson, "not a League of Peoples" but "a New Holy Alliance . . . designed to hold down their enemies by superior economic and military-naval force, and to exercise a domination over the whole world."³¹ The Covenant of the League of Nations was, furthermore, part of the hated treaty or, in Morel's words, "part of a larger instrument legalising the most fearful injuries ever inflicted upon any nation in modern history."³² This association goes far to explain their initial distrust.

In their writings the recruits invariably conceded that, despite the many weaknesses of the league, efforts toward making it an effective organization should not be abandoned. The first moves which were made toward strengthening the league did not, however, take the form which

they had hoped—the admission of Germany and general disarmament—but rather were directed toward strengthening sanctions against a possible aggressor. The hostility with which this group regarded the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, a plan submitted to the various governments by the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1923, was almost inevitable in the light of their convictions concerning international affairs. The draft treaty was an attempt to strengthen the rather vague Article X of the covenant by organizing regional pacts under the council of the league which would be given the authority to invoke military and economic sanctions in case of aggression. Though not all the converts were outright pacifists, most of them had a great aversion to the use of force. They were convinced that armaments breed war and that to attempt to strengthen a league for international peace by organizing military force was hopeless folly. Parmoor, speaking in the House of Lords, expressed this view point clearly. All this preparation of sanctions was not in “the spirit of good will and neighborliness which we want to encourage.” He continued:

After all, the whole object of the League is to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security. . . . I hope that side of the League will be encouraged in every possible way. I may be wrong . . . but the Treaty of Mutual Assistance seems to me to point in a directly contrary direction. It is based on the theory that you must have force before you can have friendliness or security. I wholly deny that. I say that the introduction of force in those circumstances is a fatal mistake. It would be the introduction of a new era of fear such as led to the war of 1914.³³

A similar view was expressed by Mrs. Swanwick:

When all possibility of its [the league's] appealing to physical force has been abandoned its decisions will stand as moral judgments of great and growing power. The League will then not "fail" if some foolish States defy its judgments; the League will fail only if it shirks its duty and dare [*sic*] not utter the judgment of International Right.³⁴

It is some indication of the change which was about to affect the Labour party's thinking in these matters that both Mrs. Swanwick and Parmoor were members of the delegation which, in the fall of 1924, voted in favor of the Geneva Protocol, a plan which placed equal reliance on military sanctions.

Another factor explaining the converts' opposition to the draft treaty was their fear that to guarantee existing frontiers would be to fasten the Versailles system still more firmly on Europe. As early as 1920, Ponsonby had cautioned against any such attempt. "Nothing . . . could be more short-sighted," he warned, "than to saddle the League with the task of preserving the ill-considered and, in many cases, flagrantly injudicious decisions of the Peace Conference."³⁵ This objection was infrequently voiced, however, for it left the objectors open to the charge of favoring the alteration of frontiers by force. The abhorrence of the use of force which was characteristic of most of the converts made any such imputation untrue. However, the suspicion on the part of the recruits that too great a feeling of security on the part of the French, the Poles, and the Czechs might make them less willing to submit to boundary revisions probably persisted nonetheless.

Though the converts were overwhelmingly opposed to a league backed by force, it is important to observe that

the recruits also provided spokesmen for the smaller group which was beginning to voice an opposing viewpoint. As early as 1920 Arnold-Forster was recommending that blockade be outlawed as a weapon in "private war" and that only the League of Nations be permitted to employ it. He argued:

If we assume for the moment that economic war cannot yet be done away with altogether, then any step in the direction of putting it in the hands of the community of nations is obviously a step in the right direction. . . . It is far better that the League, imperfect as it is, should have a measure of control over economic war than that the appalling weapon should be left lying about for any reckless Power to pick up.³⁶

Morel was quick to reply with the stock criticism that the league was simply an alliance from which half the population of Europe had been excluded.³⁷ Yet in 1923 Lowes Dickinson proposed an answer to difficulties raised concerning possible breaches of faith in the event of the adoption of a disarmament scheme.³⁸

It is interesting to note that Arnold-Forster, who appears to have been the first to recommend the strengthening of sanctions for collective security, was also the first to admit any sympathy with French demands for security against Germany. The attitude toward Germany most commonly accepted by the recruits during the early post-war years was expressed editorially in *Foreign Affairs*.

With the attitude of the rulers of France from the armistice to the present day we have no sympathy whatever: nor with the claim that their acts are justified by their fear of Germany. It is they themselves who are the causation of the fears they plead in excuse for their conduct, which has been atrocious.³⁹

Yet, several months earlier Arnold-Forster had pointed out that Britain, having induced France to relinquish the Rhine frontier at Versailles with promises of an Anglo-American guarantee, was bound in honor to provide security against a German attack. Furthermore, he maintained that Europe could anticipate no stability until such a guarantee was given, for "she [France] is likely to continue to seek everywhere for such fallacious safeguards as may seem to be afforded by the weakening of Germany."⁴⁰ His proposed solution was a Locarno-type agreement which would include Germany as well as France and thus would avoid the pitfalls of an alliance directed against another power and rejection by the recruits. It is not his proposed solution, however, but the fact of his recognition of a responsibility for French security which makes Arnold-Forster's viewpoint significant.

The infrequency with which such views were expressed serves to emphasize the unanimity which was characteristic of Labour party opinion on foreign policy during the period from 1919 to 1923. A league which was based on cooperation and good will rather than sanctions, a league broadened to include Germany and Russia, a revision of the 1919 peace settlement—these were the objectives toward which the majority of the recruits had labored to lead their new party. By the eve of the first Labour government in 1924, they appeared to have achieved their goal. Labour party conferences called annually for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Proposals for disarmament were enthusiastically received, while an amendment urging armed opposition to aggression was overwhelmingly defeated.⁴¹ In their insular security, the British Labourites saw no threat but that of French "militarism," and they had no intention of committing British forces to action in support of a league which seemed to them

simply to mask a new alliance. So completely had these opinions been accepted within the Labour party by 1923 that the success in 1924 of Arnold-Forster's minority viewpoint seems startling indeed.

The foreign policy views generally accepted by the Labour party during the immediate postwar years, received their first serious setback with Morel's failure to achieve the post of Foreign Secretary in the first Labour government. His defeat of Winston Churchill at Dundee in 1922 had gained him prestige within the party, and his vigorous concentration on foreign policy had made him the symbol to the public of the Labour party's views in that sphere. It was expected by many, therefore, that he would be given control of foreign affairs in any Labour cabinet. The considerations which served to deprive him of the office were largely personal: MacDonald's ambition to hold the post himself and his dislike of Morel. It is true, however, that even in the absence of such factors it would have been virtually impossible to ask the French government to deal with a foreign secretary who had devoted the better part of five years to vitriolic criticism of French policy.⁴² Debarred from the responsibilities of office, Morel was to continue his agitation for the policies which had constituted Labour's views in 1923, at the same time that others among the recruits were exerting their influence in favor of the changes which developed during the party's first term of office.

The first alteration in the party's stand came with MacDonald's embarrassed admission under Conservative questioning in the House of Commons that the Labour government had no plans for pressing for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles.⁴³ Party orators had long demanded the calling of a conference which would completely revise the settlement, and Arthur Henderson, the Home Secretary, appears simply to have yielded to rhe-

torical habit when, during the heat of a bye-election, he took a strong stand in favor of revision. Given the fact that the government was at the time engaged in negotiations attempting to bring about French withdrawal from the Ruhr and the further fact that any such conference almost certainly faced total failure, MacDonald had little choice but to repudiate Henderson's statement. Thus the hard facts of the international situation had forced the Labour government to set aside one of the party's chief foreign policy objectives.

If MacDonald's statement appeared to mean Labour's acquiescence in the territorial settlement of Versailles, the government's agreement to the Dawes Plan for reparations payments seemed to imply acceptance of the economic clauses. This plan, which reduced the payments of reparations though not the total, was regarded by such moderates as Angell as a practical benefit to Germany, not only because it eased the immediate burden, but also because its acceptance served as the basis for the French withdrawal from the Ruhr.⁴⁴ Yet in obtaining such practical results, the Labour cabinet had been forced to agree to reparations totals which they had hitherto denounced as both unjust and ruinous.

The government's support of the Dawes Plan was the signal for Morel's revolt against MacDonald's foreign policy. His attack on the Dawes proposals in the House of Commons revealed an open breach with the party's leadership.

The whole of this scheme from the economic point of view is an attempt to rebuild the economy of Europe upon absolutely unsound lines, using the enormous human machine production in Germany in an abnormal way; abnormally forcing its output and abnormally restricting its imports. . . . I will be no party

to inducing, by my silence on these Benches, the British public to believe that this last attempt to square the circle and to make economic truths compatible with the violation of economic truths, is going to settle this tangle in the days to come.⁴⁵

A week and a half later, in a letter to the *New Leader*, he extended his criticism to include the whole tone of Labour's foreign policy. Not only had the Labour government given its sanction to the Treaty of Versailles, it had revealed no more friendly attitude toward Germany than that of its Conservative predecessor. Surely, he argued, Labourites had been justified in expecting a Labour government

. . . to bring Germany as well as France into the international picture, to exhibit some measure of understanding, some expression of appreciation, it might even be of sympathy for the difficulties of a people whose treatment during the last five years has been an outrage upon and a peril to, our common civilization. There has been no such effort.⁴⁶

The severe criticism of the government's acceptance of the Dawes Report which was voiced at the 1924 Labour party conference,⁴⁷ and Angell's disclosure that Ponsonby, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was disturbed by "the absence of a syllable of sympathy for Germany"⁴⁸ suggest that Morel was speaking for a considerable section of the party.

Morel's efforts to force the Labour government to adhere strictly to the party's earlier pronouncements on foreign policy achieved only one success, the Russian treaty. The opening of full diplomatic and trade relations with Soviet Russia had been advocated since 1917 by all sections of the Labour party, and it was an especially popu-

lar cause among the trades-unionists who anticipated that large Russian orders would help solve the unemployment problem. The Labour government early granted *de jure* recognition to the Soviet government, but negotiations for a treaty foundered on the Soviet's refusal to acknowledge any responsibility for debts owed either to British citizens or to the British government at the time of the revolution. In such circumstances, the Labour government refused to guarantee a loan to Russia which would have been necessary for the financing of Russian orders in England, and after four months of effort Ponsonby announced in the House of Commons that negotiations had broken down. There followed the curious intervention of a group of backbenchers led by Morel,⁴⁹ who were determined to "save" the treaty. By dint of much pressure on Ponsonby and their own unofficial negotiations with Rakovsky, the Russian delegate, they were able to bring about an agreement that a guaranteed loan would be granted when a commission had reached agreement on the question of the debts.⁵⁰ It was, as one observer remarked, "an agreement to agree if and when the Parties could agree to agree,"⁵¹ but a treaty had been obtained, and Morel and his group posed proudly for a photographer after the completion of their labors.⁵²

On the basis of these incidents it has been suggested that, had Morel lived, he would have led a revolt which would seriously have challenged MacDonald's leadership.⁵³ Surely he would have continued to serve as the focus for those forces discontented with the party's foreign policy. It should be pointed out, however, that Morel's sole success in pressing his views on the Labour government had been achieved with the backing of the trades-unionists, a group ordinarily less influenced by questions of foreign policy than by domestic issues. Of the other recruits, even such a stalwart revisionist as C.

R. Buxton had admitted the necessity of some of MacDonald's compromises on Germany.⁵⁴ Without the wholehearted support of the other converts which he had enjoyed before 1924, and probably without any enthusiastic cooperation from the trades-unionists, it is unlikely that Morel would have repeated this success even if he had lived beyond December, 1924.

While Morel was thus busily fighting changes in Labour's foreign policy, others among the converts were engaged in leading their adopted party toward one of the most significant foreign policy shifts in its history, the acceptance of the concept of collective security. Angell's description of MacDonald's hostile reaction to suggestions of any British guarantee⁵⁵ indicates how far the Labour government was from the acceptance of any such concept during its early weeks in office. Yet the fact that Angell, one of the leading journalists within the party, was preaching both to MacDonald and to the public the value of some reassurance to France suggests, in itself, a change of atmosphere. Angell favored an agreement on collective defense between England and France which might later serve as a nucleus for the police power of the League of Nations. His apologetic tone indicates, however, that he fully appreciated the strength of the anti-French ideas of Labour's immediate past and that, in fact, he shared them.

It is true that there is something comic about the suggestion that France, more powerful relatively than any state in Europe since the days of Napoleon, with enormous air, sea and under-sea armaments, with a round dozen of satellite States and the vast reserves of savage Africa to draw upon, should tremble at the thought of Germany—disarmed, helpless, hopeless, paralyzed, starving; more comic still when the France which fears

the vengeance of Germany commits daily acts which would inflame the vengeance of any people under the sun. The spectacle, I say, of this France demanding security from attack by the Power which she is invading, violating, insulting, trampling upon, has something in it of the outrageously and obscenely comic. In this playing of the cat with the nearly dead mouse, we are asked to afford security-to the cat. . . . Even so, if such an offer is the road to some reawakening of French sanity, if it is by some plan of security that France will at last see reason, then to that plan we must resort. . . . The effect of this absurd fear . . . upon French behavior is precisely the same as though that fear were well-founded. And the part of wisdom is, in all our negotiations with the French to act as though that fear *were* well-founded. By that means only will it be exorcised.⁵⁶

He agitated further for the recognition of force as an inevitable element in international as in domestic life. The significant issue, he maintained, was not force versus no force, but the principles for which force is to stand. The efforts of the pacifists should be devoted not to reducing the number of cruisers, but to seeing that those cruisers were put at the disposal of the international community to enforce a code of international morality. Disarmament would then occur naturally.⁵⁷ There were signs, within the party, of a small but growing support for Angell's views.⁵⁸

Yet Labour's acceptance of a plan for collective security was the result less of the efforts of its few proponents in England than of a diplomatic *quid pro quo* at Geneva. The delegation to the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 appears to have had no specific instructions,⁵⁹ but its members were hopeful that

British Labour could lead the way to the acceptance of some plan for disarmament. It was thought that tensions preventing disarmament might be reduced if the area of arbitration, rather limited under the covenant, were increased. They found, however, that neither arbitration nor disarmament plans would receive serious attention from other nations without some provision for sanctions in case of violations. It was a testimony to the strength of their devotion to disarmament and arbitration that the British delegation was willing to set aside its long-standing objections to the use of force in order to obtain acceptance of their cherished objectives. The Geneva Protocol, which was unanimously recommended by the Fifth Assembly, was, from the Labour party's point of view, an improvement in several respects over the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. By its requirement of arbitration in all disputes as well as the acceptance of the arbitral award, by its provision for a successful disarmament conference as a preliminary to the actual operation of the protocol, it placed more emphasis on those positive approaches to peace of which British Labour was so fond. In its ultimate reliance on military sanctions, however, it did not differ from the draft treaty which the Labour party had so recently rejected.

It would be erroneous to infer, however, that acceptance of the Geneva Protocol made the British delegates enthusiastic about the idea of collective force. The writings of the converts on the delegation, both at the time and subsequently, reveal a reluctant acceptance of the concept, but an acceptance the implications of which they were fully aware. The head of the delegation, Lord Parmoor, expressed his position thus:

I regarded the creation of a common confidence and goodwill as of greater importance than penalties of any

kind in the form of sanctions. . . . I am aware that any system of sanctions opens certain avenues for criticism, but we must maintain the right perspective and realize, without any illusion, that if arbitration is to be maintained as a form of international security, adequate sanctions must be provided, however deeply some of us may feel that these sanctions are only likely to be required in a very small number of cases, if they are ever required at all.⁶⁰

The Quaker, C. R. Buxton, echoed these sentiments:

I do not dispute the fact that this is a serious obligation. I believe it is a price that is worth paying—in a world that has not yet embraced pure pacifism—for a scheme which provides for the reference of every international dispute of judicial, arbitral or conciliatory settlement.⁶¹

Mrs. Swanwick, who was to revert shortly to her earlier uncompromising stand against sanctions,⁶² explained clearly, after her return from Geneva, the considerations which had gained her acquiescence:

There is not the slightest doubt that, unless these Powers can get this kind of international sanction they will neither reduce their armaments nor abandon the policy of balance of power, and sitting upon their enemies' heads. It is not therefore for us a question of force or no force: it is a question whether force should be subjected to law or remain anarchical.⁶³

If the delegates to Geneva felt a certain trepidation concerning the protocol, the reaction of the Labour cabinet appears to have verged on outright hostility. Haldane, one of the few Labour converts from among the Liberal imperialists of the prewar years, opposed it as too heavy a commitment for Britain's naval and military

forces. Though Wedgwood appears to have given reluctant assent at the time, his subsequent efforts to convince the Second International that they should give it their support only after Germany had been admitted to the league⁶⁴ indicates that his support was somewhat ephemeral. Furthermore, despite MacDonald's rhetoric in behalf of internationalism, supporters of a vigorous League of Nations policy found him "suspicious" of the league,⁶⁵ a tendency which may have been increased while in office by a heavy reliance on permanent officials at the war office and at the admiralty who were, like Haldane, opposed to increasing Britain's military commitments.⁶⁶ There are, in short, good grounds for the opinion of some scholars that the Labour cabinet might have refused to adopt the protocol without major reservations.⁶⁷

The fall of the Labour government made a cabinet decision unnecessary, but the protocol was accepted as the party's policy by most of the leaders. There was a tendency, however, on the part of some of the protocol's advocates to present the provisions for sanctions as simply a humoring of France which would have no practical consequences.⁶⁸ The fullest grasp of the implications of collective security appears to have been attained by the most violent opponents on the one hand, and, on the other, by a small group of enthusiasts who not only accepted but embraced sanctions. In both cases, it was the recruits who provided either the leadership or the inspiration of the respective groups.

One of the strongest attacks on the concept of collective security came from the pacifist section of the party which was led by Arthur Ponsonby. Ponsonby rejected "the myth of the aggressor nation" on which the protocol was based, insisting that the causes of war were not "the crossing of a frontier" or "the isolated refusal of a nation to submit a dispute to arbitration," but a complex of ten-

sions which inevitably erupted on one pretext or another.⁶⁹ His campaign for "disarmament by example," *i.e.*, unilateral disarmament, was an attempt, by a gesture of good will, to reduce these fears and tensions. He was also the originator of the Peace Letter whose numerous signers, in pledging themselves to take no part in any future war, made no exception of a possible league war. To Ponsonby it seemed ridiculous to expect to

. . . abolish "private war" by organising in a restricted degree "public war" under the guise of a collective guarantee of security for all nations. In this rests the whole fallacy of sanctions. It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that the idea of stopping war by war is farcical in the extreme.⁷⁰

In addition to the pacifist scruples concerning the use of force, the widespread objection to the protocol's stereotyping of the status quo reveals the success of the converts' early efforts to create anti-Versailles sentiment within the party. The Conservative rejection of the protocol was applauded by the *New Statesman*, a magazine which reflected the views of the Fabians. They insisted, "On the fundamental issue he [Austen Chamberlain] was right; it was necessary to reject the Protocol."⁷¹ Their stand was re-emphasized during the next few weeks.

We [England] are not prepared even seriously to discuss—still less to defend—the rights of Poland to her present frontiers either on the East or on the West. . . . We will not or cannot undertake any obligations East of the Rhine.⁷²

And again:

Great Britain does not wish to repudiate the Covenant, but she will certainly do so—if the practical issue

should ever arise—more readily than she will consent to admit the justice of the Polish occupation of Pinsk and Kattowitz and Tarnopol. If Article 10 means the preservation of palpable injustices, then so much the worse for Article 10! . . . The Article can have no practical meaning or value until (1) the League of Nations includes all the Great Powers of Europe, and (2) the boundary settlements of existing States are generally admitted to be just.⁷³

While the self-conscious socialists of the Labour party were thus either publishing such Morel-like statements in the *New Stateman* or passing resolutions in favor of Ponsonby's "disarmament by example" at I.L.P. conferences, whatever advocacy the party's internationalist program had came from among the recruits. With the important exception of Arthur Henderson, those most active in defending the principles of the protocol—Noel Baker, Dalton, Arnold-Forster, and Angell—were recruits of the war or postwar years. Dalton's enthusiastic defense of the concept of collective security against the assaults of the pacifists reveals none of the apologetic tone which had characterized the explanations of the league delegates in 1924. He asserted:

Some provision for sanctions and coercive action, however discreetly these things may be kept in the background and however sparingly they may be used in practice, is a logical requirement of any legal system. . . . To think, as some sentimentalists appear to do, that we can build a new international order without any sanctions whatever, is not to think at all. . . . If a high moral tone is to be the League's only weapon against the material force of an aggressor, its bluff will soon be called. . . . If law and order in the interna-

tional sphere are what we want, it is common sense that, in that sphere, we must be prepared to back the police.⁷⁴

Arnold-Forster put it more succinctly. Security, he explained, "involves the renunciation of 'private peace' as well as 'private war.' " ⁷⁵

In answer to the criticism that the protocol would mean guaranteeing unjust boundaries, the proponents of collective security made one of their most startling deviations from the orthodoxy of the first half of the decade. Noel Baker declared, "The worst conceivable status quo is better than a resort to arms." "The great need of the present hour," he maintained, "is not for change, it is for stability." ⁷⁶ Hugh Dalton went even further and attempted a kind of defense of the Versailles Treaty, pointing out that the boundaries, while admittedly unjust, were a considerable improvement over the 1914 frontiers. He criticized his fellow Labourites for their neglect of the Polish side of the frontier question. He likewise frowned upon their agitation for frontier revisions which, by raising false hopes, made the task of the German moderates more difficult.

It is folly to dream, at this stage, of important changes in frontiers otherwise than by war and it is worse than folly to prefer war, with all its horrors and the hazards of its issue, to the itch of present discontents. The only practical and wise starting point of immediate policy is to take existing frontiers for granted and to aim not towards their revision, but towards their obliteration. Let justice be done within the present frontiers, let communication and trade and personal intercourse be facilitated across them, and the itch may be soothed. Then, in a happier and less inflamed future, frontier

revision may come to seem both less impossible and less important.⁷⁷

This internationalist group of converts at the end of the decade clearly regarded the antisanctionist, anti-Versailles views which had been inculcated by their fellow recruits in the first half of the decade as the most serious obstacle to a wholehearted acceptance of their own policy.

By the time Labour again assumed office in 1929, the disagreement over the issue of collective security had been somewhat assuaged by a seeming relaxation of international tensions. The league's admission of Germany to membership had mollified the suspicions of some Labourites. The Locarno pacts, by recognizing England's responsibility for the Rhine frontier, appeared to settle the problem of security for the two major continental powers. Though the foreign office was taken over in 1929 by the most league-minded members of the party—Henderson, Dalton, and Noel Baker—their policy emphasizing arbitration and disarmament found few critics within the party. In working for the early withdrawal of Allied troops from the Rhineland, the second Labour government was pursuing the policy suggested by Dalton, that of reducing tensions within the Versailles system without attempting to destroy it. The question of what England's policy should be in the face of an armed attack on the Versailles settlement, which was to be the central foreign policy issue of the 1930's, was thus temporarily obscured by these more hopeful developments.

Despite the differences which developed among the converts in the last half of the decade, there were certain shared assumptions underlying their foreign policy views throughout. The central position which was occupied by disarmament in their thinking, the desire after "having

fought a man and beaten him to shake hands with him,"⁷⁸ and, more especially, to trade with him,⁷⁹ the optimism with which they viewed man's efforts to control his international fate, whether by military sanctions or good will, suggest their common background of nineteenth-century liberalism. It can be argued that this viewpoint was the most significant contribution of the recruits to their new party. The Labour party continued to work vigorously for the salvation of capitalistic civilization while the doctrinaire socialists cried out in vain that it was futile to disarm, arbitrate, and cooperate in a capitalistic world.⁸⁰ To assign the converts full responsibility for the Labour party's liberal foreign policy outlook would be to ignore the elements which derived from the party's own Liberal parentage. It is quite clear, however, that the influence of the new members, while perhaps not decisive, clearly strengthened the liberal tendencies already present.

An assessment of the total impact of Labour's recruits on the direction of its foreign policy during the 1920's is difficult because of the extent to which they merged into their new party. After 1919 they ceased to be an identifiable group, and the converts are to be found arguing both pro and con on the question of military sanctions, the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, and almost any issue which came under discussion during the decade. It would be inaccurate to conclude, however, that they simply canceled each other out, for their greater influence appears to have been given from 1919 to 1923 to the support of the viewpoint represented by Morel, while in the later period it seems to have been largely exerted in favor of the position typified by Dalton. Their role within the party thus appears to have been one of leadership in the true sense of the term, for if they were the first to heap scorn on the treaty and the league, they were also

the first to recognize the dangers of such a position, and to retreat from it. It is important to note also, that it was the sobering experience of the responsibilities of office in 1924 rather than the shock of Hitler's rise in the 1930's which accounts for this fundamental change of heart.

V

The Recruits and Intraparty Conflict, 1924-1931

"How are things with your Party?" asked the Liberal [in 1930]. "Pretty rough" said the Labour man. "We've got a lot of Liberals in our Party—and *they're getting fed up with this Tory Government!*"¹

THE dramatic development by which, in August, 1931, Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues, Snowden and Thomas, shifted within hours from the leadership of the Labour party to the leadership of a National government composed of Liberals and Conservatives was the culmination of pressures which had been developing within the Labour party since 1924 and which had been intensified by the "economic blizzard" of 1929. In the internal controversies of these years the recruits, now fully settled in their new party, assumed a prominent part. Theirs was not a single impact, however, for their influence was evident in the revolts of left and right as well as in the vociferous criticism which emanated from that section of the party which remained grudgingly loyal to the leadership until the events of August, 1931.

Of the tensions which marked this period the most consistently prominent was the rift which developed between the Independent Labour party and the leadership

of the Labour party. The leaders most distasteful to the I.L.P., MacDonald and Snowden, were, curiously enough, I.L.P. members who had been considerably aided by this affiliation in their rise to office. This was especially true of MacDonald who had regained the leadership of the Parliamentary Labour party in 1922 after his four-year absence from Parliament² in a close contest in which the votes of the I.L.P. had been decisive. Yet by 1925 crucial policy differences between the I.L.P. and its two most prominent members had arisen, and relations thereafter deteriorated until, by 1930, the I.L.P. constituted a far more bitter opposition to the Labour government than did the Conservatives.

The genesis of this rift was the experience of the Labour government of 1924. During its nine months of office, this minority government had been able to produce only one major piece of social legislation, the Wheatley Housing Act. Such a moderate achievement was far from fulfilling the expectations of Labour supporters who had been led by party orators to expect sweeping reforms. MacDonald was determined to avoid in the future sensational and "flashy" commitments which could prove embarrassing when Labour returned to office. The I.L.P., on the other hand, was attempting to insure against a repetition of the disappointments of 1924 by gaining adoption of a program so precise that a future Labour government would be compelled to carry it out or resign.

The first of a series of programs by which the I.L.P. attempted to attain this objective was its "Socialism in Our Time" policy. These proposals, which were known also as the "Living Income" policy, were prepared by one of several I.L.P. committees whose function it was to work out policy in various areas. At the time this program was associated particularly with H. N. Brailsford and E. F. Wise, but the most influential member of the

committee would appear to have been the former Liberal, J. A. Hobson, on whose theories of oversaving and under-consumption the report was squarely based.³

According to Hobson, unemployment was a direct consequence of maldistribution of income. The workers did not receive sufficient wages to purchase the products of industry. This lack of demand meant unemployment for the worker and lack of investment opportunities for capital; thus capital accumulated in the hands of those who received too large a portion of the national income, tempting them to seek areas for investment in imperialistic ventures. The solution was clearly to be found in directing a higher proportion of the national income to those who would spend rather than save, *i.e.*, the workers, thus creating a sufficient demand at home to employ both the full labour force and the smaller amount of capital which would then be available. The method suggested by the committee and later endorsed by the I.L.P. was a minimum wage for industry supplemented by family allowances provided by the state. Some industries would be nationalized, and those which could not afford to pay the minimum wage would be forced to reorganize in order to accept the burden.

The attitude of the top leaders of the Labour party toward the program was distinctly hostile. The slogan "Socialism in Our Time" was especially irritating to MacDonald who viewed socialism as an evolutionary process. Philip Snowden, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, while bitterly hostile to MacDonald, was no less opposed to the direction of I.L.P. policies, for he had himself moved considerably to the right during his term of office.

Differences over the "Socialism in Our Time" program led the National Administrative Council of the I.L.P. in October, 1925, to remove MacDonald (who had publicly

referred to an I.L.P. branch in connection with another matter as "easie-oosie-asses") from the editorship of the I.L.P.'s *Socialist Review*. The general strike, which gave a rightward impetus to the political as well as the industrial labour movement, further widened the breach between the I.L.P. and the Labour party's leaders. In 1927 Snowden resigned his membership. By the time the 1929 government was formed the rupture was complete. Whereas I.L.P. members had constituted 30 per cent of the 1924 cabinet,⁴ no one prominently identified with the I.L.P. was appointed to the 1929 cabinet—to the relief of I.L.P. leaders. Their noninvolvement, said one of their leaders, would make criticism easier.⁵

Although it was on a program inspired by one of the recruits that the rift between the I.L.P. and the Labour party was based, the converts were not prominent in the I.L.P. revolt which followed. This is remarkable because in the years from 1914 to 1925, the vast majority of recruits had entered the Labour party through the I.L.P. In the years before the adoption of the new Labour Party Constitution in 1918, a non-trade-unionist could enter the Labour party only through membership either in the I.L.P. or the Fabian Society. Even after the establishment of constituency Labour parties, however, converts in the period from 1918 to 1925, attracted either by the I.L.P.'s pacifist record during the war or by the hope of catching the attention of MacDonald,⁶ continued to enter Labour's ranks by the I.L.P. route.

The explanation for the gradual disappearance of the converts from the I.L.P. after 1925 appears to lie in a change in its atmosphere and tone after that date. Clifford Allen, the middle class chairman of the I.L.P. who was described as MacDonald's "hidden hand,"⁷ resigned his chairmanship in 1925, partially, at least, on the issue of MacDonald's editorship of the *Socialist Review*.⁸ He

was succeeded by James Maxton, a more radical and more self-consciously proletarian leader from the Clyde. Thereafter the atmosphere became far less congenial to the middle class recruits. Those entering the Labour party after 1925 seldom enlisted in the I.L.P.,⁹ and, as the battle with MacDonald became more shrill—proceeding from the agitation for “Socialism in Our Time” to the even more pointed criticisms of the Maxton-Cook Manifesto—many of the earlier converts resigned.¹⁰

For the most part this exodus took place quietly, but at the 1929 conference of the I.L.P., C. R. Buxton, a former Liberal who had been prominent in I.L.P. circles, voiced the objections which prompted it.

The I.L.P. appeared to be adopting a policy which was sowing suspicion of the Labour Party, constantly suggesting that the wider Labour Party was untrue to Socialism, and was following this up by a system of pin-pricks and small criticisms. The impression was being created that the I.L.P. was a small self-righteous sect, and while harm was done to the Labour Party by this, more was being done to the I.L.P. itself. The result was that the I.L.P. carried less weight than it did and its influence was steadily lessening. It was looked upon as secedarian and its effort to make Socialists was weakened rather than strengthened.¹¹

A reply to this criticism, as recorded in the conference report, was made by another recruit, Charles Trevelyan, and it is significant that his defense was chiefly on nostalgic grounds.

The I.L.P. had been a refuge in the darkest hours he had ever experienced. He disagreed with Buxton. The I.L.P. must continue to be all it was or nothing. . . .

He looked upon the I.L.P. as a great emergency power. He did not think the I.L.P. had been quite so effective during the last year, but during the war it had kept the conscience of the workers. The experience might come again. . . . They must have an organized body like the I.L.P. in the Party, strongly alive to protest against a Labour Government if it did not do things.¹²

When, in 1930, the issue became whether members of the I.L.P. in the House of Commons would accept I.L.P. or Labour party discipline neither Buxton nor Trevelyan was listed among the eighteen members who chose loyalty to the I.L.P. Only John Strachey, among the converts, accepted I.L.P. leadership. Thus had the enthusiastic recruits of the war and early postwar years passed out of the I.L.P. into the larger Labour party.

This adherence to the Labour party on the part of the converts in the face of the I.L.P. rebellion should not be interpreted as signifying satisfaction with the Labour party's leadership, for there were among the former Liberals and Conservatives within the Labour party during these years, in G. D. H. Cole's phrase, both "seceders" and "loyal grouseers."¹³ The leader among the seceders was Sir Oswald Mosley, former Conservative and future Fascist, who, after a strong challenge to the leadership of the Labour party, led a group of six M.P.'s out of the Labour party.

Mosley's career in the Labour party, which was to end in his angry departure, began amid considerable promise. Of the recruits who streamed into the Labour party during the war and early postwar years he was generally acknowledged to have the brightest political future. As early as 1923 Beatrice Webb was referring to him as "the most brilliant man in the House of Commons."¹⁴ Her en-

thusiastic, if portentous, description of him is especially revealing as coming from one with rather exacting standards.

"Here is the perfect politician who is also a perfect gentleman," said I to myself as he entered the room. . . . If there were a word for the direct opposite of a caricature, for something which is almost absurdly a *perfect type*, I should apply it to him. Tall and slim, his features not too handsome to be strikingly peculiar to himself; modest yet dignified in manner, with a pleasant voice and unegotistical conversation, this young person would make his way in the world without his adventitious advantages which are many—birth, wealth, and a beautiful aristocratic wife. He is also an accomplished orator in the old grand style; and [*sic*] assiduous worker in the modern manner—keeps two secretaries at work supplying him with information but realizes that he himself has to do the thinking! So much perfection argues rottenness somewhere.¹⁵

His charms and abilities, as well as his aristocratic connections and those of his wife, the daughter of Lord Curzon, very much impressed MacDonald, and an intimate social relationship sprang up between them which augured well for Mosley's political future.¹⁶

This close association with the leader of the party did not prevent Mosley from being a candid, if polite, critic of Labour policy from his earliest days in the party. Snowden was clearly irritated by the fact that within a few months of his entry into the party in 1924, Mosley was furnishing proposals for a new program.¹⁷ During the Labour government of 1924 he attempted, by his questions in the House of Commons to induce the government "to examine the relationship of monetary policy and unemployment."¹⁸ At the I.L.P. summer school of 1925 he

put forth a plan worked out by himself and John Strachey, who was the son of the editor of *Spectator* and, like Mosley, a former Conservative. This plan was later published in pamphlet form under the title *Revolution by Reason* (1925).

The proposals in *Revolution by Reason* were put forth as a supplement to, rather than a reversal of, Labour party policy. There was, however, a criticism of Labour's policy implied in his statement of the problem.

We hold that evolutionary Socialism is not enough. Time presses in the turmoil of the war's aftermath. The year 1925 holds not the atmosphere of a secluded study where pedants may stroll their way through go-slow philosophies. Events move with ever-gathering momentum to conclusions of ever-darkening shadows. Crisis after crisis sends capitalist society staggering ever nearer to abysses of inconceivable catastrophe to suffering millions. The socialisation of one or two industries after protracted struggle in several parliamentary sessions can scarcely arrest in time the fatal process of disintegration and collapse. Measures of a drastic and Socialist character must be enforced rapidly over the whole field of industry.¹⁹

The measures which Mosley proposed were based on the idea that unemployment should be attacked by an expansion of credit and a reversal of the deflationary policy being pursued by the Conservatives. An early nationalization of the banks was the first step in the plan. In this way the government would gain control of credit and could then embark on a program of granting credits to consumers and to the producers of socially desirable commodities. This expansion of credit would, according to Mosley, "break the vicious circle of destitution and unemployment" by increasing purchasing power

and, as a consequence, employment. The government would set down certain requirements as to wages for all industries and might, in certain cases, help to shoulder the added cost. Nationalization of industries would take place first not in the unsuccessful industries but in those prosperous enterprises whose profits would be useful to the government. Nationalization would become a somewhat less pressing matter, however, for the government by its control of credit would, in fact, virtually control the economy.

The I.L.P., eager to support any forceful proposal, endorsed Mosley's schemes for early nationalization of the banks and an expansion of credit. Mosley apparently recognized, as the I.L.P. leaders did not, however, that there was an essential difference between the assumptions on which these proposals were based and the theory which underlay the I.L.P.'s Living Income Policy.²⁰ Mosley held that a larger total purchasing power must be created by expansion of credit before unemployment could be solved. The Living Income Policy had been based on the expectation that a redistribution of present purchasing power would create sufficient effective demand to solve the problem. The first of these plans was an early attempt to apply some of Keynes' tentative conclusions concerning the use of controlled inflation as the way out of the economic slump; the second was inspired by the theory of underconsumption which had been worked out by Hobson in the early years of the century.

It is not strange, however, that these differences seemed like nuances of no importance in the face of the views held by Philip Snowden, the man chiefly responsible for Labour's financial policy. During his term of office as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924, Snowden had been completely converted to theories of "sound" finance. In his view the chief objective of the government's financial poli-

cies should be to create a feeling of confidence in the minds of investors. In specific terms this meant continuing and perhaps even increasing the contributions to the sinking fund for the payment of the national debt. This increase was bitterly opposed by Mosley and the I.L.P.; they argued that the money should be spent on social services and thus stimulate the home market, and should not be passed on to wealthy bondholders who might save it or invest it abroad.²¹ Despite a perfunctory opposition because of pressure from his own party, Snowden also clearly approved the Conservative return to the gold standard. This move, which had a deflationary effect on both prices and wages, was intended to give Britain a more favorable competitive position in the markets of the world. This attempt at revival by recapturing markets abroad was in clear opposition to the emphasis which both Mosley and the I.L.P. placed on the expansion of the home market as a means to economic recovery.

By 1927 Mosley was criticizing Labour's "Front Bench speakers" with increasing vehemence for their advocacy of large additions to the sinking fund,²² and he was attacking Snowden and his policies with mounting bitterness.

The adherence of the Labour Chancellor [in 1924] to the Cunliffe recommendations and the gold standard objective has throughout prevented the great crime of Toryism [the return to the gold standard] in the creation of unemployment and the reduction of wages being fully brought home to its authors. Labour was not guilty of this crime, but the attitude and commitments of our financial pundits make it difficult to challenge Tory policy effectively and to bring home the lesson to the country. . . . It is difficult to see how a Socialist can be an enthusiastic supporter of the gold stand-

ard. . . . Socialism is the conscious control and direction of human resources for human needs. How then, can we place our vital medium of exchange at the mercy of the blind hazards of fortune? On a rigid gold standard the expansion and contraction of credit is dependent on the discovery or exhaustion of far-away goldfields and the gold manipulation of foreign statesmen and financiers.²³

When some recommendations for reform of credit arrangements were made by the head of the Midlands Bank, Mosley's lieutenant, John Strachey, complained that they had been greeted by Labour leaders "with almost contemptuous silence."²⁴ He declared,

Such inactivity might almost lend itself to the interpretation that those who direct the financial policy of the Labour Party are even more Conservative than the bankers themselves! We might almost be led to suppose that our financial authorities wished to prove themselves *plus royalist que le roi!*²⁵

Even after William Graham, on behalf of the Labour party, had moved a resolution asking for an inquiry into this matter, Mosley insisted that the impression had been created that Snowden was allied with "the reactionary elements in the City."²⁶

It is somewhat curious that throughout this period of mounting criticism of official Labour policy on the part of Mosley and Strachey, Mosley's relationship with MacDonald, whose sensitivity to criticism was notorious, remained close. As late as 1929 MacDonald was attempting to gain support for Mosley as his successor as leader of the Parliamentary Labour party.²⁷ A partial explanation of this unaccustomed tolerance on MacDonald's part undoubtedly lay in his huge enjoyment of his friendship

with the wealthy and aristocratic Mosleys. More important, however, may be the fact that the weight of Mosley's criticism was directed specifically against Snowden who was a bitter private critic of MacDonald.²⁸

So encouraging was MacDonald's attitude that Mosley appears to have expected a cabinet post in the 1929 government and was, therefore, greatly disappointed in his appointment to the minor post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.²⁹ He was, however, given additional duties which seemed especially appropriate to his interests. Together with George Lansbury and Thomas Johnston he was placed on a committee under the chairmanship of the Lord Privy Seal, J. H. Thomas, to deal with the problem of unemployment.

Mosley's energetic career on the very unenergetic Committee on Unemployment lasted less than a year. Though Mosley was busy from the first preparing schemes, the committee seldom met,³⁰ and he found it increasingly difficult to gain the attention of Thomas who seemed to become paralyzed with discouragement as the repercussions of the Wall Street crash pushed the unemployment figures ever higher. Finally, early in 1930, Mosley drew up a memorandum embodying some suggestions of Johnston and Lansbury as well as his own, and circulated it to the cabinet without Thomas' authority. Disturbed by this breach of procedure, Thomas submitted his resignation. MacDonald refused to accept the resignation and the situation was temporarily composed,³¹ but relations between Mosley and the chairman of the committee remained understandably tense.

Thomas' inertia was, however, a far less serious obstacle to the adoption of Mosley's proposals than was Snowden's violent opposition. Lansbury's biographer reveals that the memorandum when presented to the cabinet "provoked Snowden to a storm of fury worse than he

had yet treated the Cabinet to,"³² and Mosley later referred specifically to Snowden's opposition as a cause of his resignation.³³ On May 19, 1930, Mosley, convinced that the government had adopted a position in "opposition to any effective alternative to present policy," resigned from the government, making clear his intention to carry his fight to the party.³⁴

Since the memorandum was now a cabinet document, its contents were never made public, and there was a hint of demagoguery in the loud demands of Mosley and his followers that it should be published. Not only must he have been certain that the cabinet would not yield to such a demand, but he must also have realized, as Lansbury pointed out, that he could himself make it public simply by restating his proposals. It can be assumed that he did, in fact, outline the chief points in the memorandum in the debate which followed his resignation.

The program as set forth in Mosley's speeches consisted of suggestions in three broad areas. The least important were proposals for better coordination of the government departments dealing with unemployment, and some hints toward the reform of "the present machine" of government.³⁵ There was at this time, however, no indication that these reforms would be along the authoritarian lines which were later to characterize Mosley's thought.

The actual remedies for unemployment which he suggested were based on the conviction that in the state of the world economy there was no hope of recapturing the export trade which England had lost during the war. Any recovery had to be based, therefore, on a revival of the home market, but measures to improve the domestic market would be unsuccessful as long as England was exposed to the shocks of world capitalism. Thus it was

necessary first of all to "insulate" the British economy from disturbances abroad by means of tariffs, import boards, or whatever other methods might seem to be useful in controlling the relations of Britain with the rest of the world. "The principle," he explained, "was to have an organism planning, allocating, regulating their trade rather than leaving those great things to the blind forces of world capitalistic competition."³⁶ Here was a proposed reversal of the cherished free trade policy of the Labour party, and Mosley argued that it was a logical one.

In the price of labour they had always claimed the protection and intervention of the State, and it was difficult to see how they could control the price of labour unless they could also control in some degree the price of the articles which labour produced. How could they build up Socialism if they left industries exposed to the shocks of world capitalism.³⁷

It was easy to recognize in these proposals the young coalition candidate who had campaigned in 1918 on a program of "Socialistic Imperialism."³⁸

Within this "insulated" economy, recovery was to be stimulated, according to Mosley's scheme, by a program of public works so large that it could be financed only by a loan. He insisted:

If you are going to do this work on any large scale large sums of money will have to be raised. . . . It must be raised by loan. If the principle of a big loan is turned down then this kind of work must come to an end. . . . If this loan cannot be raised then unemployment, as an emergency and immediate problem, cannot be dealt with. If we are told that we cannot have the money let us confess defeat honourably and honestly.³⁹

This part of Mosley's scheme differed in no important respect from the plan worked out by Keynes and Lloyd George as part of the Liberal program, but the idea of a deficit-financed program of public works was anathema to the orthodox Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Here was a bold program presented to a party disheartened by the failure of its policies or lack of policies and dissatisfied with its leadership. The day of Mosley's resignation the Labour government, as a consequence of adverse votes and abstentions among the Labour M.P.'s, narrowly avoided defeat in the House of Commons on the issue of its handling of unemployment. Observers agree that Mosley was heard with great sympathy by both the Parliamentary Labour party and the Labour party conference to whom he presented his views.⁴⁰ There is little doubt that Mosley's resignation was well timed to take advantage of strong disaffection. Why then did his attempt to gain adoption of his policies by the Labour party end in failure?

Perhaps the chief factor in Mosley's failure was the distrust of his character and motives which appears to have been widespread. Beatrice Webb remarked in 1927 that he was regarded by many in the party as "a political adventurer,"⁴¹ or, in Snowden's phrase, as "a man on the make."⁴² According to Ellen Wilkinson, those who knew Mosley were being questioned continually about his sincerity.⁴³ His colleague on the Committee on Unemployment, Thomas Johnston, explained that while he and Lansbury had agreed with most of the memorandum they hesitated to sign it, sensing that Mosley was "preparing his ammunition for a break-away movement."⁴⁴

This impression of Mosley as an opportunist willing to sacrifice the welfare of his party to further his own career was strengthened by the tactics which he adopted. Sensing the sympathy of the Parliamentary Labour party to

whom, a few days after his resignation, he explained the reasons for his move, he insisted, against Henderson's pleas, on pressing the matter to a division. A victory for Mosley would have meant a vote of censure for the government and probably its fall. The decision to press the matter proved to be unwise from Mosley's own viewpoint. Disgruntled though they were, the members of the Parliamentary Labour party refused to jeopardize the existence of the Labour government by supporting Mosley, and he was decisively defeated. This meant, in the words of the *Times*, that the door was now "banged, barred and bolted"⁴⁵ and the matter could not be brought up again, as would have been possible had there been no vote on the first occasion.

Mosley's strength in the party was to have a second test at the Labour party conference in October, 1930, and his prospects of success were considerable. He was popular with the rank and file,⁴⁶ who were untroubled by the doubts about his motives which more intimate contact with him seemed to arouse among Labour M.P.'s. On this occasion also the trades unions, whose large vote was usually assured to the executive, were restive because of their disappointment with the government's policies on unemployment. Yet Mosley was defeated by a narrow margin, and the decisive factor may well have been a speech by MacDonald which was one of the rhetorical triumphs of his career.⁴⁷ The death of Lord Thomson, the Minister for Air, in the crash of R101 on the eve of the conference, gave MacDonald the occasion to speak of life, death, and friendship in a manner which evoked considerable sympathy and somewhat muted the debate which followed. Though Mosley scored something of a moral triumph by his election to the Labour party executive and J. H. Thomas' defeat, as well as by the size of the vote in favor of his unsuccessful amendment, his de-

feat left him no further appeal within the Labour party. Within two months he had left the Labour party and was busily organizing the New Party.

The important part which was played by distrust of Mosley's motives, his choice of tactics, and sheer bad luck in the defeat of his program should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the program itself had certain weaknesses as a rallying point for the disaffected within the Labour party. As has already been suggested, "The very mention of the word tariffs was a blasphemy and a defilement in the temple of labour,"⁴⁸ and it can be assumed that the feeling was especially strong among ex-Liberals. It is significant in this respect that, among the small band of six M.P.'s who followed Mosley out of the party, while none were former Liberals, three—Lady Cynthia Mosley, John Strachey, and Oliver Baldwin—were former Conservatives.

There were difficulties obstructing any close alliance between Mosley and the left wing also. As long as he remained within the Labour party, Mosley had the support of the I.L.P., and he might even, in the opinion of one high in I.L.P. ranks, have had the leadership of the Independent Labour party.⁴⁹ His failure to make any such bid in the early stages of his revolt may be attributed to the fact that "he was out for bigger things,"⁵⁰ *i.e.*, the leadership of the Labour party, and did not wish to associate himself too closely with the controversial I.L.P. There was also, however, a vast ideological gap between the international socialism of the I.L.P. and the national socialism which he proposed. Mrs. Webb's comments on Mosley's Manifesto for the New Party are thus equally pertinent as an analysis of the reasons for the failure of his policy within the Labour party.

It falls dead in the No Man's Land between those who wish to keep and those who wish to change the existing

order. . . . There is, in fact, nothing in the programme that will *grip* any section of the population—the curious assortment of reforms do not hang together.⁵¹

If the former Liberals within the Labour party failed to support Mosley, they produced some equally vehement critics of Labour's leadership from within their own ranks. Their target was different, however, for while Mosley had concentrated his attack primarily on Snowden, the malcontents among the Liberal recruits directed their criticisms chiefly against MacDonald until the second Labour government when they began to include Snowden in their attacks as well. There was a difference, likewise, in the nature of their criticism, for whereas Mosley's dispute with Snowden was on a clear-cut matter of policy, criticism of MacDonald was more personal.

It is somewhat curious that some of the first warnings of the hazards of what was later termed "the aristocratic embrace" should have come from this group of middle and upper class recruits. Toward the end of the first Labour government in 1924, Bertrand Russell and Hamilton Fyfe were pointing out, without naming names, the danger that Labour's leaders might begin to relish the privileges they had been elected to destroy.⁵² Josiah Wedgwood hit even more directly at the social fraternization for which MacDonald was noted in an article in *Reynolds' News* entitled "Should Labour Men Dine with Duchesses?"⁵³ MacDonald was believed to be fascinated by the gentlemanly civil servants and when, during the election of 1924, his uncritical reliance on them in the matter of the Zinoviev letter meant a loss of votes for the Labour party, it was one of the recruits, Charles Trevelyan who, "tense with passion," accused MacDonald at a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of "letting the party down."⁵⁴

The attack on MacDonald reached a climax in an article entitled "The Diplomacy of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald" which appeared in the *Labour Monthly* of January, 1925, under the signature "U.D.C.," presumed at the time to be one of the ex-Liberals, probably Trevelyan or Wedgwood.⁵⁵ The author set out to criticize MacDonald's penchant for personal and secret diplomacy as an argument against his being permitted to serve again as Foreign Secretary in any future Labour government. The indictment became general, however, and such passages as the following could be applied equally well to areas other than foreign policy.

This Saint George, having no stomach for fighting, did not attack his dragon. He courteously shook hands with it and explained that so far from being a dragon killer he felt that he and the dragon could get along splendidly and co-operate in perfect loyalty. In fact he was a bit of a dragon himself.⁵⁶

The portrait of MacDonald which emerged depicted a man unqualified not only for the post of Foreign Secretary, but for any office of public trust.

Rarely indeed in history was a statesman so disproportioned to his task. It called for the highest and toughest qualities. And this was a weak, irresolute man: a man with a vague mind incapable alike of hard thinking and of clear thinking: a man with no grasp of principles, no equipment of knowledge: a man susceptible to flattery and intolerant of criticism: at once domineering and sycophantic: a man of amazing vanity and a boundless conceit; an actor who was his own perpetual and admiring audience.⁵⁷

Whether "U.D.C." was, in fact, Trevelyan or Wedgwood, both clearly accepted the estimate of MacDonald

which "U.D.C." set forth. They were active in the unsuccessful attempt to prevent his re-election as leader of the Parliamentary Labour party after the election of 1924,⁵⁸ and so prominent was Trevelyan in this movement that there was some suspicion that he was ambitious to assume the post himself.⁵⁹

After the failure of this attempt to oust MacDonald, his opponents ceased their intensely personal attacks, at least in public, and in the years from 1925 to 1929 they concentrated on an effort to guide the Labour party away from MacDonald's evolutionary socialism. In the Labour party conference of 1925, Trevelyan was arguing against MacDonald and in favor of an explicit statement on nationalization of mines and transport when Labour should again take office.⁶⁰ In 1926 Arthur Ponsonby, another ex-Liberal, wrote an article pointing out the weaknesses of a reformist approach to a socialist order and arguing for a strong socialist program for any future Labour government.

I, for one, am not in favour of what I may term a "crescendo policy," that is to say, beginning as a Liberal movement and working up to be a Socialist Government. The danger of anything of this kind cannot be over-estimated. Office to the best of us has allurements and a curious emasculating tendency. The only way to resist these very powerful and insidious influences is to take, not necessarily an ostentatious, but a determined plunge straight away. The challenge of Socialism must be thrown down at the outset.⁶¹

Just as some of the ex-Liberals were active before 1929 in urging a vigorous program for a prospective Labour government, those converts from the Liberals who served in the 1929 cabinet were among its least conservative members. The most truly socialistic measure passed by

the second Labour government was the Agricultural Marketing Act for which the Minister of Agriculture, the ex-Liberal Charles Addison, was responsible. Not only was Addison himself a former Liberal, but the program which he was carrying out was one which had been prepared to a large extent by such former Liberals as Seymour Cocks, Geoffrey Garratt, and Noel Buxton, since agricultural policy had fallen, in default of any interest on the part of trades-unionists, Fabians, and the older members of the I.L.P., into the hands of the converts.⁶²

Addison's Agricultural Marketing Act actually constituted only a very small fraction of the party's projected program in this area, but against the background of the 1929 government it seemed an outstanding achievement. It provided for the establishment of marketing boards to grade and set prices for agricultural products when a majority of the producers of that commodity voted in favor of such action. It failed to make any provision, however, for organization of the purchase and marketing of imported agricultural commodities, which constituted the largest proportion of the produce which Britain consumed. Even the limited bill which was introduced faced an obstacle, according to Addison's lieutenant, Clement Attlee, in "the inertia of MacDonald and the negative attitude of Snowden."⁶³ That Addison himself held Snowden responsible for the Labour government's failure to deal with imports is indicated by the cry of rage with which he greeted the announcement that the National government, of which Snowden was a member, was planning to adopt a wheat quota.

I shall look forward with great interest to see the attitude displayed by Viscount Snowden towards this scheme. In so far as the Government's scheme has been described up to now Viscount Snowden has conceded

to a Conservative Minister, without the accompanying conditions, a thing which he obstructed by every device of postponement and objection that he could invent for more than twelve months when it was put forward by a colleague in the Labour Cabinet. But for him this provision, with the others to which I have referred, would have been on the Statute-book by now and the British farmers would be having the benefit of it.⁶⁴

Even such a limited success as Addison's was denied to Trevelyan who served as President of the Board of Education in the 1929 government. His primary aim was to fulfil Labour's promise to raise the age for compulsory education. This had been conceived not only as a desirable measure in itself, but as part of an attack on unemployment which, together with pensions for the aged, would remove the extreme age groups from the labour market. From the first, Trevelyan encountered a definite lack of enthusiasm on MacDonald's part, probably stemming from the fear that the measure would be unpopular among working class parents.⁶⁵ As a result, the School Bill was not brought in to the first session of Parliament, and, in Trevelyan's opinion, would not have been brought in at all "had it not been for almost a party revolt."⁶⁶

The bill which was finally introduced raising the school-leaving age from 14 to 15 survived a revolt in the House of Commons on the part of Roman Catholic Labourites, as well as those representing constituencies where Catholics were strong, only to be defeated in the House of Lords. The opposition in both cases resulted from the failure to provide state aid to help church schools expand to meet the larger enrolments. Trevelyan had, in fact, worked out a formula satisfactory to the various religious groups for state aid to their schools, but MacDonald re-

fused to permit him to insert the clause, thus sealing the doom of the bill.⁶⁷

Disheartened by the rejection of his bill and goaded by a speech of Snowden's which promised further economies, Trevelyan resigned from the government in March, 1931, making it quite clear that his dissatisfaction with the Labour government extended far beyond its education policy. In a speech to his constituents he explained:

From the first I have felt that there has not been in this Government, which ought to have been paving the way for Socialism, the vigour and drive, the enterprise and courage which alone make great changes possible. All difficult and dangerous measures were avoided instead of dared.⁶⁸

To the Parliamentary Labour party he was even more blunt.

I resign my position as officer and become a private soldier. By that action I speak. Once for all, I put into words what I think, and I shall not say it again. I do not believe that the Labour Party can succeed in breaking through to Socialism until the leadership is changed.⁶⁹

In the various pronouncements following his resignation, Trevelyan's most pointed criticisms were directed not against his old enemy MacDonald, but against the economy drive of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which would, he was convinced, only intensify the unemployment problem.

How is economy going to save the nation's prosperity? How is the stopping of expenditure in social services by a few millions going to revive trade? How is the threat of reduction of unemployment benefit or of salaries of

civil servants going to do anything except by causing the further reduction of the spending power of our people to make disaster even more disastrous. It is the very reverse of the Socialist assumption which is that prosperity depends almost entirely on the spending power of the masses.⁷⁰

Though clear about the deficiencies of the government's policy, Trevelyan was somewhat less specific about the correct solution of the problem of unemployment. He reiterated that the sole remedy was "breaking through to Socialism," but his explanation of the means by which socialism would eliminate unemployment remained vague.

Capitalist society is organized on the basis of the inevitability of poverty. Therefore a nation which continues to believe in Capitalism cannot do battle against poverty with the conviction that it can be overcome. Socialism is the only policy which can bring up the depressed millions to a reasonable economic standard.⁷¹

While the converts Addison and Trevelyan were thus instructing the veteran socialists in the cabinet on the benefits of socialism, another convert, Seymour Cocks, was attempting to goad the Labour government into action from without. Cocks, who was the biographer of E. D. Morel, entered the House of Commons in 1929, and by November, 1930, he was urging the Labour government to adopt the idea of a large loan as a method of financing "national reconstruction." He argued:

If the Government issued a great loan for national reconstruction it would, apart from the money altogether, show the people that something was being done on a big scale. Such action would not merely give employ-

ment but would help to lift the people out of the apathy, the despair, the pessimism, the depression in which they are being plunged more deeply every day.⁷²

His plea for leadership was prefaced by a pathetic offer to support any policy, even tariffs, which might help.

I have been brought up as a Free Trader. I have, in the past, used with a certain amount of dexterity the orthodox Free Trade arguments. But it is agreed I think that some of the arguments on which the old orthodox Free Trade case was based no longer exist. . . . If . . . it is necessary to insulate . . . [the home market] by some system of import boards, by licenses, by embargo or even, in certain exceptional cases, by temporary tariffs, many of us would not object at the present moment. . . . I believe the people of this country are waiting for a lead, and that if that lead were given them, they would respond with terrific enthusiasm. They are bewildered, sunk in depression and pessimism, and they want a lead out of this depression and this defeatism.⁷³

Such leadership was not to be forthcoming, however. Though its apologists used the minority position of the government as an excuse, it had, in fact, no solution of the unemployment problem to suggest, and in its declining days the search for a solution was abandoned while the various factions within the party debated the proper size of the unemployment benefit. There was, in fact, no solution to be found within the framework of orthodox theories of finance which, as Keynes pointed out, the entire cabinet "at heart" accepted.⁷⁴

Since the Labour government's lack of success in coping with unemployment appears to have stemmed from

its failure to take account of Keynes's early suggestions concerning deficit-financed government investment as a way out of depression, the expert economists within the party would appear to bear a large portion of the responsibility. Why did not those recruits who had since 1918 advised the party on matters of government finance—Dalton, Pethick-Lawrence, Lees-Smith, and Arnold—call attention to the possibilities of the Keynesian approach? It is true that in 1925 Dalton and Pethick-Lawrence were successful, over Snowden's opposition, in placing the Parliamentary Labour party on record in opposition to the return to the gold standard,⁷⁵ but after that date their activities in this sphere appear to have been confined to working out and agitating for the surtax,⁷⁶ a substitute for their earlier scheme for the capital levy, as a means of reducing the national debt. After 1929, the curious inactivity of this group might in part be accounted for by their immobilization in positions of second rank in the government in those posts which provide little opportunity for policy making and yet restrain their holders from any public criticism of government policy. There is, however, no evidence of any constructive criticism from this group, even in private, nor of any attempt to convert the cabinet from the canons of financial orthodoxy. From their memoirs it is clear that both Pethick-Lawrence and Dalton, though preferring higher taxes or a smaller sinking fund to a reduced unemployment benefit, accepted the necessity of a balanced budget as an axiom.⁷⁷

The only leadership of the sort which Seymour Cocks demanded was coming, ironically enough, from the party which he had left a decade before. Lloyd George, in co-operation with Keynes, set forth in the Liberals' "Yellow Book" a vigorous program to combat unemployment.

So striking was the contrast between the energetic proposals of the Liberal leader and the refusal to act on the part of the Labour government, that it is somewhat curious that apparently only Percy Alden among the prominent recruits from the Liberals returned to his former allegiance.⁷⁸ The loyalty of the recruits to the Labour government in the face of its disappointing record reveals how completely they had converted and how thoroughly they had abandoned their earlier ties. The statement of the recruit, Wedgwood Benn, suggests that Lloyd George's proposals, like Mosley's, were ignored because of distrust of their author.

Although today the aspect of the Lloyd George policy is essentially Socialist, what guarantee is there that this will continue? If the leader of this group had a record and reputation like that of Mr. Gladstone, who led his Party into the wilderness, and willingly shared its hardships at the end of his great career, the case would be different. But Mr. Lloyd George has an amazing capacity for short views. Today he will tax land. Seven or eight years ago he handed back to the landlords the proceeds of the tax which he himself had imposed thirteen years before. Today he will trade with Russia. Ten years ago he was the centre of a European coalition against Russia. . . . Today he is for Free Trade, yet eight years ago he initiated in this free trade country the statute on which all post-war protection is based. . . . Today he is for an expenditure of 200,000,000 on the roads. Six years ago he was the chief wielder of the Geddes Axe.⁷⁹

Even more revealing is the statement made by Trevelyan at the time of his resignation from the government.

Now, my Comrades, you ask me what my future action is going to be. I tell you quite simply what it is.

I am a loyal member of the Labour Party, and I have a profound belief in the future of the Labour Party. I have in the Labour Party an abiding home.⁸⁰

In a post-mortem which followed the debacle of 1931, R. H. Tawney traced the Labour party's difficulties to the influx of "whole battalions" of new members who were "shepherded into" the Labour party "much as the troops of Feng-hsiang, 'the Christian general,' were baptised with a hose," and whose presence, according to him, tended to dilute its principles.⁸¹ Concerning the voters who had been recruited (and it is apparently of them primarily that Tawney is writing), it is difficult to generalize. The record of the leaders who may be classed as converts is clear, however, and it does not support the implication that they can be held responsible for the Labour party's increasing conservatism after 1924. It is true that the economic experts among them did not provide the leadership which might have been expected, but the only members of the second Labour government who carried opposition to their government's inaction to the point of resignation were the ex-Conservative, Mosley and the ex-Liberal, Trevelyan, and the only piece of socialistic legislation to gain passage during its tenure of office, the Agricultural Marketing Act, originated among the recruits. If its new members did not save the Labour party during its crucial test, they can at least be assigned no special responsibility for its failures.

Conclusion

THE Labour party came into being in the early years of the twentieth century because of what were regarded by its founders as the inadequacies of the Liberals; its enormous growth in the years following World War I stemmed from the same cause. The deficiencies against which the recruits of the later period were reacting were, however, of a different sort. Whereas the working class members at the end of the nineteenth century criticized the Liberal party for its failure to abandon swiftly enough its traditional *laissez faire* doctrine in favor of a more vigorous program of state intervention in economic life, the converts of the postwar years protested rather against the real or imagined failure on the part of the Liberal leadership to adhere closely to time-honored Liberal principles. Quite obviously the Liberal foreign policy of the years 1906 to 1914 had been spectacularly unsuccessful in the traditional Liberal mission of maintaining peace, and its failure was believed by many of its own members to have been totally unnecessary. The alienation of the disaffected Liberals became complete when, at the end of the war, the coalition government under the Liberal leader Lloyd George, agreed to a peace settlement which seemed to them so unjust as to make a future war inevitable. The failure of both Asquith and Lloyd George to satisfy this group as to their devotion to free trade and

free land served against the background of their "crimes against the peace" to fortify the conviction that both sections of the Liberal leadership had betrayed the historic faith.

The crucial importance of the Liberal party's supposed violations of its own principles in motivating the shift to Labour suggests a corollary: the positive attraction exercised by the Labour party itself was a much less significant factor. For a majority of the converts studied, Labour's chief appeal appears to have been its freedom from the taint of responsibility for the war and the peace rather than any inherent virtue. Socialism was the Labour party's most distinctive principle, and it seems to have played an important part in the conversion of the small group of recruits from the Conservatives and in the integration of the Fabians more fully into the party. The larger group of Liberal converts, however, seem for the most part to have accepted rather than embraced this central doctrine of their new party.

Just as Labour's new socialist program appears to have been a minor factor in attracting new members, the constitutional changes of 1919 appear, for the group studied, to have played a surprisingly small role. It was not by way of the newly established constituency parties that most of the prominent converts entered the party, but by membership in the I.L.P., which had attracted them by its pacifism during the war. It is difficult to determine, however, the extent to which this was the pattern followed by less prominent middle and upper class recruits in the country at large.

Though the constituency parties were not the channel by which most of this group entered the Labour party, the establishment of such parties may well have been one of the factors explaining the rapidity with which many of the new members appeared in the House of Commons.

The attempt of the Labour party after 1919 to present candidates in almost every constituency created many openings for Labour candidates at the moment when the influx of recruits was at its height, and repeated unsuccessful attempts at Labour party conferences to require an apprenticeship of Labour candidates testify to the success of the converts in gaining selection by the local parties.¹ The enthusiastic acceptance by most of the Labour movement of these new middle and upper class members serves to support the impression of the snobbishness, or perhaps tolerance, of the British worker as compared with his continental counterpart.² The ability of many of these recruits to contribute substantially to campaign funds may have been a practical consideration leading to their selection by some of the less prosperous local parties. Likewise, as doubts increased during the 1920's concerning the direction of the party under MacDonald and Snowden, some local leaders reasoned that an aristocrat was most likely to be immune to the "aristocratic embrace."³

The Labour party leadership was no less hospitable to the recruits than were the rank and file. Both MacDonald and Snowden welcomed them into the party and were swift to utilize their services both as advisers and as members of the two Labour governments of the period. The influence of the new members on Labour policy was, therefore, considerable, especially in such areas as foreign, fiscal, and agricultural policy which had been largely neglected by the Labour party before the war. These were fields, likewise, in which the education and background of the converts filled a need which probably could not have been met so successfully by the solely practical experience of the trades-unionists.

Though the recruits exercised a considerable influence on the formation of Labour policy during the 1920's,

there is no evidence to suggest that they were responsible for diverting it from a predetermined course. So successful were they in merging into the party that they ceased to be a group almost immediately, and were frequently to be found on opposite sides of issues under discussion within the party. Also, the areas of their greatest impact were those in which the old-line leaders had shown such scant interest that it is difficult to imagine what the shape of Labour policy would have been without their efforts. The new members, in short, provided the Labour party with a more expert and informed leadership at a moment when it was sorely needed. The growth which had brought new responsibilities to the Labour party provided it likewise with additional talent and ability with which to help meet those responsibilities.

The interwar years—for the British Labour party, as for European socialism in general—are often regarded as a period of great ineffectiveness. Yet it must be remembered that the Labour party came of age in a period when problems of unusual magnitude faced the British government. Against Labour's failure to cope successfully with the economic crisis must be weighed its gradual acceptance, against its own deepest instincts, of the necessity of collective security. In these successes and these failures the converts of the postwar period were intimately involved.

Notes to Chapters

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. Arthur Balfour to Lord Knollys as quoted in Elie Halévy, *A History of the English People* (London, 1952), Epilogue II, 92.

2. "Chinese Labour" in South Africa was considered to be of direct concern to the British worker and was attacked by Labour candidates in the 1906 election. The party was pro-brotherhood and antiwar in the years before 1914, but the specifics of foreign policy received little attention.

3. Henry Pelling, *The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1900* (London, 1954), p. 12. Also J. H. Stewart Reid, *The Origins of the British Labour Party* (Minneapolis, 1955), pp. 28-29; 85-86.

4. Reid, *Origins of the British Labour Party*, pp. 157-61.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

6. Oswald Mosley was a Conservative M.P. and William Stapleton Royce was a Conservative candidate for Parliament. The position of Lord Parmoor, formerly a Conservative M.P., was somewhat ambiguous in 1914. See Appendix.

7. William Arnold-Forster, Oliver Baldwin, George Russell Strauss, and John Strachey were the sons respectively of a Conservative cabinet member, a Conservative prime minister, a Conservative M.P., and the editor of the Conservative periodical, *The Spectator*.

8. R. H. Tawney, "The Choice Before the Labour Party," *The Political Quarterly*, III (July-September 1932), 333.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Carl F. Brand, *British Labour's Rise to Power* (Stanford, 1941), p. 59.
2. As quoted in Francis Williams, *Fifty Years March* (London, 1949), p. 225.
3. *Labour Leader*, August 6, 1914, p. 1.
4. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Margaret I. Cole (London, 1952), p. 34.
5. See Mary Agnes Hamilton, *Remembering My Good Friends* (London, 1944), p. 72; E. M. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson* (New York, 1934), p. 157; Bertrand Russell, "Some Psychological Difficulties of Pacifism in Wartime," *We Did Not Fight*, ed. Julian Bell (London, 1935), pp. 329-30.
6. See *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Cole, p. 261.
7. Arthur Ponsonby, *Parliament and Foreign Policy*, U.D.C. Pamphlet No. 5 (London, 1915), p. 11.
8. Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, "Democratic Control of Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXVIII (August 1916), p. 152.
9. J. A. Hobson, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic* (New York, 1938), p. 104.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
11. See *Why We Should State Terms of Settlement*, U.D.C. Pamphlet No. 9 (London, 1915).
12. Douglas Goldring, *The Nineteen Twenties* (London, 1945), p. 139.
13. See Fenner Brockway, *Inside the Left* (London, 1942), pp. 50-119; Lord Allen of Hurtwood, "Pacifism: Then and Now," *We Did Not Fight*, ed. Bell, pp. 25-27.
14. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 166.
15. Hobson, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic*, pp. 107-08.
16. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 164.

17. Hobson, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic*, pp. 107-08.

18. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 169.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

22. Hamilton, *Remembering My Good Friends*, p. 79.

23. The text of the Memorandum on War Aims is included in the appendix of Arthur Henderson's *The Aims of Labour* (New York, 1918), pp. 83-90.

24. Lloyd George's original decision to send Henderson to Russia is somewhat puzzling in the light of the fact that the Prime Minister and the majority of the cabinet were opposed to any statement of war aims. The incident is further complicated by the instructions given to Henderson to replace the British ambassador, Buchanan, if after investigation he deemed it desirable. The question whether Lloyd George was seriously considering cooperation with the Stockholm Conference as an expedient for keeping Russia in the war, or whether he was simply trying to rid himself of a troublesome colleague is discussed in Stephen Graubard's *British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 24, and Mary Agnes Hamilton's *Arthur Henderson* (London, 1938), pp. 124-38.

25. The memorandum had undoubtedly already been drafted by the date of the publication of the treaties, but the revelations served to increase the enthusiasm with which it was adopted by the Labour conference.

26. William Arnold-Forster, C. R. Buxton, Mary Agnes Hamilton, E. T. John, B. N. Langdon-Davies, E. D. Morel, Helena Swanwick, and Cecil Wilson had affiliated with the Labour party by the time of the election of 1918. J. A. Hobson, H. B. Lees-Smith, R. L. Outhwaite, Arthur Ponsonby, and Charles Trevelyan stood as Independents in the election. In the period 1918-20 these five entered the Labour party as did Noel Buxton and Joseph King who were Liberal candidates in the election of 1918 and Norman Angell and General C. Birdwood Thomson who had hitherto been inactive in

party politics. Of the others included in the analysis Sydney Arnold entered the Labour party in 1922, W. H. Dickinson in 1930, and Lord Parmoor in 1921.

27. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Cole, p. 164.

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2. Godfrey Elton, "Oxford and the Labour Party," *The Living Age*, CCCXX (January 19, 1924), 159.

3. Edward R. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society* (London, 1925), p. 150.

4. *Annual Report of the Fabian Society* (1910-14).

5. The Fabian Society, "To Your Tents, Oh Israel!" *The Fortnightly Review*, LX (November 1893), 569-89.

6. R. C. K. Ensor, "Permeation," *The Webbs and Their Work*, ed. Margaret Cole, pp. 67-68. Also Mary Agnes Hamilton, *Sidney and Beatrice Webb* (Boston, 1933), pp. 142-43.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

8. Margaret Cole, *Beatrice Webb* (New York, 1946), p. 121; Beatrice Webb, *Our Partnership* (New York, 1948), pp. 447, 460-61.

9. Ensor, "Permeation," p. 66.

10. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Cole, p. 13.

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12. "Democratic Control of Industry," *Labour and the New Social Order* (London, 1918), pp. 9-13.

13. R. H. Tawney, "The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918-21," *The Economic Review*, XIII (Nos. 1 and 2, 1943), 3.

14. Sir Leo Chiozza Money, *The Triumph of Nationalization* (London, 1920), p. vii.

15. *Times* (London), November 19, 1918, p. 10.

16. Sir Leo Chiozza Money, "The Impending Triumph of

Labour," *The English Review*, XXVIII (February 1919), 132.

17. H. W. Massingham, "The Case for a Labour Government," *Fortnightly Review*, CXXI (January 1924), 119-21.

18. H. W. Massingham, "The Government and Labour," *The Contemporary Review*, LXIV (December 1893), 118-25.

19. H. G. Wells, "The World, Its Debts, and the Rich Men," *Wells' Social Anticipations*, ed. Harry W. Laidler (New York, 1927), pp. 123-24.

20. Percy Alden, "A New Liberal Programme: Liberalism and Labour," *The Contemporary Review*, CXV (April 1919), 396-403.

21. J. A. Spender, *Life, Journalism, and Politics* (New York, 1927), II, 188.

22. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Cole, p. 123.

23. R. L. Outhwaite, *The Land or Revolution*, pp. 63-64.

24. *Manchester Guardian*, November 8, 1924, p. 14.

25. *Ibid.*, November 14, 1924, p. 13.

26. *Ibid.*, November 5, 1924, p. 5.

27. Henry Hamilton Fyfe, *My Seven Selves* (London, 1935), p. 233.

28. Oliver Baldwin and Roger Chance, *Conservatism and Wealth* (London, n.d.).

29. Godfrey Elton, *Among Others* (London, 1938), p. 158.

30. *Interim Report*, Parliamentary Papers, 1919, cmd. 84, p. 5.

31. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, CXV (1919), 113; also G. D. H. Cole, *Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry* (Oxford, 1923), p. 87.

32. *Second Stage*, Parliamentary Papers, 1919, cmd. 210, p. 5.

33. Cole, *Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry*, p. 114.

34. *Times* (London), July 3, 1919, p. 7; July 10, 1919, p. 13.

35. *Second Stage*, Parliamentary Papers, 1919, cmd. 210, p. 10.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
37. Hansard, House of Lords, LXXVII (1930), 169.
38. *Second Stage*, Parliamentary Papers, 1919, cmd. 210, p. 11.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
40. Frederick B. Maurice, *Haldane, 1856-1928* (London, 1937), II, 67-68.
41. *Testimony before the Coal Commission*, Parliamentary Papers, 1919, cmd. 360, p. 1089.
42. Christopher Addison, *Practical Socialism* (London, 1926), I, 75.
43. *Ibid.*, I, 12; II, 9.
44. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. CXLIV (1921), 1488-92.
45. *Ibid.*, 2512.
46. *Ibid.*, CXLVI (1921), 325-27.
47. Charles Woodroffe Ould, *William Stapleton Royce: A Memoir* (London, 1925), p. 108.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
49. Elton, *Among Others*, p. 158.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-59.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 258-59, 276.
52. Baldwin and Chance, *Conservatism and Wealth*, pp. 43-44.
53. Pease, *The History of the Fabian Society*, p. 165.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. With the exception of Hugh Dalton, who appears to have had no party affiliation prior to his entrance into the Labour party in 1919, all the recruits dealt with in this chapter were Liberals in 1914.

2. There was no annual tax on land values in England at the turn of the century. The income tax and local rates were levied only on income from land and the death duties which were based on the total value of an estate were normally paid only once in a generation.

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5. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
6. *Land Values*, January, 1914, p. 311.
7. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, LXXIV (1915), 419-30.
8. *Land Values*, October, 1918, p. 191.
9. Charles Trevelyan, "Can Radicalism and Socialism Unite?" *The Nation*, XXII (February 2, 1918), 566-67.
10. *Land Values*, March, 1918, p. 55.
11. I.L.P. Information Committee, *The Land for the People* (London and Manchester, 1920), pp. 21-22.
12. R. L. Outhwaite, *The Land or Revolution* (London, 1917), pp. 70-71.
13. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Last of the Radicals*, p. 155.
14. Josiah and Ethel Wedgwood, *The Road to Freedom* (London, 1913), p. 69; Outhwaite, *The Land or Revolution*, pp. 67-68.
15. Wedgwood and Wedgwood, *The Road to Freedom*, p. 80.
16. See Outhwaite, *The Land or Revolution*, p. 69.
17. As quoted in C. V. Wedgwood, *The Last of the Radicals*, p. 154.
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19. *Report of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (1926), pp. 216-22, 336-41.
20. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Last of the Radicals*, p. 155.
21. Bernard Shaw, *Fabianism and the Fiscal Question: An Alternative Policy* (London, 1904), p. 39.
22. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, LXXIV (1915), 921.
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24. *Ibid.*, 610.
25. *Ibid.*, 420.

26. *Ibid.*, 416.
27. *Recommendations of the Economic Conference of the Allies Held at Paris*. Text included in J. A. Hobson's *The New Protectionism* (London, 1916), pp. 141–52.
28. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, LXXXV (1916), 380–81.
29. *Times* (London), July 30, 1918, p. 7; August 2, 1918, p. 8; August 3, 1918, p. 7.
30. *Times* (London), July 26, 1918, p. 6.
31. *Times* (London), November 28, 1923, p. 18.
32. F. Seymour Cocks, *E. D. Morel: The Man and His Work* (London, 1920), pp. 51–55.
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34. J. A. Hobson, *The New Protectionism*, pp. 113–16.
35. *Report of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Labour Party (1915)*, p. 135.
36. J. A. Hobson, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic*, p. 26.
37. Charles Trevelyan, *From Liberalism to Labour* (London, 1921), pp. 10, 51.
38. Geoffrey T. Garratt, *The Mugwumps and the Labour Party* (London, 1932), pp. 63–64; S. Haden Guest, *Where Is Labour Going* (London, 1927), p. 70; John Scanlon, *Pillars of Cloud* (London, 1936), p. 111.
39. Bernard Shaw, *Fabianism and the Fiscal Question: An Alternative Policy*, p. 9.
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49. Hugh Dalton, *The Capital Levy Explained* (London, 1923), p. 26.
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51. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, *The Capital Levy: How the Labour Party Would Settle the War Debt*, p. 3.
52. Hugh Dalton, *Toward the Peace of Nations* (London, 1928), p. lx.
53. Hugh Dalton, *The Capital Levy Explained*, p. 89.
54. John Scanlon, *Pillars of Cloud*, p. 81.
55. Hugh Dalton, *Call Back Yesterday* (London, 1953), p. 131.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
58. Fenner Brockway, *Inside the Left*, p. 144.

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2. *Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (1921), p. 172.
3. William P. Maddox, *Foreign Relations in British Labour Politics* (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 101-03.
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57. Norman Angell, "Pacifists and Cruisers," *New Leader* (February 29, 1924), p. 3.
58. Letter from C. E. Malone, *Foreign Affairs* (July 1924), p. 18.
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69. Arthur Ponsonby, "Disarmament by Example," *Contemporary Review*, CXXXII (December 1927), 690.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 690.

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79. Elie Halévy, "Etat présent de la question sociale en Angleterre," *L'ère des tyrannies* (Paris, 1938), pp. 169–70.

80. "Notes of the Month," *The Socialist Review*, N.S. (December 1928), pp. 4–5.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

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leadership in protest against the Labour party's stand on the war. See above, p. 9.

3. John Paton, *Left Turn!* (London, 1936), p. 234. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1924-1932*, ed. Margaret I. Cole (London, 1956), p. 89.

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8. Fenner Brockway, *Inside the Left*, p. 157.

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10. Paton, *Left Turn!*, p. 305.

11. *I.L.P. Annual Conference Report* (1929), p. 61.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

13. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1924-1932*, ed. Cole, p. 269.

14. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1912-1924*, ed. Cole, p. 242.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-43.

16. Philip Snowden, *An Autobiography* (London, 1934), II, 876; also Mary Agnes Hamilton, *Remembering My Good Friends*, p. 181; Brockway, *Inside the Left*, p. 210.

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32. Raymond Postgate, *The Life of George Lansbury* (London, 1951), p. 257.
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39. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, CCXXXIX (1930), 1369.
40. Snowden, *An Autobiography*, II, 877.
41. *Diaries of Beatrice Webb: 1924–1932*, ed. Cole, pp. 137–38.
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43. Ellen Wilkinson, *Peeps at Politicians* (London, 1930), p. 38.
44. Johnston, *My Story*, p. 106.
45. *Times* (London), May 24, 1930, p. 12.
46. Brown, *So Far . . .*, p. 157.
47. Elton, *Among Others*, pp. 225–26.
48. Johnston, *My Story*, p. 54.
49. Brockway, *Inside the Left*, p. 212.
50. *Loc. cit.*
51. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1924–1932*, ed. Cole, pp. 267–68.
52. Bertrand Russell, "British Labor's Lesson," *The New Republic*, XLI (December 31, 1924), 138–39; Hamilton

Fyfe, "The House of Rimmon," *The Socialist Review*, XXIV (October 1924), 109-16.

53. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Last of the Radicals*, p. 152.

54. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1924-1932*, ed. Cole, p. 60. See also L. Macneil Weir, *The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald* (London, 1938), p. 268.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 57. In a letter dated September 4, 1956, Sir Charles Trevelyan stated that he was unable to recall the article or the details of his opposition to MacDonald, but his description of his view of MacDonald after the election of 1924 supports, in general, the criticisms of the article.

56. U.D.C., "The Diplomacy of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald," *The Labour Monthly*, VII (January 1925), p. 24.

57. *Loc. cit.*

58. *Beatrice Webb's Diaries: 1924-1932*, ed. Cole, p. 67.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 60.

60. *Report of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Labour Party Conference (1925)*, pp. 220-21.

61. Arthur Ponsonby, "The Labour Party and the Liberals," *The Socialist Review*, N.S. (February 1926), p. 44.

62. Geoffrey Garratt, *The Mugwumps and the Labour Party*, pp. 128-30.

63. C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (London, 1954), pp. 69-70.

64. *Times* (London), November 28, 1931, p. 12.

65. Weir, *The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald*, p. 252.

66. Charles Trevelyan, "Why I Resigned," *New Leader*, March 20, 1931.

67. J. M. Kenworthy, *Sailors, Statesmen—and Others*, p. 268.

68. Trevelyan, "Why I Resigned," p. 9.

69. As quoted in Weir, *The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald*, p. 268.

70. Trevelyan, "Why I Resigned," p. 9.

71. Charles Trevelyan, Letter to Constituents, *New Leader*, April 24, 1931, pp. 7-8.

72. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, CCXLIV (1930), 541.

73. *Ibid.*, 542-44.
74. J. M. Keynes, "The Dilemma of Modern Socialism," *The Political Quarterly*, III (April-June, 1932), 158.
75. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, *Fate Has Been Kind* (London, 1943), p. 141.
76. Used in its original meaning of a tax on unearned income, and not as later used by the Conservatives to mean "supertax."
77. Dalton, *Call Back Yesterday*, p. 301; Pethick-Lawrence, *Fate Has Been Kind*, p. 164.
78. *New Leader*, October 21, 1927, p. 8.
79. Wedgwood Benn, "What Should a Radical Do?" *The Labour Magazine*, VIII (May 1929), 10.
80. Trevelyan, "Why I Resigned," p. 9.
81. Tawney, "The Choice Before the Labour Party," p. 331.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. *Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (1920), pp. 163-64; *Report of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (1924), pp. 154-56; *Report of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (1926), p. 275.
2. Wertheimer, *Portrait of the Labour Party*, pp. x-xi.
3. Duff Cooper, *Old Men Forget* (London, 1953), p. 125.

Appendix

FOLLOWING are biographies of the recruits on whom this study is based. Information on parliamentary candidacies was obtained from *Whitaker's Almanac*. The remaining data were collected from *Who's Who*, *Current Biography*, *The Times* (London), *The Book of the Labour Party*, edited by Herbert Tracey (London: Caxton Publishing House Ltd., 1925), 3 vols., as well as the memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies listed in the bibliography.

Titles received after 1918 are indicated in brackets.

ADDISON, Christopher [Viscount Addison of Stallingborough] (1869–1951) was the son of a Lincolnshire farmer. He was educated at Trinity College, Harrogate, and St. Bartholomew's Hospital, afterwards becoming professor of anatomy at University College, Sheffield. He entered the House of Commons in 1910 as the Liberal member for the Hoyton Division of Shoreditch, a constituency which he represented until 1922. From the first he was closely associated with Lloyd George whom he assisted in the formulation of social insurance legislation. During World War I he held the posts of Minister of Munitions (1916–17) and Minister of Reconstruction (1917). In the postwar coalition government he served as Minister of Health (1919–1921) and Minister without Portfolio (1921) until a disagreement concerning the government's housing program led to his resignation. Shortly thereafter he entered the Labour party where he continued to work for the various nationalization schemes advocated in

his book *Practical Socialism* (1926). In 1929 he reentered the House of Commons as a Labour member for Swindon (1929–31; 1934–35). As Minister of Agriculture in the second Labour government (1930–31) he inaugurated the system of import boards which was continued later by the National government. He was raised to the peerage in 1937, and he played an active role in the Labour governments following World War II. As leader of the Labour party in the House of Lords he was responsible for piloting nationalization legislation through the Upper House. He served also as Dominions Secretary (1945–47), Paymaster-General (1948–49), and Lord Privy Seal (1947–51).

ALDEN, [Sir] Percy (1865–1944) was born at Oxford. After attending Balliol College, Oxford, he devoted himself to settlement-house work, serving as warden of Mansfield House in Canning Town. From 1906 to 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for the Tottenham Division of Middlesex. During the war he was associated with the pacifists as a strong opponent of conscription. In the election of 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal, and when he re-entered the House of Commons in 1923 it was as a Labour member for South Tottenham (1923–24). By 1927 he had reverted to his former Liberal allegiance. He was a casualty of World War II.

ANGELL, [Sir] Norman (1874–) was born Ralph Norman Angell Lane, the son of a businessman who had retired to a small estate in Lincolnshire. He was educated at the Lycée de St. Omer in France and later at Geneva. From 1905 to 1914 he served as general manager of the Paris *Daily Mail*. His numerous works on international affairs were published under the name "Normal Angell." Of these the most significant was *The Great Illusion* (1910) which argued for a pacifism based on economic self-interest as well as moral principle. During World War I he was active in the work of the U.D.C. of which he was a founder. In 1920 he entered the Labour party where he worked through his writings and

his membership on the Advisory Committee on International Questions for acceptance of the policy of collective security. From 1929 to 1931 he served as editor of *Foreign Affairs* and from 1929 to 1931 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for North Bradford. Although his ties with the Labour party were less close after 1931, he stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate in 1935. His considerable efforts to gain support for a policy of collective security against fascism in the years immediately preceding World War II were exerted chiefly through the League of Nations Union.

ARNOLD, Sydney [Baron Arnold of Hale] (1878–1945) was the son of a Manchester stockbroker. He was educated at the Manchester Grammar School afterwards entering the brokerage business. From 1912 to 1921 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for the Holmford Division of Yorkshire, West Riding (known after 1918 as Penistone). A pacifist, he was a member of the No-Conscription Fellowship during World War I. He was one of the originators of the plan for payment of the national debt by means of a capital levy. In 1922 he entered the Labour party where he played an important role throughout the 1920's as an unofficial adviser on Labour policy. He served as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in the 1924 Labour government and as Paymaster-General during the second Labour government. He was elevated to the peerage in 1924. In 1938 he resigned from the Labour party charging that Labour's stand on foreign policy was leading to war.

ARNOLD-FORSTER, William (1886–1951) was the son of H. O. Arnold-Forster who served as Secretary of State for War in Balfour's Conservative government. After attending Winchester he studied painting, a pastime which he pursued throughout his life. During World War I he served with the rank of lieutenant commander at the admiralty where he helped to direct the blockade of Germany. In September, 1914, he became a member of the U.D.C., and in December,

1917, he entered the Labour party. Although he never sat in the House of Commons, he was among the most active of the recruits in the area of foreign policy. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations and he was among the first of the converts to advocate the adoption of forcible sanctions by the league. He was a member of the Labour party's Advisory Committee on International Questions, and during both Labour governments of the 1920's he served as secretary to the British delegate at the League of Nations. After 1931 he continued his efforts in behalf of international organization through his work with the League of Nations Union and the United Nations Association. His services as a foreign policy expert were utilized both by the Fabian International Bureau and the Labour party's research staff.

BALDWIN, Oliver [Earl Baldwin of Bewdley] (1899–1958) was the son of Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative party. He was educated at Eton. After serving in World War I he became a colonel in the Armenian army (1920–21) which led to his imprisonment successively by the Bolsheviks and Turks. After a short period as a correspondent in East Africa he returned to England where, in 1923, he became a member of the Social Democratic Federation. In the House of Commons where he sat as a Labour member for Dudley from 1929 to 1931 he was a critic of the Labour government, and in 1930 he followed Oswald Mosley out of the party. By 1931 he had returned to membership in the Labour party, and he represented Paisley in the Labour interest from 1945 until, on his father's death in 1947, he entered the House of Lords. From 1948 to 1950 he served as Governor-General of the Leeward Islands where he once again voiced public criticism of a Labour government's policy.

BENN, William Wedgwood [Viscount Stansgate] (1877–1960), the son of Sir J. Williams Benn, was educated at the University of London. He was a Liberal member of the House of Commons from 1906 to 1927 representing first St.

George's Division, Tower Hamlets (1906-18), and later Leith (1919-27). From 1910 to 1915 he held the post of Junior Lord of the Treasury. During World War I he served in the yeomanry and later in the air force where he had a distinguished record. In 1927 he entered the Labour party, sitting thereafter as a Labour member of the House of Commons (North Aberdeen, 1927-31; Gorton Division of Manchester, 1937-42.) He served successively as Secretary of State for India in the second Labour government, Vice President of the Allied Control Council for Italy (1943-44), and as Secretary of State for Air in the Labour government following World War II (1945-46). He was elevated to the peerage in 1941.

BENNETT, Ernest Nathaniel (1868-1947) the son of an Anglican clergyman, educated at Durham Hall and Hertford College, Oxford, he served variously as a war correspondent and army officer during the Cretan insurrection, the Soudan campaign and the Boer War. From 1906 to 1910 he sat as a Liberal in the House of Commons where he represented the Woodstock Division of Oxfordshire. After losing his seat in the election of 1911 he served with the Ottoman army during the Balkan War of 1912 and as a captain in the British Army during World War I. He became a member of the Labour party in 1916. After several unsuccessful contests as a Labour candidate, he re-entered the House of Commons in 1929 as a member for Central Cardiff, a seat which he held until 1945. He followed MacDonald into the National government, serving as Assistant Postmaster-General from 1932 to 1935.

BUXTON, Charles Roden (1875-1942) was a member of a family which had been prominent in the antislavery movement of the nineteenth century. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. He served as private secretary to his father, the Governor of South Australia, after which he entered the House of Commons in 1910 as a Liberal member for the Ashburton Division of Devon. After losing

this seat he was adopted in 1912 as the Liberal candidate for Central Hackney, an endorsement which he lost in 1915 as a result of his advocacy of a negotiated peace. Despite his lack of enthusiasm for the war, his reputation as an authority on Balkan politics led to his selection in 1914 with his brother Noel Buxton [see below] as an unofficial emissary to Bulgaria with the object of inducing that nation to join the Allies. Throughout the war he was an active member of the U.D.C. He became a member of the I.L.P. in 1917. In 1922 he re-entered the House of Commons as a Labour member representing first Accrington (1922-23) and later the Elland Division of Yorkshire (1929-31). Throughout the 1920's he gave his attention primarily to foreign policy serving as a member of the delegation to the 1924 Assembly of the League of Nations and, with his wife, the former Dorothy Jebb, as a member of Labour's Advisory Committee on International Questions. After his defeat in the election of 1931 he continued as Parliamentary Adviser to the Labour party until 1939 when dissatisfaction with Labour's advocacy of the use of force against fascism led to his resignation from his post.

BUXTON, Dorothy. See Charles Roden Buxton.

BUXTON, Noel [Baron Noel-Buxton of Aylsham] (1869-1948) was the brother of Charles Roden Buxton [see above]. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. From 1905 to 1906 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for the Whitby Division of Yorkshire and from 1910 to 1918 as a Liberal member for North Norfolk. With his brother he was the author of several books on the Balkans, and he accompanied him on the mission to Bulgaria in 1914. His association with the pacifists throughout the war resulted in the loss of his seat in the election of 1918. By 1920 he had joined the Labour party, and in 1922 he won back his seat, this time as a Labourite (1922-30). During the 1920's he served as a member of the Labour party's Advisory Committee on International Questions, and in both

Labour governments of the period he held the post of Minister of Agriculture. He was elevated to the peerage in 1930.

Cocks, Frederick Seymour (1882–1953) was the son of a naval officer. He was educated at Plymouth College and the Mannamoad School. A journalist, he was associated before the war with the nonpartisan effort to gain public support for the views of Norman Angell. During the war he was active in the work of the U.D.C. and was the author of one of the most influential U.D.C. publications, *The Secret Treaties* (1918). Though still a Liberal at the close of the war, he stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate in 1923. He entered the House of Commons in 1929 as a Labour member for the Broxstowe Division of Nottinghamshire, a seat which he held until his death.

CRIPPS, Sir Richard Stafford (1889–1952) was the son of Lord Parmoor who preceded him into the Labour party [see below]. He was educated at Winchester and University College, University of London. His political career began at the age of forty, his earlier years having been devoted to a highly successful practice at the bar as well as to activities in behalf of religious organizations which were working for international understanding. The dearth of legal talent within the Labour party resulted in his appointment in 1930, within a few months of his entrance into the party, as Solicitor-General in the second Labour government. During the 1930's he was in conflict with the party leadership first as the founder of the Socialist League which was working for a more extreme socialist policy in the event of Labour's return to power, and, at the end of the decade, as the leader of the Popular Front movement against fascism which resulted in his expulsion from the party in 1939. During World War II he served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1941–42), Lord Privy Seal, and leader of the House of Commons (1942), and finally as Minister of Aircraft Production (1942–45) in the coalition government. After returning to the Labour party in 1945 he played a significant role in the postwar Labour govern-

ment. In 1945 he was a member of the mission to India which unsuccessfully attempted to work out a formula for Indian independence. He served successively as President of the Board of Trade (1945-47), Minister of Economic Affairs (1947), and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1947-50) in which post he became the personification of the austerity program for which he was to a large extent responsible.

DALTON, Hugh [Baron] (1887-1962) was the son of Canon J. N. Dalton who was domestic chaplain to the royal family. He was educated at Eton, King's College, Cambridge, and the London School of Economics where he later became a lecturer in economics. Although he had regarded himself as a socialist since 1907, he became an active member of the Labour party only after his demobilization in 1919. Before his entrance into the House of Commons in 1924 he was already widely known within the Labour party for his writings in behalf of the capital levy. He served as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the second Labour government. In the coalition government of World War II he was Minister of Economic Warfare (1940-42) and later President of the Board of Trade (1942-45). He was an important figure in the Labour governments following World War II, serving successively as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1945-47), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1948-50) and Minister of Town and County Planning (1950-51). He was made a life peer in 1959.

DE LA WARR, Earl (Herbrand Edward Sackville) (1900-) was educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. He succeeded to the title as the ninth Earl in 1915. After joining the Labour party in 1924 he became Under-Secretary of State for War in the second Labour government. In 1931 he followed MacDonald into the national government in which he held various posts throughout the decade of the 1930's. He became a member of the Conservative party in 1945, and from 1951 to 1955 he served as Postmaster General in the Conservative government.

DICKINSON, Goldsworthy Lowes (1862–1932) was the son of a portrait painter. He was educated at Charterhouse and King's College, Cambridge. As a Cambridge don whose interests were philosophy and history, he exerted a tremendous influence on the prewar student generation. A Conservative in his early years, he was a Liberal by 1914. Throughout the war he assumed a prominent role in the efforts of the Bryce Group and the Society for the League of Nations to draw up a blueprint for a postwar international organization. After joining the Labour party, he served during the 1920's as a member of the party's Advisory Committee on International Questions. His book *The International Anarchy* (1926) was an attempt to disprove the thesis that any single nation bore the responsibility for the outbreak of World War I.

DICKINSON, Willoughby H. [Baron Dickinson of Painswick] (1859–1943) was the son of an M.P. for Stroud. He was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge after which he began the practice of law. From 1906 to 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for St. Pancras, North, while serving also as Chairman of the London Liberal Federation (1896–1918). During the war as a member of the Bryce Group and as President of the Society for the League of Nations he was an active proponent of an international organization after the war. He continued this activity throughout the 1920's through his work for the League of Nations Union and the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship Through the Churches. In 1930 he entered the Labour party, only to leave with MacDonald in 1931. He was elevated to the peerage in 1930.

DUNN, Albert Edward (1864–1937) was born in Exeter. He was educated at Hallam Hall College in Clevedon. A solicitor, he served as Mayor of Exeter from 1900 to 1902 and as a Liberal M.P. for the Camborne Division of Cornwall from 1906 to 1910. Though over age, he served with the army during World War I. He stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate in 1918 and 1923.

EDE, J. Chuter (1882—) the son of a grocer, attended the national schools at Epsom and Christ College, Cambridge, which he was forced to leave for lack of funds. Until 1914 he was a teacher in the Surrey elementary schools. He was active in the National Union of Teachers, and, as a Liberal, in local government in Surrey. His conversion to the Labour party occurred during World War I in which he served as a sergeant. He has been a Labour member of the House of Commons representing first the Mitcham Division of Surrey (1923) and later South Shields (1929–31; 1935—). In both of the Labour governments following World War II he served as Home Secretary.

ELTON, Godfrey [Baron Elton of Headington] (1892—) was born in Gloucestershire. He was educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford. After serving as a lieutenant in World War I he returned to Oxford as a lecturer in history at Queen's College. He entered the Labour party in 1921 and unsuccessfully contested the Thornbury Division of Gloucestershire in 1924 and 1929. In 1931 his support of MacDonald led to his resignation from his prospective Labour candidacy and his expulsion from the party. He was elevated to the peerage in 1934. His published works include a biography of MacDonald. He is presently an independent in politics.

FLETCHER, Reginald Thomas [Baron Winster of Wither-slack] (1885–1961) was the son of a Conservative family. He served in the navy for twenty years, reaching the rank of lieutenant commander during World War I. From 1923 to 1924 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for Basingstoke. In 1929 he entered the Labour party. He sat as a Labour member for the Nuneaton Division of Warwick from 1935 until his elevation to the House of Lords in 1942. During the Labour government following World War II he served first as Minister of Civil Aviation (1945–46) and later as Governor of Cyprus (1946–49).

FYFE, Henry Hamilton (1869–1951) was the son of a barrister. He was educated at Fettes College in Edinburgh. Although a Fabian during the first decade of the century, he devoted himself primarily to journalism until after World War I. He was employed by the *Daily Mirror* (1903–07) and the *Daily Mail* (1907–22) and during the war as a correspondent for the *Times*. After 1919 his growing Labour sympathies led to tensions with his employer, Lord Northcliffe, and he resigned his position to become editor of Labour's *Daily Herald*, a post which he held until 1926. During the general strike he served as editor of the trades-union newspaper, *The British Worker*. He stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate for Parliament in 1929 and 1931.

GARRATT, Geoffrey Theodore (1888–1942) was the son of a clergyman. He was educated at Rugby and Hertford College, Oxford. After a period in the Indian Civil Service (1913–23) he returned to England where he became active in the Labour party. He stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate for Cambridgeshire in 1924, 1929, and 1931, and for the Wrekin Division in 1935. He served as political secretary of the Indian Round Table Conference in 1931. During the 1930's he published several books pointing out the dangers of the appeasement policy. He was a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* first in Ethiopia (1936) and later in Finland (1940). He died while on active service as a captain during World War II.

GORELL, Baron (Ronald Gorall Barnes) (1884–) was educated at Winchester, Harrow, and Balliol College, Oxford. In 1917 he succeeded his brother as the third Baron Gorell. From 1910 to 1915 he held a post on the editorial staff of the *Times* after which he served as an army officer during World War I. In the postwar coalition government he held the position of Under-Secretary of State for Air (1921–22). He entered the Labour party in 1925. His activities after that date were chiefly literary. He was the editor of the *Corn-*

hill Review (1933–39) as well as the author of several works of poetry and fiction.

HALDANE, Viscount of Cloan (Richard Burden Haldane) (1856–1928) was born in Edinburgh and educated at Edinburgh Academy and the universities of Edinburgh and Göttingen. After establishing a practice at the bar he entered the House of Commons in 1885 as a Liberal member for Haddingtonshire, a seat which he held until 1912. When the issue of the Boer War divided the Liberal party he became associated with the Rosebery group of Liberal imperialists. During his tenure as Secretary of State for War (1906–12) he carried out a reorganization of the army which made possible Britain's rapid mobilization in 1914. With his elevation to the peerage in 1911 he became Lord Chancellor. Some of his prewar statements concerning the merits of German culture made him the object of great hostility during World War I, and it was to placate public opinion that he was omitted from the coalition government in 1915. By 1922 he had shifted his allegiance to the Labour party. He served as Lord Chancellor in the first Labour government, the only member with previous cabinet experience.

HAMILTON, Mary Agnes (1883–), the daughter of Robert Adamson, a professor of logic at Glasgow University, was educated at Glasgow Girls High School and Newnham College, Cambridge. Her political sympathies had been Liberal, but in the week preceding the outbreak of World War I she became a member of the I.L.P. She was one of the original members of the U.D.C. From 1929 to 1931 she sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for Blackburn as well as serving as a member of the delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1929 and 1930. She served as a Governor of the B.B.C. from 1933 to 1937 and from 1940 to 1952 she held various posts as a temporary civil servant. Among her published works are biographies of Henderson, MacDonald, the Webbs, and Mary MacArthur, some of which appeared under the pseudonym "Iconoclast."

HASTINGS, Sir Patrick (1880–1952) was the son of a solicitor. He was educated at Charterhouse. After a period as a journalist, he entered upon a highly successful career at the bar where he distinguished himself as an advocate in criminal cases. His intention to stand as a Liberal candidate in the election of 1918 was frustrated by his failure to receive a coupon, and a few months after the election he entered the Labour party. From 1922 until 1926 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for Wallsend. He served as Attorney-General in the 1924 Labour government, and it was criticism of his handling of the Campbell case which led to the government's fall. In 1926 he retired from active political life because of ill health.

HAY, John Primrose (1878–1949) was born in Lanarkshire. He was educated at the universities of London and Glasgow. The period from 1906 to 1915 was spent in Manchuria where he lectured on mathematics at the Christian College. After serving as an officer in World War I he settled in Scotland where he taught for the Renfrewshire Education Authority. He became a member of the I.L.P., and from 1922 to 1923 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for the Cathcart Division of Glasgow. A member of the United Free Church, he was a strong advocate of temperance legislation.

HEMMERDE, Edward George (1871–1948) was the son of a former manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. After attending Winchester and University College, Oxford, he began the practice of law. In the House of Commons where he sat as a Liberal member for East Denbeigh (1906–10) and North West Norfolk (1912–18) he was one of the leaders of the movement for the taxation of land values and a critic of the Liberal government's land policy. He was refused coalition support in the 1918 election, and in 1920 he entered the Labour party. From 1922 to 1924 he sat as a Labour member for Crewe. A court case involving his financial transac-

tions was perhaps responsible for his disappearance from the national political scene after that date.

HOBSON, John Atkinson (1858–1940) was, according to his own account, “born and bred in the middle stratum of the middle class of a middle-sized industrial town in the Midlands.” He was educated at the Derby School and Lincoln College, Oxford. Although both Lenin and Keynes acknowledge their indebtedness to his theory of oversaving and underconsumption, the unorthodoxy of his views on economics prevented his holding a university post and his influence was exerted largely through his numerous books on economic theory. During World War I he was an active member of the U.D.C. and the Bryce Group. He severed his ties with the Liberal party during the war and stood unsuccessfully as an independent in the election of 1918. Shortly thereafter he entered the Labour party where he had a significant impact on the policies advocated by the I.L.P. wing of the party for dealing with the problem of unemployment.

JOHN, Edward Thomas (1857–1931) was born in Wales and he was throughout his life a zealous Welsh Nationalist. The director of a smelting and mining company, he sat in the House of Commons from 1910 to 1918 as a Liberal member for Denbeigh East in Wales. During World War I he voted against conscription and the adoption of the McKenna duties and advocated a negotiated peace. In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully in the same constituency as a Labour candidate. Throughout the 1920's he was active in the work of the Peace Society of which he was the President from 1924 to 1927.

JOWITT, William [Earl Jowitt] (1885–1957) was the son of a Church of England clergyman. He was educated at Marlborough College and New College, Oxford, after which he began a very successful career at the bar. He sat in the House of Commons from 1922 to 1924 as a Liberal member for

the Hartlepoons. In the election of 1929 he was returned as a Liberal member for Preston. When he accepted MacDonald's invitation to become Attorney-General in the second Labour government he resigned his seat and stood successfully in the same constituency as a Labourite. In 1931 he followed MacDonald into the national government in which he continued to serve as Attorney-General until 1932. After re-entering the Labour party in 1936 he represented Ashton-under-Lyme in the House of Commons (1939-45). During World War II he held various posts in the coalition government. After his elevation to the peerage in 1945, he served as Lord Chancellor in the Labour governments from 1945 to 1951.

KENWORTHY, Joseph Montague [Baron Strabolgi] (1886-1953) attended the Royal Naval Academy at Winchester. He entered the navy in 1902 and retired in 1920 with the rank of lieutenant commander. Although a Fabian since 1917, he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for Central Hull from 1919 to 1926. In 1926 he resigned his seat and stood successfully as a Labour candidate in the same constituency. Throughout his career in the House of Commons he was one of the most vocal of the backbenchers. After losing his seat in the election of 1931, he entered the House of Lords on the death of his father in 1934. In the years preceding World War II he was a proponent of a strong stand against fascism.

KING, Joseph (1860-1943) was the son of a Liverpool surgeon. He was educated at Uppingham School and Trinity College, Cambridge, Airedale College, Bradford, and in Germany. Although trained for the Congregational ministry, he became a lawyer, and from 1910 until 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for North Somerset. His association with the U.D.C. during World War I resulted in the loss of his seat in the election of 1918. He entered the Labour party in 1919. He was the author of works on politics and foreign policy; one of his works, *The German Revolution* (1933), was a warning concerning the dangers of Nazism.

LAMBERT, Richard (1868–1939) was the son of the Vicar of Christ Church at Bradford-on-Avon. He was educated at Shrewsbury and Trinity College, Cambridge. From 1910 to 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for North Wilts. His contacts with the U.D.C. during World War I led to his entrance into the Labour party. After 1918 his active participation in political life ceased. From 1922 to 1935 he served as librarian of the Athenaeum.

LANGDON-DAVIES, Bernard Noel (1876–1952) was the son of an electrical engineer. He was educated at St. Paul's School and Pembroke College, Cambridge, where he was President of the Cambridge Union. In 1912 he joined the staff of the Garton Foundation, a group dedicated to gaining public support for the pacifism preached by Norman Angell. With the outbreak of the war in 1914 he resigned from the National Liberal Federation and became a member of the I.L.P. A conscientious objector, he was active in the U.D.C. as well as being the organizer of the National Council for Civil Liberties, a group which worked in cooperation with the No-Conscription Fellowship. After the war he managed several enterprises connected with bookselling and publishing, one of which was the Labour Publishing Company. He resigned from the Labour party in 1940.

LEES-SMITH, Hastings Bertrand (1878–1941) was born in India where his father was serving as an officer in the Indian army. He was educated at Aldenham School and Queen's College, Oxford. The author of works on the Indian economy, he held academic appointments in the field of public administration at the London School of Economics and the University of Bristol. From 1910 until 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for Northampton. Despite his membership in the U.D.C. he volunteered as a private and served at the front during World War I, returning to the House of Commons on one occasion to oppose the adoption of conscription. By the election of 1918 he had severed his ties with the Liberal party and he stood unsuccessfully as an independ-

ent radical in the Don Valley Division of Yorkshire. In 1919 he joined the I.L.P., and in 1922 he re-entered the House of Commons as a Labour member for the Keighley Division of Yorkshire. With the exception of the period from 1931 to 1934 he represented this constituency until the end of his life. During the second Labour government he served first as Postmaster-General (1929–1931) and later as President of the Board of Education (1931).

MALONE, Cecil L'Estrange (? –) is the son of a clergyman. He was educated at the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth after which he entered the navy in 1905. During World War I he was associated with the air forces of both the navy and the army. From 1918 to 1922 he sat in the House of Commons as a coalition Liberal member for East Leyton. In 1928 he returned to the House as a Labour member for Northampton, a seat which he held until 1931.

MARTIN, Joseph (1852–1923) was born in Canada. He was educated in the public schools of Canada and Michigan and at the University of Toronto. While in Canada he was a telegraph operator, a barrister, and a newspaper publisher and owner. He sat in the Canadian Parliament (1893–96) and served as Premier of British Columbia (1900). From 1910 to 1918 he sat in the British House of Commons as a Liberal member for the East St. Pancras Division of London. By 1918 he had entered the Labour party.

MASSINGHAM, H. W. (1860–1924) was the son of a Methodist preacher who was also private secretary to the Gurney family. He was educated at the Norwich Grammar School. After holding various positions as reporter and editor he assumed the editorship in 1907 of the Liberal periodical, the *Nation*, a post which he held until its sale in 1923. A Fabian during his early years, he resigned from the society in 1892 when Shaw and Webb issued a manifesto calling for an independent labour party. During World War I he urged a

negotiated peace with Germany. He became a member of the Labour party in 1923.

MITCHELL, Edward Rosslyn (1879–) was educated at Hillhead High School and the University of Glasgow, after which he began the practice of law. In 1910 he stood unsuccessfully for the House of Commons as a Liberal. During World War I he was a member of the U.D.C. as well as serving as solicitor for the I.L.P. organ, *Forward*. After two unsuccessful contests as a Labour candidate in Central Glasgow (1922; 1923) he defeated Asquith in the Paisley Division in the election of 1924. While a member of the House of Commons he delivered a speech in the prayerbook debate which was regarded as one of the oratorical events of the decade, and it was widely believed that his political future was assured. He did not, however, return to the House of Commons in 1929, and he disappeared thereafter from the political scene.

MONEY, Sir Leo Chiozza (1870–1944) was born in Genoa, the son of Joseph Chiozza. He assumed the surname "Money" in 1903. After being educated privately, he held posts as managing editor of *Commercial Intelligence* (1898–1903) and as a statistician for the Board of Trade (1903). His book, *Riches and Poverty* (1905), was one of the most widely read socialist works of the prewar period. He sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member first for North Paddington (1906–10) and later for East Northants (1910–18). During World War I he served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Shipping (1916–18). With the decision of the government to sell merchant ships to private firms, he resigned his post and entered the Labour party. Through his membership on the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry (1919) and his book *The Triumph of Nationalization* (1920), he became one of the most prominent advocates of the nationalization of industry in the years immediately following the war.

MOREL, Edmund D. (1873–1924) was born in France, the son of a French father and an English mother. He was educated in England at Madras House in Eastbourne, afterwards holding a post with a Liverpool shipping firm whose contacts with Africa stimulated his interest in the welfare of the African natives. Through the Congo Reform Association, which he founded in 1904, as well as his numerous books and articles he worked for the elimination of abuses in the treatment of natives in the Congo Free State. In 1912 he was adopted as the Liberal candidate for Birkenhead, but his opposition to the war led to his resignation of the candidacy in October, 1914. As secretary of the U.D.C. he was one of the most prominent critics of Britain's participation in the war, and in 1917 he was imprisoned for six months for a technical violation of the Defense of the Realm Act. He became a member of the I.L.P. in March, 1918. In the postwar period Morel became the spokesman for the most violent critics of the Treaty of Versailles. From 1922 until his death in 1924 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for Dundee.

MOSLEY, [Sir] Oswald (1896–), the son of Sir Oswald Mosley of Staffordshire, was educated at Winchester and the Royal Military College. His first wife was Cynthia Curzon, the daughter of Lord Curzon. Three years after her death in 1933 he married Diana Mitford, the daughter of Baron Redesdale. During World War I he served as a cavalry officer and as an aviator. From 1918 to 1924 he sat in the House of Commons representing the Harrow Division of Middlesex successively as a Conservative (1918–22), an independent (1922–24), and finally as a Labourite (1924); from 1926 until 1931 he sat as a Labour member for Smethwick. During the second Labour government in which he served as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, he was a member of the Committee on Unemployment. When the Labour government in 1930 refused to adopt his recommendations for dealing with the problem he resigned from the party and, with a few followers, established the New Party after which his importance

as a major political figure declined. During the 1930's he became the leader of British fascism which resulted in his imprisonment during World War II. He is presently the head of the British Union, an organization which seeks to exploit the growing resentment against West Indian immigration into England.

NOEL-BAKER, Philip (1889–) is the son of J. Allen Baker, a Liberal M.P. whose Quaker family had a tradition of pacifism. He was educated at the Bootham School, York, Haverford College in Pennsylvania, and King's College, Cambridge. During World War I he served with a Friends Ambulance Unit in France. He played an active role in the League of Nations during its early years, serving as assistant to Sir Robert Cecil in the League of Nations section of the Versailles Conference, assistant to Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League, and finally, in 1929 and 1930, as a member of the British delegation to the League Assembly. During the second Labour government he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Foreign Minister. After an unsuccessful contest as a Labour candidate in 1924 he entered the House of Commons as a Labour member for Coventry (1929–31). Subsequently he has represented Derby (1936–50) and South Derby (1950–). In the coalition government of World War II he served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of War Transport and in the Labour governments of the postwar period he held posts successively as Minister of State (1945–46), Secretary of State for Air (1946–47), Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1947–50), and Minister of Fuel and Power (1950–51). He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959.

OUTHWAITE, Robert Leonard (1869–1930) was born in Tasmania. He engaged in sheep farming in New Zealand and later served as a correspondent investigating the Chinese labour question for a group of Liberal newspapers. In the House of Commons where he sat as a Liberal member for the

Hanley Division from 1912 to 1918, he was one of the foremost advocates of a land values tax. During World War I he voted against conscription and was associated with the movement for a negotiated peace. He stood unsuccessfully as an independent Liberal in the election of 1918, the Liberal Association in his constituency having repudiated him. By 1919 he had joined the I.L.P. After this date ill health forced his retirement from active political life.

PARMOOR, Baron of Frieth (Charles Alfred Cripps) (1852–1941) was the son of a prominent lawyer. He was educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford. Like his father, he became an authority on ecclesiastical law and a successful advocate at the parliamentary bar. Throughout his life he was active in the affairs of the Church of England. His first wife was Theresa Potter, the sister of Beatrice Webb. It was said of his political career that he received “a seat from the Conservatives, a peerage from the Liberals and office from the Labour Party.” He sat in the House of Commons as a Conservative member (1895–1900; 1901–06; 1910–14) until 1914 when he was elevated to the House of Lords by Asquith who was desirous of strengthening the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. During World War I his pacifist sympathies led him to advocate a negotiated peace and to work for an international organization through the Society for the League of Nations of which he was a founder. In 1921 he entered the Labour party. During both Labour governments of the 1920’s he served as Lord President of the Council. During the first Labour government he headed the British delegation to the Assembly of the League of Nations where he played an important role in formulating the Geneva Protocol.

PETHICK-LAWRENCE, Frederick William [Baron Pethick-Lawrence of Peaslake] (1871–1961) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, later becoming a Fellow of the College. A Liberal during his early life, he was, with his wife Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, a leader of the women’s suffrage movement in the years preceding World War I. Dur-

ing the war he served as Treasurer of the U.D.C. and stood unsuccessfully as a peace-by-negotiation candidate in a bye-election in 1917. By 1922 he had become a member of the Labour party, and from 1923 to 1931 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for West Leicestershire. During the second Labour government he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury as well as serving as a member of the Indian Round Table Conference. From 1935 until his elevation to the peerage in 1945 he represented East Edinburgh in the House of Commons. During the Labour government which followed World War II he served as the last Secretary of State for India (1945-47).

PONSONBY, Arthur [Baron Ponsonby of Shulbrede] (1871-1946) was the son of Sir Henry Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary, and a great-grandson of Lord Grey of Reform Bill fame. He was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. After a period in the diplomatic service and at the Foreign Office (1894-1902) he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for Stirling Burghs (1908-18). A critic in the years before the war of his party's foreign policy, he was one of the founders of the U.D.C. His pacifism led to his repudiation by the Liberals of his constituency, and he stood unsuccessfully as an independent in the election of 1918. Immediately after the election he joined the Labour party, returning to the House of Commons in 1922 as a Labour member for the Brightside Division of Sheffield, a seat which he held until 1930. He served as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 1924 Labour government, and in the second Labour government he held posts successively as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Dominions (1929), Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Transport (1929-31), and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1931). After his elevation to the peerage in 1930 he served as leader of the Labour party in the House of Lords from 1931 to 1935 when his opposition to Labour's support of sanctions led to his resignation from the post.

PRICE, Morgan Philips (1885–), the son of Major Edwin Price a former Liberal M.P., was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. From 1911 to 1914 he was the prospective Liberal candidate for Gloucester. From 1914 to 1918 he was in Russia as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*. After joining the I.L.P. he became Berlin correspondent for Labour's *Daily Herald* (1919–23). He entered the House of Commons as a Labour member for the Whitehaven Division of Cumberland (1929–31). During the second Labour government he served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Board of Education. He has since represented the Forest of Dean Division of Gloucestershire (1935–50) and the West Division of Gloucestershire (1950–59).

RENDALL, Athelstan (1871–1948) was educated at the University of London College School. After a period devoted to journalism he became a solicitor. In 1895 he joined the Fabian Society. In the House of Commons where he sat as the Liberal member for the Thornbury Division of Gloucestershire (1906–22; 1923–24), he interested himself particularly in divorce reform and was responsible for introducing the Deceased Husband's Brother Bill. In 1925 he entered the Labour party.

ROYCE, William Stapleton (1858–1924), the son of a millwright, was educated at Pretty's Preparatory School in Spaulding. After a period in South Africa where he made a fortune as managing director of an engineering firm, he returned to England where he became a large landowner. From 1910 to 1918 he was closely associated with the Conservative party in Spaulding, standing for Parliament unsuccessfully as a Unionist in 1910 and serving as President of the Spaulding Unionist Association until shortly before the election of 1918. From 1918 until his death he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for Holland-with-Boston, the old Spaulding Division.

RUTHERFORD, Vickerman Henzell (1860–1934) was educated at Edinburgh High School and Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, afterwards becoming a physician. From 1906 to 1910 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for the Brentford Division of Middlesex. In 1920 he stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate in Sunderland.

RUSSELL, Bertrand [Earl Russell] (1872–) is the grandson of Lord John Russell, the champion of the first Reform Bill. He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. A philosopher and mathematician of note, he later became a Fellow of the College. A Fabian for a brief period in his early years, he stood for Parliament as an unofficial Liberal candidate in 1907. An active pacifist during World War I, he was a member of the U.D.C. and served, for a time, as Chairman of the No-Conscription Fellowship. His authorship of an article highly critical of the United States led to his imprisonment during the last months of the war. By 1922 he had entered the Labour party, standing unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate in the elections of 1922 and 1923. On his brother's death in 1931 he succeeded to the peerage, delaying his entrance into the House of Lords, however, until 1937. Although a pacifist in the years preceding the outbreak of World War II, he supported the war effort. In recent years he has been one of the most prominent spokesmen of the movement for nuclear disarmament.

SANKEY, John [Viscount Sankey of Moreton] (1866–1948) was born in Moreton. He was educated at Lancing College and Jesus College, Oxford. After a successful legal career in South Wales where he specialized in workmen's compensation cases, he was appointed a Judge of the King's Bench in 1914. As Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Coal Industry in 1919, though still a Conservative, he recommended that the industry be nationalized. Although his judicial position placed him somewhat outside politics, his ties with the Labour party were sufficiently close by 1924 for him to be considered

as a possible Lord Chancellor in the first Labour government, a post which he held in the second Labour government. His decision to remain as Lord Chancellor in MacDonald's National government was affected by his desire to complete his work as Chairman of the Federal Structure Committee of the Indian Round Table Conference, and his appearance at a Labour party meeting to explain the reasons for his action resulted in his being spared the bitterness directed at other Labour members of the National government by their former colleagues. He re-entered the Labour party in 1942. From 1930 until his death he served as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. He was elevated to the peerage in 1929.

SASSOON, Siegfried (1886—) attended Marlborough Grammar School and Clare College, Cambridge. He served as an officer during World War I, winning various decorations for heroism before his growing conviction that the war was being unnecessarily prolonged led him to refuse, for a time, any further military service. He was a member of the 1917 Club. His poetry, which was widely read in the postwar period, emphasized the horrors of war. Hitherto inactive in politics, he supported the Labour party in the election of 1918. He served for a time as literary editor of Labour's *Daily Herald*.

STRACHEY, (Evelyn) John St. Loe (1901—) is the son of the former editor of the Conservative periodical *Spectator*. He was educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was converted to socialism in 1922. On leaving the university he engaged in journalistic and editorial work for such Labour periodicals as the *New Leader*, *The Miner*, and *The Socialist Review*. He entered the House of Commons in 1929 as a Labour member for the Ashton Division of Birmingham. Throughout the 1920's he was a close associate of Sir Oswald Mosley, and in 1930 he followed him out of the Labour party. As Mosley's fascist tendencies became evident Strachey severed his connection with the New Party, and in

the election of 1931 he stood unsuccessfully as an independent. During the 1930's he published *The Coming Struggle for Power* (1932), *The Nature of the Capitalist Crisis* (1938), and *What Are We to Do* (1938), works which revealed strongly Marxist sympathies. With the outbreak of the war he moved away from strict Marxism. In 1943 he was adopted as a Labour candidate for Dundee. He returned to the House of Commons in 1945 as a Labour member first for Dundee (1945-50) and later for West Dundee (1950-). In the Labour governments following World War II he served successively as Under-Secretary of State for Air (1945-46), Minister of Food (1946-50), and Secretary of State for War (1950-51).

STRAUSS, George Russell (1901-) is the son of Arthur Strauss, a one-time Conservative M.P. who himself joined the Labour party shortly before his death. George was educated at Rugby. After unsuccessful contests as a Labour candidate in 1922 and 1924 he entered the House of Commons in 1929 as a member for North Lambeth. He served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport during the second Labour government. After a defeat in the election of 1931 he regained his seat in 1934, holding it until 1950 when he became a Labour member for the Vauxhall Division of Lambeth (1950-). His support of the Popular Front led to his expulsion from the party in 1939. He re-entered the Labour party in 1940. During World War II he served as Minister of Aircraft Production (1942-45) in the coalition government, and in the Labour governments following the war he held the post of Minister of Supply (1947-51).

SWANWICK, Helena Sickert (1864-1939) was born in Germany of a German father and an English mother. She went to England as a child and was educated at Notting Hill High School and Girton College, Cambridge. Her energies in the years before the war were devoted to the women's suffrage movement. During the war she served on the executive of the U.D.C. and was one of the founders of the 1917 Club. By

1918 she was associated with the Labour party. A prominent pacifist, she was a member during the 1920's of Labour's Advisory Committee on International Questions as well as serving on the British delegations to the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 and 1929.

TEMPLE, William (1881–1944) was the son of Frederick Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford, afterwards taking orders in the Church of England. A Fabian, he was active also in the work of the Christian Social Union. He entered the Labour party early in 1918 while Rector of St. James, Piccadilly. He served successively as Bishop of Manchester (1921–29), Archbishop of York (1929–42), and Archbishop of Canterbury (1942–44). Disappointment with the Labour party's achievements and disagreement with its Middle Eastern policy led to his withdrawal from the party after seven years, but he remained sympathetic to Labour throughout his career.

THOMSON, Christopher Birdwood [Baron Thomson of Cardington] (1875–1930), the son of a major-general in the Indian army, was educated at Eton and New College, Oxford. He entered the army in 1894, and resigned his commission as a brigadier-general in 1919. Despite his military duties, he was a member of the executive of the U.D.C. during World War I. He served as a military adviser at the Versailles Conference and it was his disapproval of the treaty which led him to enter the Labour party in 1919. From 1919 to 1923 he was engaged in several unsuccessful contests as a Labour candidate for the House of Commons. After his elevation to the peerage in 1924 he served as Secretary of State for Air in the first and second Labour governments. He was killed in the crash of the airship R-101.

TRESTRAIL, Alfred Ernest (1876–1935) was the son of an army officer. He was educated at Amersham Hall School and Christ College, Cambridge, afterwards becoming a solicitor. In 1910 he stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate for

the House of Commons. While serving as a major in France during World War I he wrote to Henderson offering his services to the Labour party. In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate for Torquay, Devon.

TREVELYAN, [Sir] Charles (1870–1958) was the son of Sir George Trevelyan who was the nephew as well as the biographer of Macaulay. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. From 1899 to 1918 he sat in the House of Commons as a Liberal member for the Elland Division of Yorkshire. His opposition to the war led both to his resignation in 1914 from his post as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education and to his active membership in the U.D.C. Shortly after an unsuccessful contest as an independent in the election of 1918 he became a member of the I.L.P. He re-entered the House of Commons in 1922 as a Labour member for Central Newcastle, a seat which he held until 1931. In both Labour governments of the 1920's he served as President of the Board of Education, resigning this post in 1931 in protest against Snowden's economies. His participation in the Popular Front movement led to his expulsion from the Labour party in 1939. He re-entered the Labour party during World War II.

WEDGWOOD, Josiah [Baron Wedgwood of Barlaston] (1872–1943) was a member of the family long famous for its manufacture of pottery. He was educated at Clifton College and the Royal Naval College. After a period in South Africa where he served first in the Boer War and later as a government administrator, he returned to England where he entered the House of Commons as a Liberal member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, a seat which he held until 1942. Throughout his career he was an enthusiastic proponent of the single tax. Though he served as an army officer during World War I, he was an active defender of the civil rights of the pacifists. After the election of 1918, in which he stood successfully as an independent, he joined the I.L.P. in 1919. After serving as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the

1924 Labour government, he became one of the best known and least orthodox of Labour's backbenchers. He was elevated to the peerage in 1942.

WELLS, Herbert George (1866–1946) was born in Bromley, Kent, the son of a lower-middle class family. He was educated at Midhurst Grammar School and the Royal College of Science after which he began his highly successful career as a novelist. A Fabian from 1903 to 1908, he resigned after he had failed to divert the society from its program of permeation to one of propaganda. From 1908 until the end of World War I he was largely inactive in politics, occasionally supporting either Liberal or Labour candidates for Parliament. He was an active supporter of Britain's participation in World War I. After the war he became a member of the Labour party, standing unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate for the University of London in 1922 and 1923. Disillusionment with the achievements of the first Labour government led to his withdrawal from active political life though he maintained his Labour party membership.

WHITE, James Dundas (1866–1951) was educated at Rugby and Trinity College, Cambridge, after which he became a barrister specializing in marine law. In the House of Commons where he sat as a Liberal member first for Dumbar-tonshire (1906–10) and later for the Tradeston Division of Glasgow (1911–18) he was prominent in the agitation for a tax on land values. After losing his seat in the election of 1918, he became a member of the I.L.P. in 1919. After two unsuccessful contests as a Labour candidate (1922; 1924) he retired from political life. By 1945 he had withdrawn from membership in the Labour party.

WILLIAMS, Thomas Samuel Beauchamp (1877–1927) was the son of the Archdeacon of Merioneth. After being educated at the University of Edinburgh, he served as a lieutenant colonel in the medical service of the Indian army and later in World War I where he suffered injuries which proved

to be permanent. He retired from the army in 1920, and in 1923 he entered the Labour party. From 1923 to 1924 he sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member of the Kennington Division of Lambeth, serving also as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade during the first Labour government.

WILSON, Cecil (1862–1945) was the son of H. J. Wilson, a Liberal M.P. for many years. Though a Congregationalist, he was educated at the Friends School, Kendal, Wesley College, Sheffield, and Victoria University in Manchester. During World War I he was closely associated with the conscientious objectors. Before the end of the war he had joined the I.L.P., and in 1918 he was elected Chairman of the Attercliffe Labour party. From 1919 to 1923 he was the leader of the Labour group on the Sheffield City Council. He sat in the House of Commons as a Labour member for the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield (1922–31; 1935–44).

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